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 This thesis compares the establishment and management of protected areas (PAs) in 
China and Taiwan.  It encourages scholars to analyze PAs in a global, interdisciplinary context, 
where many “natures,” defined under various historical, political, economic, and cultural 
contexts, create a multitude of conservation strategies and PA models over time. The thesis also 
explores the social implications of PA management. Historically, PA creation and management 
has often resulted in the displacement of local peoples, especially indigenous groups, as well as 
in the economic and cultural deterioration of these groups.  
 A transnational analysis of PA management strategies is especially pertinent today, due 
to the exponential growth of PAs worldwide. By 2014, the number of designated PAs covered 
nearly 15.4% of the world’s land area. Whereas much of the PA literature from the United States 
assumes that the global PA system developed around an exported unitary U.S. PA model (based 
on Yellowstone National Park), the thesis argues that global PA management is characterized by 
its diversity. I compare PA models in the United States, Mexico, Switzerland, South Africa, 
China, and Taiwan in order to demonstrate how each PA developed its own unique 
environmental management strategies that reflect particular historical, social, political, and 
economic contexts. The thesis narrows its focus to two case studies in China and Taiwan. 
Considering China and Taiwan is interesting, because despite their shared political and cultural 
history, they also have divergent political, economic, and cultural circumstances that provide 
interesting comparisons between their different PA conservation models.  
 The thesis critically engages with three main frames of analysis. The first framework 
considers the ways that PA management strategies that reflect the environmental ideals of earlier 
historical periods are not erased by new environmental regulations; instead, they layer on top of 
each other. The existence of multiple and conflicting environmental management strategies that 
reflect multiple legitimate environmental interests is known as intercurrence. The thesis 
considers how intercurrence plays a role in present PA management. The second framework 
analyzes the active role of the state in the creation and management of protected areas. It 
considers how PAs are involved in the construction of “national identity,” and how states 
rationalize, classify, and control natural landscapes, including the people who live in them. The 
third framework evaluates the connection between PAs and the displacement, invisibility, and 
exclusion of local indigenous PA residents. The thesis analyzes how PA creation and 
management has impacted indigenous residents who are often physically displaced from their 
homes or forced to abandon their traditional subsistence activities. While national governments 
and international organizations often have legitimate reasons to protect fragile ecosystems by 
excluding local residents, decision-makers must consider that displacement can devastate the 
social, cultural, and economic basis of indigenous groups. The thesis uses the aforementioned 
three frameworks to analyze PA creation and management in two case studies: China’s Wolong 
Nature Reserve and Taiwan’s Taroko National Park.  
I drew upon a variety of interdisciplinary primary and secondary sources as part of my 
methodology. I analyzed PA scholarly literature, scientific PA evaluations, and the conservation 
biology literature in order to understand the existing PA discourse, as well as the scientific 
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rationales for conservation. A large portion of my research involved engaging with 
interdisciplinary social science literature in order to analyze the social justice concerns inherent 
in PA management. I analyzed literature on environmental history, political ecology, 
environmental justice, international development, political science, and anthropology in order to 
understand the historical, cultural, and political contexts of the PAs. I also engaged with 
literatures unique to my area of study: primary documents written in Chinese. I read documents 
by Chinese central government officials and non-profit organizations, Confucian philosophical 
texts, newspaper articles written by Taiwanese indigenous peoples, and Chinese PA legislation.  
In order to understand how my case studies in China and Taiwan generated different PA 
models, the thesis examines the broader environmental, political, social, economic, cultural, and 
historical contexts in each country. China’s PA system developed in the 1980-90s, and draws 
upon Confucian ideologies that value a fluid relationship between humans and the physical 
landscape (Gardner 2015). It also incorporates modernist, preservationist, and international PA 
ideologies into its PA management. Unfortunately, China’s current political, cultural, and social 
context also impedes the effectiveness of its PA enforcement. Indeed, many of China’s PAs can 
be considered “paper parks,” because they do not come close to achieving sustainability in 
practice (Quan 2011). The thesis considers how the monopolizing power and fragmented nature 
of China’s provincial and central government apparatus can result in ineffective PA 
management, including inadequate PA financial distribution, contradictory environmental 
regulations between the provincial and central governments, and state prioritization of economic 
development over environmental goals. China’s PAs also struggle with social justice concerns, 
such as local resident displacement and unpredictable resident land tenure. 
Taiwan’s PA system draws upon similar ideologies as those in China, especially in 
relation to its Confucian and modern ideals. However, Taiwan’s PA system is also shaped by its 
unique history of colonial takeover by the Japanese and Chinese Nationalist governments, who 
forcibly relocated and assimilated local indigenous people in order to create PAs. By the 1980s, 
Taiwan was developing its own environmental and indigenous rights protest culture that pushed 
environmental and social justice issues to the forefront of Taiwan politics. As a result, Taiwan’s 
current PA system represents a combination of environmental ideals, from Confucian 
interconnections between natural/cultural landscapes to indigenous rights discourses attempting 
to reverse the historical erasure of local residents who were displaced from PAs. Taiwan’s PAs 
face enforcement challenges that are representative of its unique history. At most Taiwanese 
PAs, indigenous people have already been displaced from their homelands, and PA managers 
continue to ignore the needs of present indigenous needs. Taiwan’s PAs also share similar 
challenges with China, including inadequate funding and land tenure conflicts. 
The historical, cultural, economic, political, and environmental contexts that created 
China and Taiwan’s PA systems highlight the unique environmental ideals and challenges facing 
each country. The thesis draws on these contexts to compare PA management strategies at 
China’s Wolong Nature Reserve and Taiwan’s Taroko National Park. Wolong Nature Reserve is 
a 200,000 hectare PA in southwest China and is best known as the largest giant panda reserve. It 
also is home to over 4000 indigenous Tibetan residents. The thesis compares two periods of 
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environmental management at Wolong. In the 1970-90s, Wolong’s primary management goal 
was the preservation of wild giant panda populations. One reason that the PA prioritized panda 
protection is because the species is a “national treasure” that symbolizes the Chinese nation in 
international politics. Furthermore, China’s pandas are likely to become extinct unless drastic 
actions are taken to protect their habitat. In response to these concerns, government officials and 
international organizations advocated for strict PA management strategies that involved coerced 
relocation of local residents and bans on local subsistence activities such as firewood gathering 
and grazing in Wolong’s forests. Unfortunately, Wolong Nature Reserve’s forests and panda 
populations declined even after PA designation (Liu 2001), partially due to socioeconomic 
factors and commercial logging in areas surrounding the reserve. Even though Wolong’s 
degradation was caused by a multitude of factors, the PA’s preservationist laws targeted local 
Tibetan indigenous residents. The laws rendered local residents economically vulnerable, 
because they no longer had access to Wolong’s forest resources that once provided them with 
basic goods such as food and timber. Wolong residents’ economic situation mirrors the history of 
indigenous Tibetan treatment and erasure throughout China. Indigenous populations make up 
40% of the country’s poorest individuals, even though they only make up 9% of the population.  
In the 2000s, the Chinese central government adopted three new PA environmental 
policies that incentivized local residents to preserve the environment. Legislation such as the 
Grain to Green Program paid local Wolong residents for every hectare of land that they 
converted from cropland to forest. By 2006, Wolong households had converted 56% of their land 
into forest, and payments accounted for 8% of their household income (Liu et al. 2016B). 
Despite the success of the new legislation, the preservationist laws of the 1970-90s remain in 
place at Wolong, even though their environmental ideologies supported local resident exclusion. 
The persistence of the strict preservationist laws demonstrates how numerous legitimate and 
contradictory understandings of the environment can co-exist at the same PA.  
 Taiwan’s Taroko National Park is a 92,000 hectare park that was established in 1937 by 
the Japanese colonial government. The park mountainous terrain harbors nearly half of the 
island’s mammal species, and 90% of its bird species (Wu et al. 1996). Over 12,000 Taroko 
indigenous people live adjacent to or within the park (Simon 2011). The thesis examines three 
distinctive eras of environmental management at Taroko National Park. The first era (1895-
2008) is characterized by mining and indigenous displacement. Japanese (1895-1945) colonial 
and Chinese martial governments (1945-1986) managed and controlled Taroko’s human 
inhabitants, the indigenous Taroko people, by imposing forced assimilation schemes on them and 
by removing local people from their ancestral lands. While the Japanese established Taroko 
National Park for multiple purposes, such as fostering national pride and preserving natural 
resources, in practice Japanese and Chinese lumber and mining companies exploited Taroko’s 
natural resources until 2008, even after the establishment of the park and the end of martial rule. 
In the second era (1972-2005), Taiwan’s martial Chinese government established strict 
preservationist legislations to protect the newly established Taroko National Park. Like Wolong 
Nature Reserve, Taroko economically burdened local populations by making local subsistence 
practices illegal, and by barring human entry into 70% of the park. The preservationist laws 
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ignored the fact that the Taroko indigenous people had established cultural, religious, and 
subsistence hunting practices that preserved the integrity of environmental systems. The Gaya 
belief system holds much of nature sacred, and enforces stewardship practices such as hunting 
seasons and no-hunting zones. Unfortunately, the park’s preservationist laws outlawed hunting. 
By doing so, they disproportionately impact indigenous people and declared their local cultural 
practice illegitimate. In contrast, Taroko National Park allowed mining companies to continue 
their operations in the park for twenty-two years after its establishment. These mines were 
destructive to the environment, and destroyed entire watersheds in the park.  
The third era of Taroko park management (2000-present) recognizes the rise of Taiwan’s 
indigenous rights movement. During this period, Taroko indigenous people protested for their 
right to hunt on PA premises and to reclaim their ancestral lands that were taken by mining 
companies. While Taiwan national regulations recognized indigenous peoples’ rights to hunt for 
cultural reasons as early as 2005, Taroko people remain unable to hunt, because park managers 
do not respect the new law. Taroko National Park highlights the importance of historical context 
in understanding present PA conflicts. It also demonstrates the possibilities for alternative PA 
management that incorporate indigenous cultural beliefs into PA regulations. 
The thesis concludes by examining which PA management frameworks are most 
effective for achieving conservation and social justice goals, given the complexity and diversity 
of PA management worldwide. It supports a tradeoffs model in which multiple stakeholders 
identify and acknowledge the tradeoffs between their various PA goals, and attempts to reconcile 
the ones that conflict with one another. The approach responds to concerns with win-win PA 
management strategies that attempted to satisfy all environmental and social justice goals, and 
yet failed to produce meaningful results. In contrast, the tradeoffs model requires stakeholders to 
prioritize between their different environmental and social justice interests and values.  
The thesis concludes with four recommendations for PA management. First, PAs should 
devise environmental strategies that are suited to the particular political, economic, cultural, 
historical, environmental, and religious contexts of the PA. For example, Taroko National Park 
should consider creating a co-management committee that allows local indigenous groups to 
participate in PA decision-making. A similar PA strategy at Wolong is impossible, because of 
Chinese political realities. Second, PAs should respond to socio-economic activities and 
landscape changes outside the physical boundaries of the PA, such as commercial logging 
outside Wolong Nature Reserve that may be damaging panda habitat. Third, PA should include 
local indigenous people in all phases of PA environmental decision-making. Four, PAs should 
establish concrete, participatory regulatory enforcement mechanisms.  
While recognizing the many “natures” present at PAs across the globe is essential for 
reinterpreting PA literature within an interdisciplinary context, it is also important for creating 
practical PA management strategies that produce tangible environmental and social justice 
results. By acknowledging PA diversity and by actively incorporating local indigenous people 
into PA decision-making processes, stakeholders have the opportunity to construct PAs that 
address the issues most precious to involved stakeholders, from creating economic alternatives 
for local residents and preserving fragile ecosystems to fostering national identities.    
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This thesis compares the establishment and management of protected areas (PAs) in 
China and Taiwan and the ways these nations continuously redefine “nature.” In doing so, it 
addresses two questions that are central to the literature on protected areas, political ecology, and 
environmental conservation. First, how do different interest groups (national governments, 
provincial governments, internationally-based non-governmental organizations, local residents) 
define “nature,” and how do these definitions result in a diversity of PA models, with different 
management structures and environmental goals? How does the PA itself reshape various 
groups’ understandings of “nature?” Second, what are the social consequences associated with 
protected area management, particularly with regard to the inclusion/exclusion of local park 
residents? Historically, protected area creation and management has often resulted in 
displacement of local peoples (especially indigenous groups) and ecological degradation of 
surrounding areas. Until the 1970s, however, protected area literature did not acknowledge the 
consequences of parks for local and indigenous rights. More recent protected area models 
attempt to engage local communities in participatory environmental management schemes that 
seek to achieve both environmental sustainability and social equity.  
The goal of this thesis is twofold. First, it encourages scholars to analyze protected areas 
in a global, interdisciplinary context, where many “natures,” defined under various historical, 
political, economic, and cultural contexts, create a multitude of conservation strategies and PA 
models. Another goal of this thesis is to inform policies for protected areas, especially those that 
include indigenous populations in conservation schemes. I will examine the efficacy of existing 
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management schemes in China and Taiwan, and present recommendations that are intended to 
address human rights as well as environmental concerns.   
 Although scholars have examined these questions in other national contexts, such as the 
United States, Africa, Latin America, and Europe (Cronon 1995; Jacoby 2001; Sundnes 2013), 
no one has undertaken a comparative study of China and Taiwan. Considering China and Taiwan 
is especially interesting, because of their complex historical relationship, and the influence of a 
single political party (the Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-Shek) on both countries. Despite 
these similarities, the countries also present important differences. The development of PAs 
under China’s communist government and Japan’s colonial government in Taiwan raises 
questions about the meaning of “nature” and “nation” under such regimes, especially in contrast 
to other countries like Mexico, where protected areas were associated with democracy (Wakild 
2009). Additionally, China and Taiwan’s divergent political, economic, and cultural 
circumstances (since the mid-1940s) provide interesting comparisons between their different PA 
conservation models.   
A transnational analysis of protected area management strategies is especially pertinent 
today, due to the exponential growth of protected areas worldwide. Between 1990 and 2014 
alone, the number of designated PAs grew by nearly 240% to cover nearly 15.4% of the world’s 
land area (UNEP 2015). While this large increase is an essential victory for nature preservation, 
it is also important to consider the efficacy of these protected areas. What are the goals of these 
newly created parks? Are they preserving biodiversity? Are they addressing the needs of the 
millions of people worldwide who rely upon these areas for sustenance (Xu et al. 2006)? In this 
context, understanding global diversity of protected area models is essential for creating practical 
environmental management strategies that address the social and environmental goals of specific 
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parks. This is especially important in understudied areas such as China and Taiwan, which have 
unique protected area models and a growing number of PAs.  
 
Protected Area Literature – U.S. Export Model, Pristine Nature, and Wilderness 
Protected areas are spaces that are set-aside specifically for the purposes of environmental 
and/or cultural preservation, usually by a government entity (IUCN 2008). Major types of 
protected areas include national parks, wilderness areas, nature reserves, community 
conservation areas, and privately owned areas.  
Originally, environmental scholars in the United States described the growing global PA 
movement as the result of an exported, unitary U.S. protected area model, based on the 
experience of Yellowstone National Park, the world’s first national park (1872). In the 1970s and 
80s, scholars such as Roderick Nash, Runte, and Worster celebrated this U.S. export model as an 
international success, because of its incorporation of “unique” American values, especially 
democratic ideals (Nash 1970; Runte 1997; Worster 2007). Specifically, they identified 
America’s “love of wilderness” as essential to both American identity and the development of 
the U.S. protected areas system.  During the late 19th and early 20th century, various 
preservationists defined wilderness as undeveloped lands that preserved the health and integrity 
of America’s urban populations by cleansing Americans from the negative impacts of over-
industrialization (Muir 1901). Romantic writers described wilderness as the polar opposite of 
busy, polluting cities; natural landscapes were considered tranquil, clean spaces that could 
rejuvenate American city dwellers who were negatively impacted by the city (Ibid). In this 
context, Nash argued that the seeming “vanishing” of these romanticized natural places was an 
essential catalyst for calls for environmental preservation (Nash 1970).  
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The U.S. export model assumes that the American protected areas system is a 
“coherent…definitive model [exported] for nature protection globally” (Turner 2014). However, 
as argued by environmental historian Turner, the concept of a singular, coherent U.S. model is 
misleading in itself; U.S. nature preservation is also associated with other environmental 
management strategies (Ibid). For example, according to the document establishing Yellowstone 
National Park in 1872, the park was intended to be a “public park or pleasuring-ground for the 
benefit and enjoyment of the people” (United States Congress 1872). While the park forbade 
destructive environmental activities such as natural resource extraction (e.g. mining and 
logging), it also supported management schemes that had the potential to harm the environment. 
For example, tourism is a significant economic activity for all U.S. national parks: in 2014 alone, 
over 292.8 million people visited them (Hetter 2015). Unfortunately, tourist activities have 
significant implications for environmental degradation. Even the construction of roads essential 
for tourism can have detrimental impacts on wildlife by dividing once continuous habitats with 
unwooded areas. Hotels, campgrounds, and railways also disrupt natural habitats (Turner 2014).  
In response to increased concerns regarding the high environmental costs of national park 
development (e.g. roads, tourist lodges, and transportation), national park resource extraction, 
and the preservation of ecological biodiversity, Congress passed the 1964 Wilderness Act. The 
program designates “wilderness areas” on existing public lands. Wilderness areas have more 
restrictive development policies than national parks; roads, motorized vehicles, natural resources 
exploitation, and many forms of tourist development, including visitor centers and campgrounds, 
are forbidden (Turner 2015). In just 50 years, the wilderness system has protected nearly 107.5 
million acres, or a land mass greater than the state of Montana (Ibid). The U.S. wilderness 
system demonstrates that even within the same nation, multiple park models exist, overlap, and 
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contradict one another. They also represent the goals of a diverse set of stakeholders, across 
various local, regional, and global contexts. This degree of complexity is present in the protected 
area systems of all nations. 
 
Protected Area Models – Global Diversity 
This thesis does not adopt the U.S. protected areas model as its frame of analysis. Nor 
will it presume that PAs are equated with untouched pristine wilderness.  Instead, I will adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach that recognizes the diversity of protected area management strategies 
worldwide. These models are situated within particular historical, social, political, and economic 
contexts.  
Instead of adopting a monolithic U.S. park model, this thesis highlights the international 
spectrum of protected areas across the globe. This diversity of PA systems support goals that 
range from resource sustainability and community development to scientific research and 
community management. I argue that different understandings of “nature” arises due to diverse 
environmental, historical, political, cultural, and economic contexts. The diversity in PA 
management models is the result of each nation’s specific understandings and valuations of 
“nature.” To demonstrate the diversity of global park models, the following are examples of 
various PA models. These examples are simplifications of protected area management strategies 
in each respective country; as the U.S. protected area models demonstrate, no country adopts a 
singular model, but rather multiple. I have chosen these examples to exhibit the range in 
diversity among protected area models, including diversity in context, stakeholder engagement, 
and historical change.  
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Historical, social, and political context can be essential in the formation of diverse 
protected area models. In a recent paper about Mexico’s national parks in the 1930s and 40s, 
Emily Wakild (2009) argues that differences between Mexico and United States’ valuations of 
nature resulted in the failure of the two states to adopt a joint national park that would cross the 
borders of both countries. Originally, the United States proposed the park as a means by which to 
promote peace and friendship with Mexico, via the shared goal of nature conservation. This was 
an especially important diplomatic mission, given their contentious militarized border. 
However, while both countries supported “nature conservation,” they had very different 
understandings and goals regarding preservation. While the U.S. proposed a joint park proposal 
that preserved remote areas with grandiose and beautiful landscapes, Mexican park managers 
were more interested in providing environmental resources to historically dispossessed people 
(Wakild 2009). This is most likely because Mexico’s national park system was originally 
developed in a period of social reform and upheaval: the Mexican Revolution (1910-1940). This 
period was subject to unique economic, social, and political reform. In particular, President 
Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) articulated a vision of national parks as inclusive spaces where the 
needs of rural farmers, scientists, and urban workers were all considered (Ibid). In this light, 
natural spaces were painted as “national heroes” that represented national pride, recovery from 
civil unrest, and respect for the experience of rural people. In practice, Cardenas’ administration 
purposefully located parks in areas with significant local populations, and frequently attempted 
to revitalize natural spaces that had already been degraded by human activity. In consequence, 
park managers did not understand U.S. attempts to establish remote “national” parks; a truly 
“national” park, in their eyes, was one that provided resources to needy groups. Mexico’s park 
system challenged elite environmental institutions, and provided natural resources to and support 
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for traditionally dispossessed groups, including peasants and urban workers (Wakild 2009; 
Turner 2014). Nature conservation strategies were tailored to the interests of the political 
reformist government and local actors; Mexican national park models cannot be understood 
outside of this context.  
  Under completely different social, political, economic, and environmental circumstances, 
however, different ideologies about nature and conservation management strategies developed. 
For example, Patrick Kupper describes Switzerland’s PAs in the early 1900s as places that 
excluded all human visitors from natural spaces, including tourists and industries (Kupper 2009; 
Turner 2014). The goal of this Swiss PA model was to achieve complete preservation 
(Totalschutz) of the natural area “undisturbed by human interference”; only a select group of 
scientists could enter these parks for research purposes. Kupper argues that the goal of these 
parks was very much tied to understandings of Swiss national identity. Switzerland is a place 
with a diversity of languages and religious beliefs; as such, the creation of a common national 
identity is difficult, and primarily achieved through a discourse that celebrates Switzerland’s 
nature and topography. By the early 1900s, the very nature essential to Swiss identity was 
threatened by the encroachment of human activities, including the growing tourist industry. In 
response, the Swiss Academy of Sciences established the Committee for the Conservation of 
Nature Monuments and Prehistorical Sites (Ibid). The committee was primarily led by Swiss 
scientists, who pointedly rejected American protected area models that incorporated tourism, 
because they viewed such models as scientifically inadequate for nature preservation. Instead, 
the scientists argued that complete isolation and exclusivity of large swaths of land was essential 
for biodiversity and ecosystem maintenance. Switzerland’s Totalschutz demonstrates the 
influence of stakeholder groups such as expert scientists and government officials in shaping 
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protected area models for establishing ecological preservation and for fostering Swiss national 
identity.  
Protected area models are certainly specific to a particular context; however, they are also 
specific to particular historical periods. For example, in the space of ten years, the Chinese 
communist government in the 1950s adopted two very different protected area models.   
For the Chinese communist government in the early 1950s, PAs were a means of 
evaluating and utilizing natural resources on state-owned land in industrial production processes 
(Songster 2004; Weller 2006). Each of the aforementioned park models is based on the particular 
political, cultural, social, historical, environmental, and economic contexts of the country in 
question at a specific moment in time. For example, China’s PA system was initially based on 
the country’s desire to industrialize rapidly; a decade later, however, its protected area system 
shifted focus to the preservation of wildlife populations for human consumption (Ibid). This 
change was in response to the major historical and environmental events impacting China at that 
time: in this case, a major famine that killed millions of people (see chapter 2 for further 
discussion). The PAs provided a food “safety” net in case similar famines occurred in the future 
(Ibid). Therefore, different historical, political, and cultural, and economic forces change through 
time, resulting in changing protected area models in different time periods.  
Protected area creation and management depends on understandings of nature that are 
constructed under many contexts: environmental, social, political, cultural, and economic. At the 
same time, PA models are influenced by the needs and desires of various stakeholders, from 
government bodies and expert scientists to local residents. Finally, the forces responsible for 
constructed ideologies of “nature” shift through time, and result in a variety of protected area 
models. In many cases, these various historical park models overlay upon each other, and create 
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a diverse mix of protected area models informed by multiple historical events. These conditions 
result in multiple PA management models within the same nation, and an even greater diversity 
globally.  
 
Major Thesis Frameworks  
The multi-model framework of this thesis allows me to critically engage with three major 
themes in the literature on protected areas. First, I will consider the ways in which PA policies do 
not always erase or supplant the past environmental regulations adopted for a PA. Instead, the 
policies “layer” on top of one another to create multiple co-existing PA management strategies 
that possess conflicting environmental values and interests. Despite the fact that the layers often 
conflict, they usually represent legitimate environmental priorities of the time period in which 
they were created. The “crashing and grinding” of PA policies is known as intercurrence (Klyza 
& Sousa 2008). This thesis considers how intercurrence affects the success of present PA 
management, which has conflicting environmental goals compared to enduring historical PA 
policies. Second, I wish to fill the gap in environmental studies research regarding the role of the 
state in managing protected areas. While other disciplines such as political anthropology and 
political ecology consider the role of nature conservation in preserving ideologies of national 
identity and “statehood,” the dominant U.S. protected area literature does not explore this 
relationship in enough detail. Specifically, the thesis will consider the ways in which government 
rationality, categorization, and control shape both human and natural landscapes. Third, I will 
considering the social justice implications of nature conservation. A major part of this discussion 
will consider the forced displacement of local people and indigenous groups as a result of nature 
preservation schemes. It will also consider the ways in which PA management systems exclude 
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local people in decision-making processes, and can make invisible their needs and environmental 
values.  
 
Layers of Conflicting Environmental Decision-making - Intercurrence 
 The types of environmental management strategies adopted by a PA vary not only by 
local context but also by historical period. As previously shown, China initially developed its PA 
system in the 1950s as a means to increase its industrial output, but a decade later, their PA 
system focused on wildlife preservation. This framing of PA management makes it seem as if 
different historical periods produce distinctive PA environmental management strategies that do 
not overlap with those of other time periods. In their book American Environmental Policy, 
1990-2006, Christopher McGrory Klyza and David Sousa (2008) argue that present U.S. 
environmental regulation includes environmental policies from earlier historical periods that 
persist into the present. Instead of replacing older laws, new environmental legislation is often 
layered on top of existing ones. As such, PA environmental management represents multiple and 
often contradictory understandings of “nature” that co-exist at the same time. Klyza and Sousa 
describe the conflict between orders of environmental management as “intercurrence.” 
Intercurrence is a useful framework for understanding PA management because it highlights that 
PAs consist of multiple legitimate and conflicting environmental priorities and regulations that 
play a role in present PA management.  
 For example, the intercurrence of PA management strategies in Taiwan caused conflict 
between stakeholders with disparate interests. Taiwan’s central government established a series 
of environmental regulations in the 1970-80s in order to combat the country’s severe pollution 
issues and to preserve natural landscapes that were overexploited by extractive logging and 
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mining companies. One of these laws, the 1972 National Park Law, banned hunting in Taiwan’s 
PAs (CPA 2003; Simon 2007). However, by the 2000s, Taiwan’s indigenous rights movement 
had been growing into a strong political force. Legislators responded to indigenous protests by 
passing the 2005 Basic Law on Indigenous People. The regulation gave indigenous people the 
right to hunt for cultural and religious purposes. Taiwan enacted the 2005 Basic Law over fifteen 
years ago; however, the 1972 National Park Law remains unchanged, despite the fact that they 
directly conflict with one another. The 2005 Basic Law remains unenforced on national park 
lands, and park managers continue to fine and imprison indigenous people who “poach” wildlife 
on national park land (Simon 2010; Simon 2013). Park managers argue that the 1972 National 
Park Law remains in effect, and that no one is allowed to hunt on park premises (Simon 2013). 
Indigenous people argue that they have the right to hunt wherever they please, as long as they are 
hunting for religious purposes (Simon 2007; Meng-ching et al. 2015).  
Taiwan’s conflicting and PA legislations represent the different priorities of the 1970s 
and the 2000s, and the ways in which environmental legislative layers persist and accumulate 
through time. Such intercurrence also causes conflict in Taiwan’s present PA management 
strategies. Both park managers and indigenous people have valid legal claims that justify their 
conflicting environmental ideologies – one that supports indigenous hunting on PA lands, and 
one that does not. Indeed, Klyza and Sousa (2008) argue that a key aspect of intercurrence is its 
ability to give ‘the weight of law… [to] conflicting claims of contending interests” (Ibid). That 
is, intercurrence provides stakeholders with the opportunity to legitimize their disparate 
environmental values and needs. This thesis considers how intercurrence shapes PA management 
strategies as stakeholders enforce and mobilize different PA regulatory layers in order to serve 
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their own environmental needs and values, whether for the advancement of indigenous rights or 
for the protection of wildlife populations from poachers.  
 
Categorizing and Governing Nature and People – State 
 The second framework I will use in this thesis analyzes the active role of the state in the 
creation and management of protected areas. PAs are often essential for the construction and 
maintenance of “national identity”; as such, state management strategies represent the ways in 
which governments attempt to create particular images of their nation. In this context, I will 
examine the ways in which the state rationalizes, classifies, and controls natural landscapes, 
including the people who live within them. During this process, “nature” itself is reshaped into a 
form that is more easily administrated by state officials. 
In many cases, PAs are imperative for the construction of collective national identity. For 
example, political ecologist Roderick P. Neumann argues that the “enclosure” of Yosemite and 
Yellowstone national parks in the late 19th century occurred precisely at a moment where the 
concept of U.S. national identity was under threat. With an influx of new immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and the recent conclusion of the Civil War, the creation of protected areas by the 
federal government “helped answer the questions, what was ‘America’ and who was 
‘American’” (Neumann 2005). Similarly, the creation of protected areas in South Africa in the 
early 1900s helped delineate a collective white space that racialized and excluded Africans from 
natural landscapes (McDonald 2002; Neumann 2005). The diversity apparent in protected area 
models worldwide also applies to the various “national identities” that each model supports. 
From upholding peasant rights in reformist Mexico (Wakild 2009), to supporting industrial 
development by the Chinese communist government (Songster 2004; Weller 2006), protected 
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areas promote a diversity of “nationhoods” that vary across political, social, and economic 
regimes.  
The means by which states manage PAs often require a process of simplifying and 
rationalizing natural processes. For example, in his well-known book Seeing Like a State, James 
Scott (1998) describes the ways in which states simplify and categorize complex, chaotic social 
and environmental systems in order to more easily control and manipulate them. Scott describes 
these trends in relation to the emergence of scientific forestry in 18th century Europe. Without 
precise measurement of available wood in these forests, governments could not maximize wood 
exploitation. With the adoption of scientific techniques, however, European government 
bureaucracies were able to classify, control, and to a certain extent “control” “nature” (Adam and 
Hutton 2007). German forestry adopted various mathematic measures by which to estimate the 
volume of exploitable wood available in a “standard tree.” Other foresters developed detailed 
tables that estimated tree growth patterns, given certain tree sizes and ages. Scott argues that 
these forms of measurement allowed the state to reimagine the forest as merely a collection of 
economically exploitable “abstract” trees (Scott 1998). These trees were only imagined as 
volumes of lumber; the complexity associated with real forest ecosystems was lost.  
State management approaches not only re-imagined natural spaces, but also reshaped the 
forest itself by utilizing new forms of state scientific management. In an effort to make the 
forests more easily manipulated for maximum resource exploitation, foresters transformed 
chaotic old-growth forests into homogenized monocultures with same-age, same-species tree 
stands (Scott 1998). For example, foresters regrew logged trees into uniform straight lines, so 
that they could be easily “read” using simplistic maps. They also cleared away underbrush and 
fallen trees and branches, so that the valued “crop,” the tree, could be harvested more easily. 
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From this perspective, a well-managed forest was “regular” and “neat” (Ibid). In consequence, 
centralized state management strategies served to reshape the natural landscape itself by creating 
a uniform, “legible” natural terrain that was easily supervised and controlled by state bodies.1  
State classification and reorganization of the natural landscape was also essential for state 
control of PAs. In his book Making Political Ecology, Roderick P. Neumann (2005) argues that 
the very creation of protected areas is a political act, because it requires a transfer of local 
common space to state ownership. This redefining of common space is an example of a wider 
phenomenon of state control. For example, the legitimacy of state power is often predicated upon 
its ability to claim and govern certain lands (i.e. the nation’s political boundaries) as its own 
(Neumann 2005). In this sense, national government creation of PAs results in the classification 
and reorganization of the physical landscape so that it can be more easily understood, managed, 
and controlled. This was especially the case in the early 20th century in the U.S., when the federal 
government claimed large swaths of public land in the western United States for conservation 
and preservation purposes (Klyza and Sousa 2008).   
State management and control of territorial space not only redefines and reorganizes 
natural spaces, but also the communities of people who live there. For example, the removal of 
Native Americans from U.S. protected areas helped facilitate the creation of the reservation 
system, which served to regulate and control indigenous groups. Much like the 18th century 
German state, which counted, categorized, and “controlled” the simplified forests that it helped 
                                                          
1 While forestry management did attempt to completely reshape forests, it is important to note that these attempts 
were never entirely successful, and that physical landscapes are not solely the result of human processes. See 
political ecologists Neumann 2005 and Robbins 2011 for more details.   
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create, similar processes of classification and governance were often applied to both the natural 
landscape and the human populations2 in colonial settings (Adam and Hutton 2007).  
In Taiwan, for example, this process was extreme – during Japanese occupation (1895-
1945), indigenous groups such as the Taroko were violently suppressed and removed from their 
original lands, which became the property of the state (Simon 2007). Some of this newly 
designated state land was transformed into protected areas. The government relocated remote 
indigenous groups from the mountains to the more readily accessible plains. There, Japanese 
officials introduced a tribal governing structure to the previously egalitarian Taroko (Simon 
2006; Simon 2011). Much like European forestry in the 1800s (Scott 1998), which facilitated 
easy management of complex forest ecosystems, the tribal system (including hierarchical 
relationships with a ruling tribal council) allowed the Japanese to more easily manage Taroko 
populations. To this day, the tribal organizational structure remains entrenched, and contributes 
to class inequalities and misrepresentation in Taroko society (Simon 2006; Chi and Chin 2012). 
At the same time, the mountain landscapes from which the Taroko were displaced became 
sources of raw materials for the Japanese state during wartime. The state went as far as to widen 
the areas’ rocky mountain passes, so as to more easily access the natural riches of the region, as 
well as more easily “pacify” the Taroko resistance (Ibid). To this day, the Taroko’s original lands 
remain in the control of the state, which manages it for environmental purposes. As such, the 
creation of protected areas has be used by state governments as a means of “managing” and 
controlling both land use, land access, and indigenous populations. 
                                                          
2 The simplification, classification, and control of local peoples, especially by state governments, is known as 
“governmentality.” The term was coined and developed by Michel Foucault (Foucault 2010). For more information 
regarding governmentality in China, see Jeffreys (2009). 
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 While “state” actions to construct and manage the environment are essential to 
understanding the creation and management of protected areas, it is important to recognize that 
the “state” itself is not a unitary category that acts as a cohesive whole. In fact, the “state” often 
consists of several different levels of local, regional, and national governance, each of whom 
pursues different agendas that often contradict one another. This is especially true in countries 
like China, whose sheer geographical size and scope of political operations provide local and 
regional lawmakers with considerable power to manage local protected areas in ways that 
diverge from national environmental requirements. Consideration of both “state” rationalization 
and regulation at the national level and local/regional variation in environmental governance is 
essential for understanding the complexity involved in the management of natural spaces. 
 
Displacement, Invisibility, and Exclusion – Social Implications of Protected Areas 
The third lens with which I will analyze protected area management and establishment 
highlights the social implications of nature preservation. This thesis explores the voices of local 
indigenous groups who depend upon natural resources either within or adjacent to the boundaries 
of protected areas. In particular, I will explore how PA creation and management can displace 
local residents from both their land and the natural resources that they depend on for survival. I 
will also consider the ways in which popular PA discourses can render the needs of indigenous 
PA residents invisible. I conclude by discussing scholarly and indigenous discourses that view 
PA creation as a form of colonialism. I complicate these perspectives by considering the 
ecological reasons for creating PAs from the perspective of government officials, international 
agencies, and scientists.    
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The following social critiques were first developed in the context of the environmental 
justice movement that began in the 1980s. Environmental justice recognizes that environmental 
and health impacts are disproportionately borne by communities of color, and seeks the equal 
treatment of all peoples, regardless of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and national origin 
(Bullard 1994). The emergence of the environmental justice and indigenous rights movement 
during this period also marked the first time that scholars began to consider the social 
implications of PA creation and management. 
By the late 1980s and 1990s, several prominent authors were already challenging pre-
existing protected area models for their exclusion of social issues. The creation of PAs is 
frequently associated with the displacement of local indigenous populations (Cronon 1995; 
Jacoby 2001). The scale at which displacement occurs is significant: in Africa alone, an 
estimated 14 million local residents have been displaced for the purposes of nature conservation 
(Dowie 2005). Unfortunately, many disenfranchised groups represent indigenous or 
economically disadvantaged communities. For example, South Africa’s conservation movement 
was first advanced by a white, upper class elite whose focus was wildlife and flora protection 
and preservation (McDonald 2002). The first conservation programs in South Africa (colonial-
1947) were reserved only for whites; in fact, game protection associations before the 1910s 
excluded Africans from subsistence hunting in an attempt to protect sport hunting by wealthier, 
white groups (Ibid). Within the United States, the federal government forcibly relocated Native 
American populations from the premises of seemingly “wild” places, including Yosemite and 
Yellowstone National Parks. Native American displacement is part of a larger trend across the 
United States that occurred in both “wild” and “artificial” landscapes, where Native Americans 
were forced to live on reservations, where they were more easily managed and controlled. 
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Meanwhile, their ancestral lands were re-shaped into protected areas, frontier settlement, and 
even urban centers such as New York and Chicago. As such, protected areas are a part of a wider 
trend, in which state governments forcibly displaced indigenous peoples from their historic lands 
both for the purposes of managing these groups and for land acquisition of all kinds, of which 
nature preservation was just one type.   
Physical displacement is often associated with invisibility of the displaced communities. 
In Slow Violence and The Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon (2011) describes this 
phenomenon as “spatial amnesia,” where certain communities are not only physically unsettled 
but also “imaginatively removed… from the idea of both a national future and a national 
memory” (Nixon 2011). Even today, popular depictions3 of protected areas often employ a 
discourse of untouched wilderness4 that ignores the forced removal of Native Americans from 
their lands, and the cultural erasure necessary to construct this perception of the park as a space 
beyond the realm of humans. These “unimagined communities” are usually neither recognized 
nor adequately compensated for the damages they faced.  
Forced displacement is not limited to the physical removal of local and indigenous 
people. While physical relocation for the sake of “nature conservation” is certainly a widespread 
and significant issue, local communities who remain in the same location can be subject to what 
Nixon describes as “displacement without movement” (Nixon 2011). Displacement without 
movement occurs when the land and resources of a physical landscape are exploited to such an 
                                                          
3 This is primarily true of media representations of protected areas. In the past few decades, the U.S. Park Service 
and environmental scholars have increasingly recognized the displacement of Native Americans in the creation of 
national parks such as Yellowstone.  
4 Spatial amnesia regarding the displacement of Native Americans is not limited to a discourse of “untouched 
wilderness”; urban areas such as Chicago and New York adopt discourses of “progress” and “cosmopolitanism” that 
ignore the forced displacement and resource exploitation necessary to create these urban centers.  
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extent that it is “stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable” (Ibid: 19). Other 
forms of involuntary displacement include involuntary restriction of local access to land and 
natural resources, especially in relation to traditional sustenance activities (Adams and Hutton 
2007). Given that in China alone, nearly 30 million people depend upon natural resources found 
within protected areas (Xu and Melick 2007), the number of people who are involuntarily 
displaced without movement is highly significant.5 This thesis uses displacement and invisibility 
as frameworks for understanding the social justice concerns tied to PA creation and management.   
One of the harshest critiques of PA models that displace local residents are advanced by 
scholars who identify the creation of nature reserves within postcolonial thought. In his famous 
1989 critique, Ramachandra Guha argued that the needs of humans and biodiversity are not 
necessarily opposed (Guha 1989). In fact, in many countries in the Global South, humans have a 
“finely balanced relationship with nature” that has existed for thousands of years. By valuing 
ecological needs over human needs, Guha argues that at the extreme, environmental preservation 
results in the physical displacement of poor communities who depend upon natural resources for 
subsistence. Guha notes that for nations in the Global South such as India, conservation projects 
advanced by the Indian feudal elite and international environmental organizations created 
exclusionary nature reserves that banned local subsistence practices, and merely served to 
transfer resources from poor local inhabitants of the new nature reserves to the rich (Ibid). Guha 
condemns this focus on preserving biological systems (while ignoring social concerns) as 
“imperialist.” Other authors have also labeled the creation of protected areas as a form of state 
                                                          
5 Nixon describes the negative impacts of forced displacement as “slow violence” (Nixon 2011). Slow violence 
describes gradual, incremental, and “delayed” violence that often remains invisible in national discourse, partly 
because it does not have the sensational visibility of dramatic acts of violence that occur over shorter time scales 
(e.g. hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes). However, even though slow violence occurs across extended time-scales, 
the negative environmental impacts are just as severe. A goal of this thesis is to highlight “unimagined groups” who 
may be subject to displacement without movement and other forms of slow violence. 
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control that is often associated with European colonialism. Political ecologist Roderick Neumann 
argues that many nature reserves were already in use by local inhabitants, who historically lost 
the power to manage their own lands. In this sense, states define “nature” in particular ways, and 
regulates its use, including the people who have access to it (Adams and Hutton 2007). Neumann 
argued that the exclusion of local peoples from subsistence activities, and the shift from local to 
state land management, mirrors land seizures carried about during European colonization. For 
example, in the early 20th century, British colonial governments in Africa declared all 
uncultivated lands, forests, and wildlife as state property, and passed laws that established 
restrictive state reserves that were inaccessible to local people who depended upon these lands 
for sustenance (McDonald 2002).  
While scholars like Guha, McDonald, and Neumann critique the exclusion of local people 
from PA management schemes as fulfilling elite colonial and post-colonial interests, it is 
important to recognize the reasons why certain central and regional government officials, 
international non-profit organizations, and scientists might support top-down PA management 
schemes that exclude local residents. For example, in 1975, India’s central and regional 
government, along with international organizations including the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
established a network of nine PAs under the name of Project Tiger. The project was an attempt to 
save India’s dwindling Bengal tiger (Panthera tigris tigris) populations, which had dropped from 
40,000 tigers in 1900 to 1827 animals in the 1970s (Panwar 1982). WWF and government 
officials realized that left unchecked, continuing commercial logging, illegal tiger poaching, and 
local agricultural, grazing and subsistence activities would destroy all available tiger habitat and 
drive tigers to extinction. The Indian Board for Wildlife, which helped protect the tiger under 
Indian national law, argued that the species was part of the country’s national heritage, and that 
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its protection would benefit all people (Panwar 1982). Furthermore, the WWF and government 
officials considered the tiger to be an “index for the health of entire ecosystems” (Ibid). By 
protecting tiger habitat, these groups hoped to preserve the environment at large. Indeed, the 
government determined which regions to set up Project Tiger PAs by choosing locations with as 
many “biogeographic habitat types as possible” (Ibid).  
While Project Tiger negatively affected the economic possibilities of local communities, 
it did achieve some of its key conservation goals. It prevented commercial logging in 5142 km2 
of tiger habitat and crushed tiger “poacher gangs” who were hunting the precious animal. In 
response, tiger populations rose significantly, from 1,827 individuals in 1972 to 3890 tigers in 
2016 (Damodaran 2007; Chappell 2016). In the process, Project Tiger displaced over 6000 local 
people from their homes, and limited the local subsistence activities of thousands more. 
However, government officials and international agencies were aware of the local economic 
sacrifices, and attempted to provide some alternatives. While one third of the total reserve land 
was designated as ‘core areas” where all human activity was forbidden, the other 10,000 km2 
allowed for “rational,” sustainable human activity (Panwar 1982). Critics of Project Tiger such 
as Guha and Gadgil argued that Project Tiger was unsuccessful in its attempts to provide viable 
economic alternatives for local residents, many of whom were coercively displaced from their 
homes (Guha 1989; Gadgil 2012). Other critics argued that while the PAs increased tiger 
populations, they tended to ignore the habitats that nurtured the tiger, and was not as successful 
for protecting fragile ecosystems as a whole (Damodaran 2007).6 The example of Project Tiger 
demonstrates that while such programs can have negative effects on local populations 
                                                          
6 Another ecological critique of Project Tiger is its inattentiveness to metapopulation isolation. See Perfecto and 
Vandermeer (2008) for further discussion.  
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reminiscent of colonialism, the government bodies, scientists, and international agencies 
involved accepted these trade-offs and successfully preserved fragile ecosystems and wildlife 
populations on the verge of collapse. 
While government bodies and other stakeholders often create PAs in order to preserve 
fragile ecosystems and endangered species, the unintended consequences of local displacement 
can cause major economic and cultural damage to indigenous communities. At the extreme, 
certain indigenous groups have protested the very creation of protected areas. Since the 1980s, 
the international community was already beginning to propose new models for protected areas 
that recognized the needs of both natural systems and local people (Dowie 2005; Adams and 
Hutton 2007; Turner 2014; see chapter 5). As part of these conversations, which revolved around 
the emerging indigenous rights movement, the United Nations released a draft declaration 
defending the rights of indigenous peoples that banned forced relocation from their traditional 
lands and territories. At the 2004 World Conservation Congress, indigenous groups directly 
voiced their concerns. Saning’o, the leader of the nomadic indigenous group known as the 
Maasai in Thailand, stated that the Maasai considered themselves “enemies of conservation” 
(Dowie 2005). This is because international environmental organizations and state bodies were 
forcibly seizing traditional Maasai grazing lands in the name of land conservation; consequently, 
the Maasai were living in poverty, and their culture was “dissolving” (Ibid). Saning’o located his 
concerns within larger indigenous discourse that critiqued protected area conservation that was 
carried out by national and international bodies, without the consultation or consent from local 
communities. Saning’o’s speech at the World Conservation Congress demonstrates that even for 
projects such as Project Tiger in which top-down decision-makers attempt to provide resource 
for local communities, the consequences of displacement can devastate the social, cultural, and 
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economic basis of indigenous groups. As such, PA managers should consider inclusionary 
decision-making processes that engage local residents in PA efforts that also attempt to address 
local economic and cultural concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
The themes of intercurrence, national identity, displacement, and human exclusion allow 
for the analysis of protected areas within their entire historical, political, social and 
environmental scope. They reject singular understandings of PA creation and management as 
simply an “objective” environmental process, and instead contextualizes them within local 
history and culture, power dynamics across multiple scales, and stakeholder involvement and 
exclusion. Most importantly, these themes can help explain the variety of PA models that exist 
worldwide by directly engaging with the interdisciplinary nature of protected area creation and 
management. In doing so, they support alternate conceptions of environmental preservation that 
engage with both the ecological and social justice dimensions of protected areas management. 
This thesis examines how different contexts in China and Taiwan constructed PAs with different 




Chapter 2 – The Many “Natures” of China and Taiwan’s PA Systems  
 
In this chapter, I will focus on the broader environmental, political, social, economic, 
cultural, and historical contexts that generated different protected area models in China and 
Taiwan. At first glance, the protected area systems of both countries may appear to be the result 
of a globalized “protected areas model” from the West, inspired by Yellowstone National Park. 
Upon closer analysis, however, protected areas in China and Taiwan are not based on a unitary 
“Western” conception of nature. Instead, protected areas have been constantly redefined by 
multiple understandings of nature. I argue that definitions of nature are characterized by 
“intercurrence”; as new “natures” are created through time, older conceptions of the environment 
are not erased. China and Taiwan’s present protected area systems incorporate elements of past 
“natures” that frequently compliment and contradict one another.   
 
China – Historical Context and Intercurrence 
China’s current protected areas “system” is an excellent example of the variety that can 
exist among environmental management strategies. In 2009, China had as many as 2,538 nature 
reserves, which covered 1.4 million square kilometers, or over 14% of its total land mass (Xu 
and Melick 2007; Quan et al. 2011). These reserves represent 85% of the country’s terrestrial 
ecosystem types and animal species, and protect over 300 endangered animals and 130 valuable 
tree species (Quan et al. 2011). 
China’s protected areas system draws upon Confucian, modernist, industrial, 
preservationist and global ideologies. Before the 20th century and the introduction of Western 
thought, the Chinese word that describes the natural “environment” did not exist. Instead, 
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Confucianism, the dominant Chinese ideology for millennia, advanced the concept of qi and li 
(Gardner 2003; Weller 2006; Chen 2015; Thompson 2015). Qi is the cosmic energy that flows 
through all living and nonliving things. Nature is not separate from humans, because the same 
underlying qi flows through them both (Weller 2006). Li refers to order, principle, and harmony. 
According to famous neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1126-1271), li and qi are complementary 
(Gardner 2003; Thompson 2015). That is, the natural world maintains a certain balanced order, 
and aspects of the physical landscape contain their own unique qi (Gardner 2003). Zhu Xi and 
other neo-Confucian scholars suggested that the qi and li present in the environment represented 
positive traits that should be embodied by humankind. For example, like the mountains, humans 
should act with unrelenting honesty and integrity (Chen 2015). By embodying the qi of the 
environment, humans can begin to cultivate their spirits and strive for true goodness (Gardner 
2015). From this perspective, the environment represented an ideal model for human behavior. 
As such, for most of China’s history, Confucian ideologies conceptualized a fluid relationship 
between humans and the physical landscape that both encapsulated similar kinds of qi and li.  
Even today, the word “environment” (自然) in Chinese does not unambiguously connote 
a nature free from human activity. Nor does Chinese literature describe protected areas as empty 
wilderness. If anything, Confucianism advocates for the human manipulation of natural 
landscapes for the purpose of enhancing them (Weller 2006; Ma et al. 2009). Given China’s long 
history as an agricultural society that depended upon altering nature (e.g. terracing, rice 
paddies.), this is not surprising.  
The implications of these traditions for China’s protected area system are still significant. 
Ma et al. 2008 argues that tourist development on protected area lands, and of “enhancing nature 
by man-made artefacts,” is much more common than in similar European parks. In addition, 
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Weller (2008) notes that many Chinese protected areas are connected to local temples, or are the 
homes of ethnic nationalities, both of which are deeply incorporated as a part of Chinese park 
tourism. Protected areas, these authors argue, are treasured equally for their environmental and 
cultural values.7 
 By the early 1900s, however, China was experiencing significant political, social, and 
cultural changes that greatly changed human relationships with nature. By the late 1800s, China 
had been exposed to Britain’s superiority in technology and military strength, via the Opium 
War, and was witnessing the rise of Japan’s increasingly powerful empire. In response, China 
began to adopt new policies intended to “modernize” science and promote technological 
progress, in order to “catch up” to the rest of the world (Shapiro 2001). By the mid-20th century, 
China had experienced three different political regimes: the collapse of the dynastic system in 
1911, the rise and fall of the Chinese Nationalists (1912-1949), and the rise of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which took control in 1949. Despite the vastly different political orientations 
of these groups, all were “developmental” states (Woo-Cummings 1999), and were deeply 
committed to rapid industrialization (Shapiro 2001; Weller 2006). This commitment to industry 
is clearly demonstrated by the creation of China’s first nature reserve, Dinghu Mountain, in 
1956, during the communist regime (Songster 2004).  The reserve was created, ironically, not for 
environmental protection, but for the purpose of assessing the mountain’s natural resources for 
industrial development (Ibid). The mountain’s natural resources were one of many tools that the 
Chinese Communist Party drew upon in an attempt to modernize the nation. For example, a few 
years later, China began a nation-wide experiment in rapid industrial development known as the 
                                                          
7 While a significant number of Chinese and Taiwanese nature reserves are also important cultural or religious sites, 
the case studies focus on two nature reserves that do not have prominent cultural activities directly on their premises. 
This is partially due to cultural erasure and indigenous displacement at Taroko National Park (Taiwan) and a focus 
on ecological preservation of giant pandas at Wolong Nature Reserve (China).  
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Great Leap Forward. The experiment’s attempted to double agricultural and steel production 
using any and all resources available. Specifically, Chinese people across the nation melted 
down all of their steel kitchenware and household items in useless backyard furnaces in an effort 
to make steel. The furnaces produced nothing but worthless metal (Songster 2004). While the 
Great Leap Forward was a catastrophe, its initial optimism and its mass mobilization of all of the 
nation’s resources explain why China’s first PA was created for industrial development 
purposes. 
At the same time, the creation of the first Chinese nature reserves in the mid-20th century 
does not represent a total abandonment from past Chinese ideology. In addition to fulfilling the 
industrial needs of the nation, PAs like Dinghu Mountain were originally designed as scientific 
bases where biologists could learn about natural ecological systems. However, scientific research 
was not intended for solely environmental preservation purposes; instead, the Chinese 
Communist party hoped that an understanding of natural ecosystems within the reserve could 
help inform the party’s design of socialist construction projects (Songster 2004). The party’s 
aspirations mirror neo-Confucian ideologies that encourage humans to cultivate their character 
based on the qi present in natural landscapes. The Chinese government’s attempts to order social 
and human systems based on the natural principles that they observed at Dinghu Mountain is 
reminiscent of neo-Confucian ideals of li and qi that aspired for order and harmony in both 
physical and human landscapes (Gardner 2003). 
Unfortunately, China’s desire to rapidly modernize, and catch up with Japan and the 
West, took precedence over all other priorities, which proved destructive to the environment. The 
most extreme example of this destruction took place during the period known as the Great Leap 
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Forward (1958-1961). Utilizing the slogan “Man Must Conquer Nature,”8 Chairman Mao, 
attempting to promote rapid industrialization, ordered the mass mobilization of the Chinese 
people in several movements that caused widespread deforestation, loss of croplands, and the 
eradication of keystone wildlife species (Shapiro 2001). By 1961, the environmental damage 
caused by the Great Leap Forward, in conjunction with a famine, led to the starvation of 20-30 
million people (Ibid; Weller 2006). In response, the next generation of China’s protected areas 
system (1960s) explicitly prohibited hunting on park premises, for the purposes of preserving 
wild animal populations, which were to act as a reserve food supply during future famines 
(Songster 2004). While the parks of the 1960s certainly preserved animal populations, they did 
so for the sake of human development.  
 A decade later, however, in 1978, China underwent another political change that 
redefined “nature” once again. After having been isolated from nearly all outside influences 
since the communist revolution of 1949, China adopted the “Reform and Opening Up” policy. 
This major shift not only restructured China’s economic system, but also introduced the country 
to new cultural and social concepts. One of the goals of the economic restructuring policies was 
to transform China from a developing country into an economic and technological superpower. It 
was during this period that China began developing a comprehensive protected areas system 
based upon the global park models to which it had so recently been exposed. In particular, China 
drew upon the guidance provided by the United Nations and World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
to shape its protected areas (Weller 2006).  
                                                          
8 Ironically, Chairman Mao misinterpreted the original Chinese phrase from which he based his “Man Must Conquer 
Nature” slogan. 人定胜天 can also mean human society must harmonize with their surroundings and their internal 
beings, including the natural world.   
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During this period, the IUCN and other international bodies were considering the role of 
local indigenous peoples in park management structures (Ibid). This period also witnessed the 
growth of the environmental justice and indigenous rights movements in the international arena. 
As a result, the IUCN promoted PA systems that recognized the importance of sustainable 
development in conjunction with biodiversity protection. While China adopted a preservationist, 
scientific approach to protected areas management that emphasized biodiversity, it included a 
consideration of indigenous people. As a result, the creation of China’s park system has very 
rarely displaced local peoples from park premises (Ibid). At the same time, however, China was 
also influenced by exclusionary ideologies of nature: in 1994, in a move away from earlier, 
communist models, the national government banned extractive activities on park premises, 
including logging, mining and quarrying (Ma et al. 2008).  
The historical changes associated with the development of China’s PA system 
demonstrate the multiple ideologies – Confucian, modernist, preservationist, and international – 
that continue to influence environmental management schemes in Chinese nature reserves. These 
multiple and often conflicting ideologies represent the diversity of environmental thought 
produced by China’s unique historical, political, cultural, and economic context. The resulting 
PA system does not fit within a singular global PA model; instead, China’s protected areas adopt 
unique environmental management schemes that reflect multiple ideologies and historical 
contexts. 
China’s Present Protected Areas System – Intercurrence and Challenges 
China’s current PA system faces major challenges in its implementation and enforcement 
of its environmental goals and management strategies. For example, a survey of 83 nature 
reserves showed that 68 permitted natural resource extraction practices that are explicitly 
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prohibited by the 1994 national law (Weller 2006). Indeed, so superficial is the resemblance of 
China’s parks to the Western model that many authors express concern that the majority of 
China’s parks are merely “paper parks”, and do not come close to achieving sustainability in 
practice (Quan 2011). To understand the challenges facing China protected areas (PA) system, I 
will explore seven factors that impede PA environmental management. The factors include: 
disregarding science in environmental management strategies, prioritization of the country’s 
“modern” image over environmental goals, displacement of local communities, monopolized 
state power, contradictory government regulations, lack of financial resources, and unpredictable 
land tenure. These factors reflect the historical, social, political, and economic conditions of the 
country. 
 
Factor #1: Gap between Science and Environmental Management Strategies 
First, there is significant disconnect between conservation sciences and environmental 
management in China’s protected areas. Reserves are not necessarily chosen for their ecological 
or scientific importance. In practice, this means that many newly created nature reserves are too 
small to sustain the natural ecosystems they seek to protect or are established in places with little 
ecological value (Xu and Melick 2007). In addition, PA management does not always reflect 
ecological and local needs. For example, certain sensitive environmental habitats may require the 
exclusion of humans in order to preserve their integrity. These habitats include wetlands, 
severely degraded environments, and giant panda habitat. Other PAs, however, are secondary 
forests with little biodiversity value (Ibid), and could be managed for multiple uses with little 
disturbance to the ecosystem. While China does possess a core-periphery PA system that would 
allow for various levels of human exclusion and development, it is not implemented in practice. 
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This is especially troubling, because both local communities and ecological systems suffer from 
this arrangement. Sensitive ecosystems can become degraded by even light human activity. On 
the other hand, an estimated 30 million people illegally live within or depend on natural 
resources in China’s PAs, including resources form their “core” zones (areas where no 
development is allowed – Xu and Melick 2007). These people are especially vulnerable, because 
the lands and natural resources that they depend upon can easily be taken away from them by the 
central government.  
 
Factor #2: Prioritization of Economic “Modern” Goals over Environmental Preservation  
If protected areas are not chosen for their ecological value, why are particular areas set 
aside for preservation? Why is implementation of environmental regulations so poor in these 
PAs? One explanation may be personal gain – local and regional government leaders who 
designate PAs often receive political praise for increasing green space in their communities 
(Quan et al. 2011). However, this alone cannot describe the exponential increase in protected 
areas designation in China in the past two decades. In fact, over 50% of China’s PAs were 
created since 1995 (Zhou and Grumbine 2011). This is very surprising, given that protected areas 
nationwide suffer from considerable lack of resources and policy implementation.  
The second factor is that China is not focusing on the quality of nature preservation at the 
reserves. Instead, it seems as if the Chinese central government may be more interested in 
increasing the total area of protected lands (Grumbine and Xu 2011). As the fastest growing 
economic power in the world, China wants to establish a positive image of itself as a nation. By 
creating a large number of protected areas, regardless of their effectiveness, China presents itself 
as a “modern” nation concerned with environmentalism, just like other industrialized countries 
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that hopes to emulate. This attitude is reminiscent of China’s attempts to “modernize” in the 20th 
century. Instead of using industrialization as the benchmark of progress, however, the central 
government is using other markers, including environmentalism, to portray itself as “modern.”  
China’s desire to present itself as a “modern” nation may also explain the disconnect 
between its federal environmental regulations and their enforcement. In 1994, the national 
government put into place several stringent, hierarchical environmental laws, including a ban on 
major development and local subsistence activities in protected areas. These laws do not consider 
local realities – that is, the needs of the estimated 30 million people (as of 1997) who live in and 
around protected areas (Xu and Melick 2007). Most Chinese PAs are found in rural, undeveloped 
regions, especially in western China, where 70% of the population is made up of peasants (Xu et 
al. 2006). Most of these people are relatively poor, and rely on ecosystem services provided by 
the parks in order to survive. As a result, natural resource use on PA premises is not uncommon. 
Hierarchical environmental laws do not consider the long-term viability, historical land use, or 
the needs of local residents. One possible explanation for the prevalence of “paper park” PAs is 
that their goal is not always necessarily for ecological preservation or local development. 
Instead, PAs are green “models” that local government officials and central government offices 
employ as an example of China as a “modern” and green nation.  
 
Factor #3: Displacement of Local Communities 
Under certain circumstances, China’s central government has created PAs in order to 
justify the displacement of local communities. The recent creation of a large number of “paper 
parks” has already had severe implications for the thirty million people who live within or next 
to the PAs. While forceful displacement for PAs is relatively rare in the present, “displacement 
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without movement,” such as local restrictions to the PA’s natural resources without consent, is a 
significant issue in China’s parks. In addition, official narratives often describe rural villagers as 
“backward” and “short-sighted… [who] only put emphasis on economic profit, ignoring social 
profit” (Ministry of Forestry 1989). These sources tend to blame local communities for 
supporting “improper business like charcoal burning, soil burning, logging,” and other 
subsistence activities as the reason for environmental degradation (Ibid). These discourses ignore 
the complex history of government land seizures and large-scale resource exploitation to justify 
state intervention and control over PAs. Displacement issues are even more severe for local 
indigenous groups, who have historically faced cultural erasure, social regulation, and repression 
by the national government (see chapter three). 
The Chinese government has already used modernist and pro-environmental discourses to 
justify forced displacement of local people from their homes. For example, in the late 2000s, 
China unveiled plans to build several modern, green cities. These advertised model “eco-cities” 
were internationally publicized as gleaming examples of China’s technological, economic, and 
environmental success. Cities like Dongtan were supposed to house over 500,000 people, recycle 
waste as fuel, and run on power from micro-wind mills. Even though Dongtan was supposed to 
finish its first phase of construction in 2010, the project fell apart due to corruption issues 
(Larson 2009). The “eco-cities” demonstrate China’s desire to present its global image as an 
environmental model.  
Eco-cities may also reflect the desire of the government to displace local communities 
and grab valuable land for state purposes (Yeh 2015). Known as the “new enclosure movement,” 
the Chinese central government has utilized its totalitarian land ownership powers to forcefully 
evict local communities of their land. For example, to create the new eco-city of Yixing, the 
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Chinese government evicted 100,000 villagers. These evictions are especially contentious 
because even though most eco-cities remain unbuilt, the government still retains control of the 
land, which was not returned to its long-time local owners. Yeh argues that by rationalizing 
displacement as “environmentally rational,” eco-city enclosures “help shape environmental 
governance as a mode of capital accumulation” (Ibid). The creation of numerous “paper parks” 
across China could easily become included in the enclosure schemes.  
 
Factor #4: Monopolized State Power Override Environmental Goals 
Environmentalism is not the only means by which the Chinese central government 
portrays itself as a “modern” power.  Since China’s “Reform and Opening Up” policy in 1978, 
the central government has foremost dedicated itself to the growth of its economy. 
Unfortunately, with the competitive natural resource demands necessary to support that growth, 
the protection of the environment often comes last (Xu and Melick 2007).  
In practice, the fourth major barrier facing PA implementation is that the state’s 
monopolizing political power allows them to act with little scrutiny, and usually in the support of 
development, at the cost of the environment. Citizens, on the other hand, do not have adequate 
legal standing that would allow them to protest environmental and land use affairs in court 
(Grumbine and Xu 2011). For example, in Chinese law, the state has the power to “downgrade” 
a nature reserve (Xu and Melick 2007). As such, powerful national agencies can easily ignore the 
environmental protection goals of a PA, and even blatantly exploit its natural resources. 
Furthermore, the state can extinguish local land use rights without any due process, because 
China’s lands belong to the state, not individuals (Grumbine and Xu 2011).  
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One may argue that the focus on economic development at protected areas is a new, less 
extreme version of an old pattern, in which China seeks to catch up with and even surpass the 
West.  Instead of emphasizing industrial development, however, the Chinese government now 
focuses on a new kind of “development.” Not coincidentally, this new approach places the 
advancement of the country over the needs of the “natural” environment.   
 
Factor #5: Conflicting Environmental Regulations 
It would be too simple to characterize the “state” as a singular force that acts in the 
interests of development. In fact, another major factor that complicates PA implementation and 
enforcement is the different priorities and often contradictory regulations established at different 
levels of governance. This issue is not limited to China; Taiwan PAs also struggle with 
contradictory government policies and enforcement mechanisms between local and national 
government agencies. However, China experiences this phenomenon at a scale much greater than 
most countries, partly because its geographical size and large human population require a larger 
and more complex government apparatus. For example, PA management is delegated through 
ten different Chinese ministries who act at national, provincial, and local levels (Xue 2000; Xu 
and Melick 2007). These agencies do not coordinate their internal actions, nor do they have 
transparent management strategies. In consequence, environmental management policies from 
Beijing, province and prefectures, counties, and municipalities often represent conflicting lines 




Factor #6: Shortage of Financial Resources 
The sixth factor is that local and provincial governments have difficulty prioritizing the 
environment compared to economic development schemes, because they are under pressure to 
contribute to economic growth models established by the central government. Because of the 
conflicting messages from the center, China’s protected areas system ends up being heavily 
profit driven, in part because tourism is a very significant market: in 2006, protected areas 
constituted 80% of domestic tourism (or 1 billion visitors – Ma et al. 2008). In such a context, it 
is possible that China’s parks are not necessarily “paper” parks, but instead cater to the interests 
of local actors and interests (i.e. economic development, integrated local understandings of 
nature and people), which have more control over park operations than do national 
preservationist interests.  
In many cases, local management of PAs presents significant challenges, such as resource 
allocation. Today, approximately 70% of nature reserves are managed at the provincial/local 
level (Zhong et al. 2015; Zhou and Grumbine 2011). Before the 1990s, only the national 
government had the power to establish nature reserves. However, it only created several dozen 
reserves for the purposes of reducing logging and hunting in biodiverse areas (Xu and Melick 
2007). In 1991, however, the national government adopted a statutory procedure that allowed 
counties and provincial governments to establish self-managed protected areas. Due to fiscal 
allocation policy and political management, local and regional level PAs do not receive financial 
support from the national government. In most cases, local/provincial governments are 
responsible for funding protected areas; as such, many areas do not have the resources to 
effectively manage parks. One study, which analyzed 25% of China’s protected areas, concluded 
that only 2% of surveyed areas had enough finances to maintain the PA’s daily activities, while 
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less than 10% identified their PA’s infrastructure as adequate for environmental protection (Quan 
et al. 2011). Less than 10% possessed a consistent monitoring and evaluation system.  In addition 
to a lack of resources, only 22.8% of the PAs had management regulations approved by the local 
provincial government.  
 In practice, provincial government control over PA financial allocations means that 
monetary distribution is highly uneven across China. In addition, there is a strong correlation 
between local economic development and environmental management effectiveness and 
financial resources (Xu and Melick 2007; Quan et al. 2011). In many courses, PAs provide a 
significant source of income for local communities and governments. They are not only profit 
driven for personal gain; the very success of nature preservation programs depends on the 
resources acquired through these tourism revenue and natural resource exploitation. According to 
one study, 66% of China’s PAs receive significant monetary support from the sale of food and 
accommodation and 41% from souvenir sales (Zhong et al. 2015). The central government 
estimated as early as 2003 that PAs pay 40% of expenses through their own fundraising efforts 
(Forestry Bureau 2003).  
 
Factor #7: Historical Volatility of Land Tenure 
A final challenge of the PA system particular to China’s political history is its 
unpredictable land tenure. In the past sixty years, China has experienced civil war, revolution, 
Maoism, and transition to market capitalism (Grumbine and Xu 2011). These tumultuous events 
were often accompanied by dramatic and unpredictable changes in land ownership. For example, 
land ownership changed from locally-organized common property, to national large-scale state 
collectivization, to a household responsibility system and finally a globalized state-regulated 
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economy (Grumbine and Xu 2011). In consequence, many rural Chinese citizens are suspicious 
of government intervention into land use affairs (Ibid). This is especially true for indigenous 
people, whose displacement and resettlement has often occurred multiple times across China’s 
long history (Xu and Melick 2007). Even today, while most land is still technically government-
owned, the extent to which local residents have rights to it is still under question. Some scholars 
even argue that uncertain land tenure has exacerbated environmental degradation in protected 
areas. Certain Chinese PAs were established on lands already promised to local residents; as 
such, the ambiguity and anxiety surrounding land ‘ownership’ can encourage short-term 
environmental destruction.   
Within the space of a century, understandings of “nature” in China have undergone a 
series of major transformations. Confucian ideas of an integrated natural/cultural landscape were 
dominant at the beginning of the period under study.  These then changed to a 
communist/developmentalist view, in which nature came to be seen as an “enemy” of modernity, 
and needed to be exploited for industrial advancement.  As the century came to a close nature 
was regarded by some as a source of local income and by others as a treasure to preserve and 
protect. Each of these “natures” reflects different needs, priorities, interests and assumptions, 
some international, some national and others local.  Complicating our efforts to understand the 
construction of nature in China’s protected areas is the fact that past “natures” still influence PA 
management schemes today– protected areas, for example, while adopting new preservationist 
conceptions of biodiversity preservation, attract large tourist crowds not only for their natural 
beauty and their cultural importance, even as they serve the subsistence needs of local 




Taiwan – Historical Context and Intercurrence 
Taiwan’s current PA system draws upon many Chinese cultural and environmental 
traditions. Between 1683 and 1895, Taiwan was a colony of China’s Qing dynasty. In fact, 90% 
of Taiwan’s current population are Han Chinese who migrated to Taiwan during this period 
(Executive Yuan 2014). Consequently, much of Taiwan’s history, and the cultural ties of its 
population, are connected to China, and have been influenced by similar Confucian principles. 
Like their Chinese counterparts, Taiwanese parks do not distinguish clearly between the human 
and the natural worlds. For example, Weller 2006 describes Taiwan’s cultural tourism and 
ecotourism as nearly one and the same. As is true in Mainland China, temples are often situated 
in places of natural beauty, and tourists frequently visit temples within or near to protected areas 
(Ibid).  
Despite these commonalities, however, Taiwan underwent a half a century of colonial 
control by the Japanese (1895-1945), which left an indelible mark on the island. The Japanese 
created three parks before they were driven from Taiwan at the end of World War II. The 
creation of “imperial” parks by the Japanese raises interesting questions, such as the meaning of 
nationalism in an imperial context, the place of indigenous people within the Japanese empire, 
and the unique set of international relations within which parks formed in Japanese controlled 
Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist Government of Taiwan, which replaced Japan as the ruling 
power after World War II, recreated these parks, but constructed and managed them based on 
different understandings of nature, and on considerations of nationalism rather than empire. The 
post World War II parks were also embedded in a transformed international milieu, one 
characterized by relationships with international bodies headquartered in the West. I will 
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compare these various understandings of parks and people during both the Japanese imperial and 
the Chinese national periods.  
Protected areas under Japanese rule were created for the benefit of the empire. For 
example, at the National Parks Investigative Board in 1936, which nominated natural areas in 
Taiwan to become parks, government bureaucrats explained that the selection process would 
prioritize natural areas that symbolized the superiority of Japan’s Empire, and thus would 
generate awe in tourists from around the world (Kanda 2003). These official discourses drew 
upon religious and cultural values that had been important in Japan for centuries. Indeed, ideas 
celebrating nature in Japan date from as early as 1000 BC, as a part of folk/popular Shintoism 
(Kodera 2014). The Japanese government adopted a new religion, state Shintoism, and 
transformed these values for political ends.  The government was especially concerned to 
propagate the notion of Japanese superiority and exceptionalism. State Shintoism provided a 
moral justification for Japan’s militarization and belligerent war tactics (Ibid). One way in which 
state Shintoism supported the notion of Japanese superiority was by defining Japan’s natural 
landscape as unique, even divine. In this context, Taiwan’s natural landscapes came to be 
regarded as an extension of Japan’s need to prove the superiority of its empire (Kanda 2003), and 
thus justify its war against the Allied nations. Not coincidentally, the three areas chosen as 
protected areas in Taiwan were dominated by the country’s most majestic mountains, a symbol 
commonly used to represent the state of Japan. 
Japanese imperial parks in Taiwan were not only used to symbolize the superiority of 
empire, but were also utilized to exclude Taiwan’s indigenous populations, who were considered 
non-subjects. When the Japanese arrived, most of Taiwan’s indigenous people lived in remote, 
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inaccessible sections of the island’s mountainous, eastern region.9  Prior to the arrival of the 
Japanese, under Chinese colonial rule, these indigenous groups were granted de facto 
sovereignty over their own affairs (Simon 2006; Simon 2011). The Japanese, however, brutally 
“pacified” these indigenous groups, through a combination of armed repression and forced 
displacement (Simon 2007). For example, in order to control the Taroko people, who currently 
reside in present-day Taroko National Park, the Japanese army widened traditional Taroko 
hunting paths through the area’s steep gorges so that they could bring in tanks and other military 
hardware and force the Taroko into submission. Such confrontations were often deadly: in the 
Wushe Incident of 1930, for example, Japanese forces killed over 200 indigenous people in a 
violent uprising that lasted over two months (Simon 2006).  
After the indigenous populations were defeated, the Japanese forcibly removed them 
from the mountains and relocated them in the plains, where they could be more easily controlled 
(via police surveillance and military outposts; Simon 2007). Nomadic and settled peoples alike 
were forced to adopt new and alien forms of economic, social and political organization. 
Traditionally egalitarian indigenous groups were reorganized into tribal councils, which tended 
to concentrate power and authority in the hands of a small group.  Traditional forms of livelihood 
have for the most part vanished, as indigenous groups were forced to live on reservations or in 
modern villages (Simon 2011). These imposed forms of economic, social and political life 
persist into the present.   
Having cleared the landscape of people, the Japanese made no effort to preserve “nature” 
in the mountainous regions of Taiwan.  Instead, the Japanese extracted raw materials from the 
                                                          
9 Population figures for indigenous groups from the early Japanese period are not available, but indigenous people 
currently make up 2.3% of the population. 
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newly depopulated mountain regions. While it is unclear whether resource extraction occurred 
directly on park lands, it is clear that the park system was a means to disenfranchising and 
subduing local populations, and relocating them for the purposes of social control. This trend of 
land dispossession and displacement continued under martial law, which was maintained by the 
Chinese Nationalists from 1949 until 1989 (Simon 2007; Simon 2011). The Nationalists, who 
were forced to flee from the communist regime that seized power in Mainland China in 1949, 
maintained many of the forms of social control established by the Japanese. While the 
Nationalists abolished Japan’s imperial park system entirely, they also nationalized Taiwan’s 
mountainous regions, and outlawed any subsistence activities within them (Simon and Mona 
2012). These areas were no longer called protected areas, but they continued to be utilized for the 
same purpose: the exclusion and social control of indigenous peoples. Indeed, the Chinese 
Nationalists increased police surveillance of native populations, and initiated new forced 
relocations from the mountains to the plains.  They went so far as to establish a policy of 
mandatory assimilation of native populations, compelling them to adopt Mandarin names and to 
learn the language of the conquerors (Simon 2007).  
Most of these policies went unchallenged by Taiwan’s indigenous populations, because 
under martial law, the Chinese Nationalists remained in complete control of the government, and 
punished any real or perceived opposition to the party via arrest, imprisonment, and even 
execution. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, and the election of Taiwan’s first 
democratically elected president in 1996, indigenous rights were finally recognized by the 
Taiwanese government (Simon and Mona 2012). Despite their new recognition, indigenous 
peoples still lack many rights that they have demanded since the 1980s, including the return of 




The Development of Taiwan’s Environmental and Indigenous Rights Movements  
The development of Taiwan’s environmental movement began as early as the 1970s, 
amidst a climate of widespread political and social protest. Before 1987 and the lifting of martial 
law, unauthorized gatherings such as protests were outlawed entirely. Even so, throughout the 
early 1980s, environmental protests became increasingly common in Taiwan, partially because 
activists found it safer to critique the pollution caused by government-supported business, as 
opposed to directly protesting the political system itself (Ho 2011). The protests were primarily 
geared towards halting large economic development projects that produced significant amounts 
of pollution that threatened local health. Since the 1960s, the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang 
(KMT) government legitimized its martial rule of the island and its support of large-business 
development by arguing that such control was necessary for the growth and prosperity of 
Taiwan’s economy (Ho 2011).  However, by the 1980s, Taiwan’s pollution issues were severe. 
For example, less than 1% of human excrement received even primary sewage treatment (Weller 
2006).  
From its very origins, Taiwan’s environment has been a “politicized” issue that was 
crucial for its democratic transition in the 1980s and 90s (Ho 2011). Under martial rule, Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) was the only political party in the country. By 1986, however, Taiwan’s 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, has since been a major political contender, 
even winning the presidential election in 2000. Since then, Taiwan’s two major parties, the DPP 
and KMT, have competed for votes and influence. One major avenue of debate between them is 
environmental protection. Since its origins, the DPP presented itself as antinuclear and pro-
environmental. Indeed, Taiwan’s environmental movement explicitly forged a political alliance 
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with the DPP in the 1980s, because the new party was allying with multiple social movements in 
order to undermine the monopolizing power of the KMT (Ho 2011).   
At the same time, DPP recognized and supported the island’s burgeoning indigenous 
rights movement. In fact, as part of presidential promises in the 2000 election, the DPP 
presidential candidate signed the New Partnership between Indigenous People and the Taiwan 
Government, which recognized the natural rights of indigenous people as the original inhabitants 
of Taiwan and having the right to a high level of autonomy and sovereignty (Simon 2007). As 
such, the DPP advocated for both environmental and indigenous issues during a crucial political 
turning point where national policies and control were shifting rapidly, and multiple social 
movements were working together.     
The DDP also relied upon a social justice discourse to not only secure their political 
power, but also to legitimize the very existence of the nation itself. The image of Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples has been important to Taiwanese nationalists who are attempting to 
distinguish their nation from China (Simon 2007). Taiwan’s native population do not have 
Chinese roots; instead, they are descended from Malay-Polynesians. Taiwan identifies these 
roots as a reason for their independence and right to be internationally recognized as a separate 
country. For example, the 1993 Draft Republic of Taiwan Constitution began its preamble by 
identifying the indigenous Taiwanese as the ancestors of all Taiwanese residents, despite the fact 
that over 80% of the population descend from Han Chinese migrants in the Qing dynasty (Ibid). 
Taiwan’s environmental and indigenous rights movements became established amidst an 
era of social justice protest and political debate and competition. The public and active political 
dialogues regarding both social movements was quite different from China, where the national 
government purposefully censored and crafted specific discourses about its ethnic nationalities 
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and environment. The unique context in which Taiwan’s social movements originated influenced 
the creation and management of protected areas that were established in the same time period.  
 
U.S. Influence on the Taiwan PA System 
By the 1970s, Taiwan had begun to re-establish a protected areas system. Instead of 
relying upon internationally accepted PA models from the United Nations or IUCN, which did 
not gain prominence until the 1980s-1990s, Taiwan’s PA system was influenced by models 
developed in the United States. The influence of U.S. environmental thought makes sense within 
Taiwan’s political and historical context. After the Chinese Nationalist Party fled China after the 
rise of the communist party, the U.S. sent its army to protect the small island, preventing the 
newly communist China to take it over. The U.S. also provided Taiwan with significant political 
and economic support. In fact, most of Taiwan’s top park managers studied park management in 
the U.S.  
Even though Taiwanese park managers and government officials recognize the U.S. park 
system and its emphasis on pristine nature as a model for the island’s PA system, Taiwan’s PA 
system prioritizes different environmental goals in both theory and practice. This is clear in the 
very structure of the PA system itself. While scenic areas are managed solely for the benefits of 
tourists, and nature reserves also preserve cultural heritage sites within their boundaries, 
protected areas are managed as pristine places free from human “disturbance.” Restricted 
activities include hunting, fishing, vegetation removal, littering, and driving outside designated 
areas (CPA 1972). These restrictions are stricter than those in U.S. parks, where certain 
recreational activities like fishing are allowed on park premises.   
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For example, while U.S. national parks were originally established for the “benefit and 
enjoyment of the people,” Taiwan’s national parks strictly forbid direct tourist interactions with 
nature. Barbecuing, selling food and drink from private vendors, or playing in streams and rivers 
is forbidden (Weller 2006). In this way, Taiwan’s national parks more closely follow 
Switzerland’s ideals of Totalschutz (Kupper 2009). One reason that Taiwan may have developed 
stricter PA regulations may be because of the severe pollution problems faced by the nation. By 
limiting the majority of human activities in Taiwanese national parks, the central government 
may have attempted to shield the parks from the rampant environmental destruction occurring 
throughout the island. Indeed, environmental conditions were so bad by the 1980s that the island 
held an average of ten nation-wide protests per month (Weller 2006). Despite the strict nature of 
these regulations, in practice restrictions upon human activity within natural areas are not 
implemented, especially at the regional level. Certain PAs even incorporate alternative concepts 
of human engagement with nature into the PA experience, such as meditation and health. A 
nature reserve near Taroko National Park, for example, encourages visitors to walk across a 
series of steps in the midst of a small river. The water flowing over the rocks is supposed to have 
healing properties, and is connected to concepts of Chinese wellbeing (Ibid). While park-created 
sites like the healing stones were relatively rare, tourist interaction with the nature at provincial 
parks is ubiquitous, despite the fact that it is forbidden, as it is at national parks. Indeed, at the 
former visitors purposefully and regularly break unenforced park rules: for example, they 
frequently play in park waters, and cook meals in the natural scenery. Despite the national 
government’s keen interest in preserving protected areas as a more “pristine” natural area with 




Taiwan’s PA system is informed by several intersecting currents of environmental 
thought that reflect its historical, economic, environmental, social, cultural, and political 
circumstances. The Qing Dynasty’s colonization of the island resulted in the migration of 
Taiwan’s predominantly Han Chinese population, whose religious beliefs regarding an 
interconnected natural/cultural landscape still encourage Taiwanese tourists to visit temples 
within protected areas, and to directly engage with nature in provincial parks. On the other hand, 
the creation of Taiwan’s first protected areas by the Japanese empire had little if anything to do 
with “nature”; instead, parks were a means of disenfranchising and controlling local indigenous 
populations, as well as displaying Japan’s superiority and prowess to the global community in 
the midst of a world war. Unfortunately, the exclusion of indigenous populations from their 
original lands remains a significant issue in Taiwan. At the national level, parks continue to 
follow a predominantly ecological agenda, whereas the needs of displaced indigenous 
populations are often written out of park discourses. Taiwan’s “natures” continue to reflect (or in 
the case of aboriginal peoples, exclude) the views and needs of various interest groups, from 
different political bureaus to Taiwan’s Han and indigenous communities. 
 
Taiwan’s Present Protected Areas System - Challenges 
Today, 20% of Taiwan’s land mass is designated for nature preservation. While Taiwan’s 
PA system is more effective than China’s “paper parks,” it faces six challenges that reflect 
important divergences from China’s system. First, despite the fact that Taiwan is currently run by 
a democratic government, PA lands continue to be controlled entirely by the national 
government, even though this nationalized land was forcibly seized from indigenous people by 
colonial Japanese rulers without compensation. After the Chinese takeover of Taiwan in 1945 
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and the establishment of martial law, Chinese politicians continued to displace and 
disenfranchise indigenous people of their land. The mountains still remain as nationalized public 
land, and the central government has not returned it to its indigenous owners. In contrast to 
China, where millions of local residents live on PA lands and are at risk of eviction and 
displacement, local residents in many of Taiwan’s protected areas have already been displaced. 
This is because the primarily indigenous populations in these areas were forcibly relocated to 
Taiwan’s plains after the Japanese colonized the island. As a consequence, debates surrounding 
national parks and indigenous treatment in Taiwan are often focused on returning lost lands to 
indigenous peoples, and to include them in exclusionary government-led land management 
schemes. However, conflicting land claims between indigenous peoples, especially between 
groups who lived on the same land during different time periods, complicates this process. 
Furthermore, the national government has yet to return any of the PA lands, or to include 
indigenous populations in its land management decision-making processes.  
The second major challenge of Taiwan’s PA system is its lack of acknowledgement of 
past and present indigenous needs. For example, in the Taiwan National Park Act (1972), parks 
were explicitly established “to protect the natural scenery, historic relics and wildlife, to 
conserve natural resources, and to facilitate scientific research and promote environmental 
education” (CPA 1972). Notably, none of these goals consider the needs of present day 
indigenous groups who lived on park lands. In fact, the official website of Taroko National Park 
(as of August 2015) claims that it was established in 1986, when in fact the origins of the park 
date to 1937, during the Japanese imperial period (CPA 2015). Additionally, while the website 
has a short section describing the original Taroko residents, the entire passage is written in the 
past tense, as if the needs of the current native population no longer apply. A brief caption 
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mentions in passing that the tribe “moved out” of the region by the beginning of the 20th century, 
and that few Taroko live within the park today (Ibid). This effectively erases Taroko’s history as 
an imperial park under the Japanese, and the forced relocations, military suppression, and social 
control necessary to create the PA. 
While the majority of Taiwan’s PAs lack residents within their borders, the third 
challenge facing their success includes human pollution and development. For China, illegal 
mining, poaching, fishing, and logging on PA lands is a significant issue, due to the large number 
of rural local residents who rely on PAs for subsistence. In Taiwan, however, economic 
development and urbanization are more serious concerns. Taiwan’s small size and high 
population density means that urban areas and economic development schemes often occur next 
to PAs. According to an evaluation of Taiwanese PAs in 2012, the most severe pressure facing 
four of the five assessed PAs was pollution from household sewage, industrial waste, and 
garbage (Lu et al. 2012). Urban sprawl, industrial and commercial development, and 
transportation corridors were all significant threats to the health of the PA systems. 
The fourth challenge facing Taiwan’s PA system is that the national government 
prioritizes economic development (and its accompanying pollution) over environmental 
preservation. While China and Taiwan face this same issue, the varying ability of each 
government to pursue its economic goals distinguishes the two nations. While the Chinese 
government is able to act without any oversight, and can subdue local unrest, Taiwan’s political 
system stays more responsive to the demands of its citizens, via environmental and social justice 
protests. Indeed, these very protest movements provided the basis for much of the current 
administration’s power (the DPP). While Taiwan’s government does have complete control over 
public lands such as protected areas, its actions are often impeded by citizen opposition. For 
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example, in the early 2000s, the DPP proposed ten major public works projects that were 
intended to promote economic growth. Dubbed the “Ten Nightmares,” (Williams and Chang 
2008), many of the projects were halted by massive protests, due to the active leadership of 
Taiwan’s environmental NGOs. While most of these projects were not related to PAs, they 
represent the political and social context in which local people can critique and even halt 
government projects.  
Like any state entity, Taiwan’s government is far from uniform. Instead, it is composed 
of many different bureaus with various needs and priorities. The fifth PA challenge reflects the 
complexity of the state - ten national bureaus supervise PA lands, and with often conflicting 
priorities. In China, PAs were managed at different regional, provincial, and national scales. In 
contrast, Taiwan’s national government directly manages all of the PAs itself. However, the 
various bureaus have differing powers on PA lands that limit the abilities of park managers to 
perform their duties. For example, in Kending National Park, park managers could not even set 
up their headquarters on reserve premises because the Forestry Bureau owned all of the land.  
Other non-government stakeholders also impede successful environmental management 
in Taiwan’s PAs. In many cases, the national government established PAs without considering 
the existing local populations who lived there or the lands already owned by private interests. At 
Kending, environmental managers were only able to control 10% of the PA; 30% of the PA’s 
land was private, and the other portions of the park were controlled by different government 
bodies whose management goals did not align with one another (Weller 2006). Meanwhile, the 
20,000 people lived within the PA’s borders had no legal claims to their land, even though many 
of their families had lived on the same land for generations ownership. This overlapping and 
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conflicting PA land ownership makes it difficult for environmental managers to effectively 
implement their environmental preservation goals across the entire PA.  
 The last major challenge facing Taiwan’s PAs is the lack of adequate funding. While PAs 
managed by national bureaus receive monetary allocations from the national government, those 
managed by local governments lack adequate finances and infrastructure. More specifically, 
while the Taiwan government paid for basic infrastructure at many of the PAs (e.g. facilities, 
equipment and route construction), finances for long-term maintenance, such as staff, were low 
(Lu et al. 2012). The lack of resources in regionally-managed PAs was particularly prohibitive. 
For example, in a regional Taiwan PA, tourists openly play in the reserve’s waterways and 
barbecue meals. While the park managers are more than aware of the situation, there are only 
four people on staff, and they are unable to stop waves of tourists from interacting with the 
environment as they please (Weller 2006). 
 
China and Taiwan – Intercurrence 
China and Taiwan’s protected areas systems are a product of society as much as a 
product of nature. While both countries shared similar cultural Confucian ideologies, and faced 
similar PA management issues such as funding and land ownership, the ways in which these 
concerns operated in practice were dependent upon historical, political, cultural, and economic 
contexts specific to each nation. What is most clear is that neither China nor Taiwan’s PA 
systems follow a singular “Yellowstone” Park model. Instead, they reflect the needs and desires 
of multiple different actors from its past and present, from Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and 
Confucian thinkers in China in to present day Taiwanese indigenous rights activists and 
regional/national government officials Chinese PAs. The environmental ideologies of earlier 
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time periods were not entirely supplanted by present-day management systems; instead, China 
and Taiwan’s PAs represent an intercurrence of environmental thought.  
In the following two chapters, I will examine the complexities inherent within a PA 
system by analyzing two specific parks – Wolong Nature Reserve in Southwest China, and 
Taroko National Park in Taiwan. These two protected areas are interesting case studies for 
several reasons. First, both PAs were among the first established in each country, and have 
experienced multiple cultural, political, economic, and environmental shifts. As such, they 
provide a unique lens through which to analyze the changes in environmental protection over 
time. Second, the PAs are popular tourist locations and have high international visibility. They 
play an important role in the cultivation of each nation’s national image. The high profile of 
these PAs also means that they receive a large amount of financial resources from the central 
government and third parties. The amount of resources allocated to these reserves is not 
representative of PA financial allocations in China and Taiwan. Rather, as “flagship” nature 
reserves, they represent the height of attainable environmental protection, given exceptional 
financial and technical resources (Liu et al. 2003). They are also seen as models for other nature 
reserves in the countries. Finally, both nature reserves had large indigenous populations living on 
park premises at one point during their history. The government’s actions in shaping ethnic 
policy and these local populations is interesting to consider.  
The two case studies also highlight key aspects of protected area creation and 
management. First, they demonstrate the diversity of the diversity of PA models worldwide. This 
variation is due to the historical contextual construction of these parks. Second, PAs are often 
used as national image key to national state building. This is partially reflected through 
environmental management schemes at PAs themselves. Finally, the case studies demonstrate 
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that the management and creation of PAs is inseparable from the treatment and ordering of 
human populations, especially indigenous people. This is true of PAs with significant human 
populations living within reserve premises (Wolong Nature Reserve), but also for reserves where 




Chapter 3 – Pandas, Tibetan Indigenous People, and Grain to Green– PA 
Management Schemes at China’s Wolong Nature Reserve Through Time 
 
Background – Ecology, Management, and Local Residents  
 Wolong Nature Reserve (Figure 1 & 2) was established in 1962. It is a 200,000 hectare 
protected area located in Southwest China’s Sichuan Province between the Tibetan highlands 
and Sichuan Basin’s lowlands. Wolong’s topography is characterized by deep valleys and high 
mountains, with altitudes ranging from 1200 m to 6250 m (Ghimire 1994; He et al 2008). The 
diversity in climactic zones at Wolong supports a large variety of habitats, including subtropical 
forests (below 1600 m), temperate coniferous forest (2000-3500m), alpine meadows (3500-
5000m), and snowy mountaintops (over 5000m; Schaller et al. 1985; Ghimire 1994). Each 
climactic zone also has its own unique soil type, rain-fall frequency, and temperature. These 
factors allow Wolong Nature Reserve to support one of the most bio-diverse ecosystems in the 
world. The reserve contains over 4000 plant species and 2200 animal and insect species, 
including 57 endangered animals (Liu 2003; Xu et al. 2006). Some of the best-known threatened 
species include the golden monkey, snow leopard, red panda, and the giant panda (Schaller et al 
1985). Many of these species are relics from the Tertiary period, and are found nowhere else in 
the world. The value of Wolong’s natural biodiversity was recognized by the international 
community as early as 1980, when the site was designated as a biosphere reserve under 
UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere program.  
 Wolong is perhaps best known as the oldest and largest among 25 nature reserves in 
China that are designated to protect the giant panda (Liu et al 1999). The reserve is the site of 
China’s most successful captive panda breeding program. The China Conservation and Research 
Center for the Giant Panda, established on reserve premises in 1980, is the result of a 
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collaboration between the World Wildlife Fund and the Chinese central government. As of 2008, 
the base bred 188 captive pandas, the largest number worldwide. Wolong Nature Reserve itself 
provides a habitat for 1,590 wild pandas (over 10% of the total population - Xu et al. 2006).  
Giant pandas are officially designated as “national treasures” by the Chinese central government. 
In addition to their symbolic, diplomatic, and cultural value, pandas are also regarded as 
invaluable for the scientific study of mammal classification, adaption, and evolution (IUCN 
2006). In 2006, Wolong and sixteen nearby protected areas were designated as a World Heritage 
site specifically for the protection of the Giant Panda (Ibid). The area is the largest remaining 
continuous panda habitat in the world.  
 Wolong Nature Reserve has over 4000 local residents who live on the reserve’s premises. 
Over 70% belong to the Tibetan ethnic nationality, and 25% to the Han ethnic group (who make 
up over 90% of China’s population; Ghimire 1994). A small population of Chang and Hui ethnic 
nationalities also live within the reserve’s premises. Residents live in two concentrated 
townships, Wolong Township and Gengda Township, which occupy a mere 2% of Wolong’s 
total land mass in the reserve’s lower temperate altitudes (Ibid). The Tibetan population migrated 
to Wolong during the late 17th century, and moved to Wolong’s higher altitudes because lowland 
Han people were initially unwilling to live there. Due to long-time interaction and inter-marriage 
between Tibetan and Han cultures, as well as isolation from the Tibetan Plateau, Wolong has its 
own unique “sub-culture” that draws upon both Tibetan and Han traditions (Ghimire 1994).  
Today, over 85% of local Wolong residents depend upon agriculture for subsistence (Lü 
2003; Vina 2007), with maize, potato, and cabbage as the main crops. Most of the crops are sold 
to surrounding towns and exchanged for rice (Ghimire 1994). Families also raise livestock, 
including yaks, pigs, cows, goats and sheep. Local residents are heavily dependent on the natural 
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resources provided by Wolong’s forests. Until the 1990s, residents derived as much as one-third 
of their household income from medicinal plant gathering from Wolong’s forests (Ghimire 
1994). Edible forest plants provided additional food security in case of crop failure. The 
community also gathered firewood and timber from the surrounding forest for cooking, heating, 
and house building (Liu et al. 2003). A small percentage of residents are also employed in small-
scale ecotourism activities (such as restaurants and hotels) and temporary jobs provided by 
Wolong Nature Reserve.   
In addition to Wolong’s rural residents, other groups interact with the reserve on a daily 
basis. Nearly 500 nature reserve staff also live within the reserve, most of whom originally came 
from areas outside of Wolong (Ghimire 1994; He 2008). Between 2002 and 2008, over 200,000 
tourists also visit the reserve annually (He et al. 2008). In contrast, only 20,000 visitors came to 
the reserve in 1995 (Vina 2007). 
 Unlike most nature reserves, which are managed by provincial authorities, Wolong is 
directly administered by the central government via the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) (Ghimire 
1994).  The two townships are under the management of the Wolong Administration Bureau, 
which reports to both regional and central governments (Liu et al. 2003).  
 
Wolong Environmental Management Schemes – 1962 to the Present 
 In this case study, I will analyze the different environmental management strategies 
adopted at Wolong Nature Reserve across two time periods. From the 1960s-1990s, international 
organizations and the central Chinese government adopted strict preservationist environmental 
regulations that prohibited most human activities within the reserve. In the second period (early 
2000s), the reserve adopted new management strategies that provided financial incentives for 
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local residents to preserve the environment. The reserve also developed a tourism plan, and 
began to draw hundreds of thousands of visitors each year.  
For each time period, I will consider the types of “natures” that different stakeholders 
sought to preserve, and the ways in which these ideologies changed over time. Instead of 
associating a singular “nature ideology” for each time period, I will also consider the overlapping 
and even contradictory policy and ideological frameworks (intercurrence) that characterized 
Wolong’s environmental management schemes across all time periods. I will also evaluate the 
ways in which the reserve’s management strategies altered the physical landscape and the socio-
economic living standards of Wolong’s local residents.  I will analyze socio-economic concerns 
at Wolong within a broader analysis of environmental justice and of ethnic minority policies and 
treatment throughout Chinese history.   
 
Period 1 – Panda Preservation – 1962-2000  
Giant Panda Conservation – National Symbol and Endangered Species 
From its creation, the primary management goal of Wolong Nature Reserve was the 
preservation of wild giant panda populations.  The establishment and subsequent expansion of 
the reserve itself was organized around panda habitat protection. Originally, the reserve was a 
mere 20,000 hectares. In 1975, the central government expanded the reserve to 200,000 hectares, 
a ten-fold increase, in order to protect a larger percentage of wild pandas who had recently been 
discovered via a nationwide ground survey (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989; Lu et al 2003). 
Indeed, before the 2000s, the provincial and national government dedicated most of Wolong’s 
financial resources to giant panda conservation. 
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Why were conservation strategies at Wolong so focused on one species? The giant panda 
is an internationally recognized symbol of the Chinese nation. Known as China’s “national 
treasure,” the charismatic animal is only found in select mountain ranges in western China. 
Despite its rarity, the panda has large international appeal, partially due to its innocent, cuddly 
appearance. Drawing upon the panda’s popularity, China has frequently gifted pandas to other 
nations as a form of guanxi. Guanxi is a form of Chinese gift-giving intended to produce long-
term, friendly relations based on loyalty and reciprocity (Harrington 2005; Hartig 2013). Only 
selected countries with whom China wishes to cultivate long-term diplomatic relations receive 
giant pandas. For example, after China’s entrance into the global economy in the late 1970s, 
“panda diplomacy” became a “seal of approval” on major trade agreements and signaled China’s 
long-term commitment for peaceful economic relations with its trade allies (Buckingham et al. 
2013).  
Panda diplomacy may also represent China’s attempts to extend its “soft power.” Instead 
of winning international favor via military or economic aggression, China may be using the 
image of the giant panda to improve its national image with select foreign audiences. The “soft, 
cuddly” symbol of the Chinese nation instills positive feelings towards not only the panda, but 
also towards the country that it symbolizes (Buckingham 2013; Hartig 2013). Indeed, both the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Chinese central government consider the panda its “most 
successful foreign ambassador” (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). By preserving wild giant 
panda populations at reserves like Wolong, the Chinese central government is also preserving the 
integrity of its national symbol – one of Chinese peace, friendship, and diplomacy. 
The giant panda is also a symbol of international wildlife conservation (Ministry of 
Forestry & WWF 1989). Giant pandas are relic species who belong to their own unique 
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taxonomic category (Liu et al. 2016B). As such, China’s Sichuan provincial government has 
deemed the giant panda as an invaluable scientific resource for the study of mammal evolution 
and environmental adaption (People’s Government 2002). Unfortunately, panda conservation is 
notoriously difficult because the species has very specific living requirements, such as a limited 
diet (99% bamboo), and a 1-3 day annual breeding period. Pandas also need 3-10 square 
kilometers of undisturbed land in order to successfully perform their mating ritual (Ministry of 
Forestry & WWF 1989; Buckingham et al. 2013). As such, pandas are susceptible to natural 
disasters and human disturbance, and only an estimated 1,600 pandas remain in the wild 
(Buckingham et al. 2013). The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) adopted the giant panda as a 
symbol of conservation, not only for the animal’s charisma, but also because the panda is a 
“classic case of a rare species unable to adapt to a rapidly changing world” (Ministry of Forestry 
& WWF 1989). In addition to preserving giant panda populations, the WWF, the Chinese 
national Ministry of Forestry, and Chinese scientists also saw panda conservation as a means by 
which to protect thousands of other rare animal species who also require undisturbed forested 
panda habitat for survival, such as the red panda and the golden monkey.     
Concerned conservationists, international non-profit organizations, and the Chinese 
central government are concerned that the giant panda will become extinct unless drastic actions 
are taken to preserve its habitat. These interest groups often identify subsistence practices of 
local communities as the cause of the panda’s decline. Between 1974 and 1988, 50% of suitable 
panda habitat in Sichuan Province vanished (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). Similarly, total 
wild panda population numbers declined from 2459 in the 1970s to 1596 in the early 2000s (Liu 
et al. 2016B). Surprisingly, the decline in suitable panda habitat occurred even within the 
boundaries of panda nature reserves. After the creation of Wolong Nature Reserve in 1962, 
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environmental degradation increased within the reserve at levels equal to or higher than 
unprotected lands around it (Liu 2001). Forest cover significantly decreased after 1974, when the 
reserve was expanded from 2,000 to 20,000 km2 to include Wolong’s two townships. By 1997, 
high-quality forest habitats in Wolong had decreased by 15% (Liu 2001; Vina 2007). The 
general quality of forest habitats also decreased, with habitats unsuitable for supporting pandas 
increasing over 10-fold (Ibid).  In addition, habitat connectivity between the reserve and the 
surrounding forest land dropped from 65% to 46% between 1965 and 2001 (Vina 2001). Habitat 
connectivity is essential for preserving species, because small isolated populations interbreed and 
decrease the vitality of the species’ gene pool10 (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2008). Decreases in 
habitat quantity and quality corresponded with a large decreases in the number of wild pandas in 
the reserve; from 1974 to 1986, Wolong’s wild panda population dropped from 145 to 72 pandas 
(Liu et al. 2001).  
Groups such as the WWF, Chinese scientists, and China’s Ministry of Forestry (MoF) 
argued that Wolong’s local residents were the “direct driving force behind the destruction” of 
both the forest and panda habitat (Liu 1999; Liu 2001; Liu 2003; Lü 2003; Xu 2006). 
Specifically, scientists studying forest habitat degradation and biodiversity loss in Wolong 
identified local activities such as fuelwood harvesting, grazing, and land cultivation as the 
primary causes of forest habitat loss and fragmentation (Ibid). The Ministry of Forestry and the 
WWF also argued that human population growth was the “biggest constraint on reserve 
management” (Ghimire 1994). Indeed, between 1975 and 1999, the number of households in the 
Wolong area grew by 115% (Liu 1999). In Wolong Nature Reserve’s official 1989 
                                                          
10 See Thorrold (2001), Carroll (2004), and Botsford (2009) for additional discussion of challenges facing 
metapopulations in PAs 
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environmental management plan, the MoF and WWF suggested that human population growth at 
Wolong facilitated an increase in local consumption of forest resources, especially fuelwood, and 
was primarily responsible for panda habitat destruction (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989; Liu 
1999). The plan estimated that local residents collected 1,817 cubic metres of firewood from the 
reserve each year (Ghimire 1994).  Pandas depend upon bamboo stands that grow in the 
understory of undisturbed forest; deforested areas remain unfavorable habitat for the pandas for 
nearly forty years after disturbance. From the perspective of the aforementioned conservationists 
and decision-makers, China’s giant panda population were rapidly disappearing, and the only 
means by which to halt that destruction was to limit the “cause” of panda decline – local 
community subsistence.  
  Another way in which the Chinese central government and international NGOs justified 
the preservation of Wolong’s panda was to invoke historical narratives that framed panda 
population loss as a centuries-long process initiated by local farmers. In Wolong’s 1989 
management plan, the Chinese Ministry of Forestry argued that pandas used to live in lowland 
areas across China, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand (Liu et al. 2016B), until human 
settlement patterns and agricultural activities forced the few remaining panda populations to 
settle in remote mountainous regions. By blaming local farmers as the primary cause of panda 
population decline, the Chinese central government justified its emphasis on panda conservation 
at Wolong Nature Reserve, over the needs of human populations.  “There is nowhere else for 
them [the pandas] to go,” the Ministry of Forestry said. “If we are serious about saving the 
panda, there is no alternative to removing people from its last habitat, however… complex that 
operation may prove” (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). The MoF also suggested that giant 
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pandas “enrich the lives of millions of interested human beings” as if the sacrifice of local 
community subsistence needs in Wolong was offset by the “greater good.”  
Strict preservationist discourses justifying human exclusion from nature reserves is not 
unique to China’s protected areas; indeed, before the 1970s, PAs across Europe, Africa, and the 
United States often adopted conservation ideals that undermined local consumption needs 
(ranging from totalschutz to displacement without movement; see chapter 1). What is interesting 
to consider about China’s preservationist approach is the reasons for which it chose to adopt 
panda conservation as the centerpiece of environmental management, and the justification for 
this approach. Evaluating the particular contexts in which Chinese decision-makers adopted 
certain preservationist approaches over others is essential for understanding the diversity of PA 
models worldwide. In the case of Wolong Nature Reserve, strict preservation strategies were 
adopted not only because of the perceived threats of local human consumption and the steady 
decline of panda populations, but also to preserve China’s symbol of peace and diplomacy. In 
contrast, while similar “displacement without movement” strategies in South Africa and 
Switzerland also limited local community activities in PAs, other factors such as the social 
control of African peoples and national identity formation around Switzerland’s natural 
landscapes played a role in the creation of environmental management strategies that had 
different consequences for each PA.  
 
Panda Conservation Strategies at Wolong Nature Reserve 
China’s first legislative attempts to manage giant panda populations reflected the 
aforementioned relationship between local consumption and panda preservation. By 1984, 
China’s National Forestry Law banned human settlement, hunting, tree-cutting, grazing, and 
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medicinal plant collection in specially designated forests, including protected areas (Ministry of 
Forestry & WWF 1989). Even outside of nature reserves, the central government took 
extraordinary steps to preserve panda habitat by barring all forestry operations in these areas by 
1999 (People’s Gov 2002), and by promoting bamboo restocking, reforestation, and forest 
monitoring (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). While these regulations were not always 
enforced at a local scale, they did halt commercial logging on the premises of Wolong Nature 
Reserve.  
Environmental management strategies at Wolong Nature Reserve during the late-1900s 
are perhaps best characterized by the National Conservation Management Plan for the Giant 
Panda and Its Habitat. Based on Wolong’s specific management plan in 1992, the legislation was 
the result of a collaboration between the central government’s Ministry of Forestry and WWF. 
The main objectives of the plan was strict panda and wildlife preservation. The plan provided for 
habitat restoration and biological and ecological research of the panda in order to identify and 
address threats to its survival. The plan explicitly requested “the reduction of human activity in 
panda habitat… in such a way that pandas can continue to live there [disturbed habitats]” 
(Ministry of Forestry and WWF 1989). The plan’s desire to reduce local consumption activities 
assume that human activity is inherently incompatible with panda and wildlife preservation as a 
whole.   
The desire of the Chinese central government to preserve the environment by limiting 
local human consumption continued into the 1990s. Building upon the 1984 PA logging ban, the 
1994 China Nature Reserve Regulation prohibited most local consumption activities within 
nature reserve premises. Banned activities included tree-cutting, grazing, hunting, fishing, 
gathering medicinal herbs, farmland reclamation, and mining (Xue 2000). Unlike most of 
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China’s nature reserves, Wolong enforced many of these local consumption restrictions, partially 
because it had the budget to do so – between 1991 and 1995, Wolong’s budget was 5 to 210 
times greater than other PAs (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). Wolong is under the 
jurisdiction of the central government, and receives resources directly from it, whereas most 
Chinese PAs receive their funds from the provincial government only. 
The 1994 China Nature Reserve Regulation also established a zoning system within 
nature reserves based on the international standard set by the UNESCO World Network of 
Biosphere Reserves. In theory, the zoning system was intended to balance the needs of local 
communities and nature preservation boy establishing various “zones” of human activity. For 
example, no humans were theoretically allowed into established “core zones” in the nature 
reserves unless they had special permission for scientific purposes. In buffer or transitional 
zones, however, certain types of human development and consumption were permitted. The law 
intended policy-makers to follow ecological principals during their delineation of the zones; that 
is, sensitive habitats such as panda habitat would be designated as core zones, whereas less 
sensitive environments such as lowland deforested regions would be designated as buffer or 
transitional. Unfortunately, zoning of Chinese PAs was not always based on conservation 
principles. In fact, Ghimire notes that the park originally designated the human settlements at 
Wolong as “core areas,” despite the fact that these areas were not suitable for panda habitat 
(Ghimire 1994).11 PA decision-makers may have used core zoning as a justification for 
                                                          
11 Notably, Wolong Nature Reserve altered its core zone designations in 1998 and 2009. The new designations 
more accurately represented panda habitat. They also designated areas of human settlement as buffer and 
experimental zones (Hull 2011). The recognition of local subsistence in the re-zoning is representative of the shift 
in Wolong environmental policy from its focus on strict preservation (Era 1 – 1970-90s) to a recognition of local 
subsistence and economic needs (Era 2 – 2000s).  
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displacing local Wolong residents in order to protect local ecosystems from the perceived threats 
of excessive local consumption of Wolong’s forest goods.    
For example, the Ministry of Forestry and international NGOs went as far as to attempt 
the coerced relocation of Wolong residents. The goal of such relocation schemes was to reduce 
local consumption of forest resources by reducing human population size (Ministry of Forestry 
and WWF 1989). Indeed, the central government has tried to relocate Wolong’s residents on 
multiple occasions without success. In the 1980s, national regulations divided Wolong Nature 
Reserve into three zones: a core area with minimal human activity permitted, a scientific 
research zone, and a zone for human settlement (Ghimire 1994). The World Food Programme 
attempted to relocate Wolong’s residents from the core area by building Western-style 
apartments for 100 families at the edge of the reserve.  Unfortunately, the WFP did not provide 
the families with land for agriculture, the main means of local employment, or any other 
employment alternatives. Local residents refused to move out, and none have been relocated. A 
1989 WWF-Ministry of Forestry management plan also proposed to move people from Genda 
Township, without success. The importance placed upon human resettlement is evident by 
Wolong Nature Reserve’s environmental budget allotment – between 1991 and 1995, 65% of the 
reserve’s total budget was allocated towards human displacement efforts. This percentage does 
not consider the money spent by the WWF and the World Food Programme for human relocation 
schemes (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). 
While China’s nature reserve regulations appear severe on paper, several PA scholars 
note that such regulations are often aspirational in nature, because they are impossible to enforce 
(Harris 2007). For example, Harris notes that while the Chinese government banned most forms 
of local consumption on PA premises in its environmental regulations, they did not put into place 
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mechanisms by which to remove the 1-3 million people nationwide who resided within the core 
zones of nature reserves across China, and who were already exploiting the natural resources of 
the land. As such, the legislation reflected “an ideal of biodiversity protection that no local 
administrator was expected to fulfill” (Harris 2007). As discussed in Chapter 2, PA park 
managers across China did not implement PA local resident land use prohibitions in practice due 
to a lack of financial and environmental enforcement. Even though the central government did 
not achieve their visions for PA management in practice, their national PA regulations attempt to 
construct a type of “nature” at PAs that is free from local human activity. The regulations 
consider this human-free PA to be the most desirable, “aspirational” environmental management 
strategy during the late-1900s.  
 
Implications of Panda Conservation for Local Human Populations 
The act of designating a protected area in and of itself has consequences for both the 
physical landscape and the socioeconomic status of the people who live there. This is most 
evident in the initial environmental management schemes adopted at Wolong Nature Reserve 
under the authority of the central government.  
As previously noted, forest ecosystems at Wolong began to degrade more rapidly after 
the reserve’s creation in the 1960s (Liu et al. 2001). The national Chinese government, 
international NGOs, and conservationists attributed the reserve’s ecological degradation to 
increased local activity, and adopted “fences and fines” policies to exclude all human 
consumption from the reserve. While local populations certainly do utilize certain ecosystem 
resources within the reserve, by only blaming rural residents for environmental damages, interest 
groups in favor of strict preservation do not acknowledge the impact of state policies and 
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environmental management strategies that produce the conditions for which local communities 
extract increasing amounts of forest resources. They are also not taking into account the 
environmental damages associated with other groups that interact with the reserve.  
 For example, blaming local residents for environmental damages on Wolong’s premises 
does not explain why degradation increased dramatically after the reserve’s formation, compared 
to surrounding areas with similar population sizes. Wolong residents had been living in the area 
since the mid-17th century. The predominantly Tibetan residents were initially pastoral, and 
grazed their livestock at high altitudes. In the eighteenth century, the introduction of maize, 
potatoes, and cabbages led residents to live in compact settlements in lowland regions where 
temperatures are more conducive for permanent agricultural crops, though livestock remained an 
important source of cash and food for the community. Before the establishment of Wolong 
Nature Reserve, residents grazed yaks, cows, pigs, and other livestock by traveling to Wolong’s 
highland grasslands. Considering that environmental degradation only increased greatly in the 
reserve after its designation, and that Wolong’s 4000 local residents had lived in the area for 
hundreds of years, other internal and external forces related to reserve designation must also be 
responsible for ecological destruction in the late 20th century.  
While park managers, scientists, and government bodies often assume that human 
activities take place in panda habitat, this is not always the case. Giant pandas only live between 
2500 to 3500 meters above sea level (Ghimire 1994). On the other hand, local residents live in 
lowland regions where pandas do not reside. Agricultural activities are thus limited to low 
altitudes (up to 2000 meters) to avoid conflict with pandas. Furthermore, local residents collect 
firewood and graze cows and goats up to a height of 2500 meters in Wolong’s mixed deciduous 
and evergreen forests. Villager subsistence activities rarely occur in areas suitable for panda 
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habitat; indeed, according to surveys in the 1990s, most residents had never even seen a wild 
panda (Ghimire 1994). Other local activities such as yak grazing and medicinal plant gathering 
occur in grassland habitats unsuitable for pandas, and at elevations higher than panda habitat 
(Ibid). In addition, local residents do not graze yaks at these higher altitudes for longer than a 
few weeks each year, minimizing damages to the habitat. As such, local consumption activities 
do not always take place in fragile panda habitats, the primary concern of Wolong conservation 
activities.  
Several outside factors may have contributed to environmental degradation in Wolong 
after the establishment of the reserve. First, commercial logging was not halted in the area until 
thirteen years after the reserve’s management. Commercial logging is a significant threat to 
panda habitat in China; between 1974 and 1989, it was the leading cause of giant panda habitat 
destruction in Sichuan Province (Liu et al. 2010). Even though logging was banned in all parts of 
the reserve, these measures were not enforced until the mid-2000s. Furthermore, logging 
continued unimpeded in the areas surrounding Wolong Nature Reserve until 1999, when the 
central government protected major tracts of forestland around Wolong in an attempt to 
safeguard panda habitat (People’s Gov 2002). Interestingly, panda populations only began to 
increase in the 2000s after the central government halted commercial logging both inside and 
outside the park.  
Another cause of the reserve’s environmental degradation was that national policies and 
economic markets rewarded local residents for destructive environmental behavior in new ways. 
For example, Wolong Nature Reserve was previously isolated in the mountains, without any 
major access roads to reach it. After the reserve’s designation, government officials built a road 
from Wolong to surrounding towns, which provided local residents with access to local markets 
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for the first time. In order to gain monetary wealth, many local residents began extracting natural 
resources such as fuelwood as marketable goods (Liu et al. 2001). By the 1990s, Wolong was 
also beginning to attract thousands of visitors each year. To support the consumption of the 
tourist population and to make additional revenue, local residents increased their extractive 
activities. As late as 1999, local residents of counties with panda habitat had an average per 
capita annual income that fell below the international poverty line; therefore, their need for extra 
income and increasing demand for forest products spurred extractive local practices (Liu et al. 
2016B). A mixture of tourist consumption, regional economic development, and lack of local 
economic alternatives resulted in Wolong’s environmental degradation in the 1900s.  
 
Local Indigenous Populations – Effects of Environmental Management 
 Environmental regulations at Wolong Nature Reserve in the 1960-90s not only had a 
profound effect on nature preservation, but also upon the livelihoods of its local Tibetan 
indigenous residents.12 By placing blame for the reserve’s environmental degradation on local 
communities, park managers, government bodies, and international organizations created top-
down environmental management schemes without considering the needs of local stakeholders, 
who depended on the reserve’s wood, wildlife, and food resources for subsistence and economic 
prosperity. Instead, the policies were established without local consultation. The newly adopted 
“fences and fines” policies banned all forms of local use of environmental resources.  
                                                          
12 Wolong Nature Reserve has improved local development in two ways. First, local investment into the reserve also 
provided local residents with electricity via five new hydroelectric plants. Second, the reserve built a road to the 
reserve, and connected the relatively isolated region to outside communities and markets. Despite these benefits, the 
economic consequences of the reserve on the local community are severe, and the health, sanitation, nutrition, and 
economic prosperity of local communities is in jeopardy.   
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 One of the major challenges faced by Wolong’s local indigenous populations during the 
1900s was their lack of access to stable sources of food. For example, as late as 1994, Wolong’s 
per capita grain subsistence production was less than half of the national average, and local 
access to meat, eggs, and fish was limited (Ghimire 1994). Before the establishment of the 
reserve, local people collected supplemental food resources from the environment, such as 
mushrooms, fruits, and nuts. This source of nutrition acted as an important safety net for families 
during low-yield agricultural harvest. With the ban on hunting and local plant gathering in 1984 
(source), the local community could no longer rely on this secondary food source. 
The establishment of environmental regulations at Wolong Nature Reserve also had a 
negative impact on local people’ ability to make a living from the land, even when such activities 
were not officially banned. From 1962 to 1994, Wolong Nature Reserve lost 23% of its 
agricultural land due to reforestation and conservation schemes (Ghimire 1994). Considering that 
between 80 and 95 percent of Wolong’s residents are farmers who heavily depend on agriculture 
for subsistence, the decrease in cropland has significant implications for local nutrition and 
employment (Ghimire 1994; Ghimire 1997). The second major source of income among local 
residents, livestock raising, also became much less profitable after the establishment of Wolong 
Nature Reserve. After the implementation of anti-grazing regulations, only 50% of the local 
community could make any income from livestock sale, despite the fact that the community had 
been a pastoral one since the 1700s (Ghimire 1997). Furthermore, park managers did not provide 
alternative economic activities for local residents that substituted their lost access to Wolong’s 
food and timber resources. The park’s 375 staff members primarily consisted of individuals from 




The increasing volatility of traditional sources of income placed Wolong’s local 
indigenous community in a precarious economic situation. By 1992, the average local net 
household income was 538 yuan, compared to a national rural household income of 708 yuan 
(Ghimire 1994). Wolong’s forest resources originally acted as an alternative source of income 
that lessened the impacts of seasonal, volatile unemployment and unprofitable harvest. For 
example, medicinal plant gathering alone constituted over one-fifth of local income in 1992, 
even though the reserve limited legal plant gathering to one month per year (Ghimire 1997). 
Without the ability to rely on food and plants in the reserve’s forests, local Wolong residents 
were more vulnerable to economic poverty and malnutrition.  
The criminalization of local consumption activities is a type of “displacement without 
movement.” While local communities were not physically displaced from the reserve, they were 
effectively excluded from the very type of environment that they depended upon for survival – 
one with forest and wildlife resources (Nixon 2011). Indeed, the fact that multiple parties have 
attempted to displace Wolong’s local community outside of the reserve during the 1980-90s is a 
good example of the priorities of environmental decision-makers to uphold nature conservation, 
especially without local interference. Displacement projects created new apartment spaces for 
local people without providing alternative economic opportunities or farming land. The failure of 
these displacement schemes not only demonstrates local opposition to removal schemes, but also 
the ways that Chinese central government and international non-profit members did not consider 
local economic context when developing PA environmental management strategies. Like the 
“fences and fines” policies targeted at local consumption, displacement projects at Wolong 
Nature Reserve did not consider local needs and instead focused on strict preservation.    
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The lack of recognition and inclusion of local people in environmental discourses and 
decision-making processes highlights the invisibility of communities who live within reserve 
boundaries. In his book Crimes Against Nature, Karl Jacoby (2001) argues that discourses 
celebrating environmental conservation and pristine nature render the discourses of local 
communities and indigenous groups invisible. Highlighting different local understandings and 
engagements with nature is crucial for understanding the complexity of human-nature 
relationships. In the case of Wolong, scientific, governmental, and public discourses that 
emphasize panda conservation as the primary point of interest for the reserve are obscuring the 
perspectives of Wolong’s local indigenous Tibetan population. Local Tibetans are especially 
invisible in public discourse and for decision-making priorities because they do not speak 
Mandarin, are physically isolated from other communities (e.g. the nearest city is eight hours 
away through dangerous mountain road systems that frequently close), and do not have the 
resources to communicate with wider audiences. Bringing attention to indigenous perspectives is 
essential, because the environmental legislations moderating use of forest resources alters local 
subsistence practices that have been in place since the 17th century. As Jacoby argues, it is 
important to consider who is able to construct environmental narratives and management 
schemes, and who is not (Jacoby 2001).  
 
Regulating Indigenous Bodies at Wolong – Implications within Chinese Ethnic Policy 
Wolong’s indigenous Tibetan population is not directly comparable to indigenous people 
living in Tibet and the rest of the nation. Wolong residents migrated to the reserve over three 
hundred years ago, and have remained relatively isolated from political, cultural, and religious 
events in the Tibetan plateau. Furthermore, Tibetan people at Wolong have intermixed with Han 
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Chinese; as such, their culture is a fusion of Han and Tibetan traditions and values (Ghimire 
1994).13  
That being said, the economic and social implications facing Wolong’s local Tibetan 
population cannot be understood without a broader analysis of indigenous treatment in recent 
Chinese history and the importance of ethnic policy in national politics. The erasure of 
indigenous cultural values and economic needs on a national level is reminiscent of Wolong 
Nature Reserve’s exclusionary environmental management schemes. Furthermore, the economic 
disparities facing Wolong residents mirror those of Tibetans and indigenous people across China. 
An evaluation of Chinese indigenous policy provides an example of the challenges facing 
indigenous PA residents at Wolong and at PAs throughout the nation.  
National ethnic policy has been a cornerstone of the Chinese central government’s 
Communist Party (CCP) agenda since its rise to power in 1949. The central government 
considers ethnic affairs to be a “national security” concern. Indeed, by “managing” ethnic and 
national culture, today’s CCP hopes to reduce the risks of ethnic conflict that potentially fuel 
CCP opposition groups such as break-away nations. From this perspective, opposition groups 
pose a threat to the CCP’s very ability to control the nation itself, and the regulation and control 
of indigenous bodies and discourse is one of the party’s top priorities (Brady 2012a). In fact, the 
CCP has several branches of provincial and central government dedicated to the regulation of 
indigenous issues, including the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, the United Front Department, 
and the Central Propaganda Department. 
                                                          
13 More research is needed to determine the cultural and religious traditions of Wolong’s Tibetan population. These 
insights are crucial for understanding local values and understandings of the environment, and for creating 
environmental management strategies that incorporate local needs and beliefs.  
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CCP national ethnic policy is as good example of the types of historical erasure, 
economic disadvantage, and ethnic control that still shape the lives of indigenous people at 
Chinese PAs today. Two of the CCP’s primary approaches to indigenous policy nationwide since 
1949 were the national integration of indigenous populations (occasionally through force) and 
the economic development of indigenous areas as part of the nation’s national economic strategy 
(Harrell :47). While CCP indigenous policy has served to improve the livelihoods of rural 
indigenous people under certain circumstances, it has also undermined indigenous rights and 
rendered local indigenous cultures invisible through forced assimilation and the denial of 
indigenous cultural and religious legitimacy.  
For example, during the late 1950s, Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong promoted 
several major student campaigns that called upon Han Chinese, who make up 92% of China’s 
total population, to “rescue the backward” rural ethnic minorities (Harrell 2001; Bradyb 2012). 
These campaigns depicted indigenous people as semi-feudal, and as if they were from an “earlier 
[and inferior] stage” of development (Ibid). In contrast, CCP discourses painted the modern 
socialist state as the savior of these impoverished people who would lead them into the modern 
world through economic development. The campaigns served to erase the legitimacy of 
indigenous lifestyles and cultures through a discourse of backwardness, and suggested that 
indigenous adoption of Han Chinese modernity and culture was the only way to “progress.” 
Forced and coercive assimilation are particularly problematic for the Tibetan indigenous 
people, including the 2.41 million that live in Tibet (China Internet Information Center 2001). 
Tibet is located in western China (Figure 3), and was taken over by the Chinese government via 
a military campaign in the early 1950s. Since the takeover, Tibet has experienced various types 
of national integration policies, from military repression to infrastructure improvement (Barnett 
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1998). Historically, the Chinese government imprisoned and even executed thousands of 
Tibetans during uprisings in 1959. Tibetan indigenous people were also one of the most 
impacted by forced assimilation tactics. One of the most severe assimilation tactics occurred 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The Cultural Revolution was a nation-wide 
movement that attempted to erase and destroy “backward” thoughts and traditions from Chinese 
society (Ibid). The nation declared religious beliefs and distinctions between nationalities to be 
the result of backward class systems. As a result, indigenous people were forced to assimilate by 
adopting Han Chinese customs, destroying religious temples, and declaring their atheism (Ibid). 
They were also expected to humiliate and prosecute their cultural leaders, such as elders, 
intellectuals, and religious figures. 14  
The central government’s suppression of Tibetan populations is a major political 
impediment to local Wolong resident participation in environmental decision-making at Wolong 
Nature Reserve. Given historical erasure and government control of Tibetan people and the 
central government’s understanding of ethnic policy as a “security issue,” Wolong Tibetan 
residents who ask for participatory management techniques may be seen as a threat to the central 
government’s political control.  
While Tibetan people’s experiences during the Cultural Revolution are an extreme 
version of forced indigenous assimilation techniques, they highlighted underlying Chinese 
central government sentiments regarding the inferior status of indigenous people and the 
                                                          
14 It is important to note that the Chinese national government also used a combination of alluring political and 
economic promises, gifts, and rewards in addition to violence and assimilation in order to secure political and 
economic control over Tibet. In some cases, Chinese policies did result in significant cultural and economic gains 
for rural Tibetan populations. Indeed, in the 1980s, CCP policies promoted Tibetan political self-autonomy, 
religious freedom, and infrastructure development. As a result, Tibetans rebuilt over 1500 monasteries, and began to 
experience economic mobility (Barnett 1998).  
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illegitimacy of their religious practices. For example, during the 1990s, China attempted to 
“redefine” Tibetan culture. China’s CCP party secretary Chen Kuiyuan argued that Buddhism 
was “foreign” to Tibetan culture (Barnett 1998). In line with this ideal, the Chinese government 
began to require monasteries to formally recognize Tibet as a part of China, and to denounce the 
Dalai Lama. Scholars have analyzed the CCP’s attack on Tibetan religion and culture as an act to 
eliminate cultural ideals that could lead to future dissent (Barnett 1998; Brady 2013B). By 
attempting to “redefine” Tibetan culture and strengthen its political and social control over 
Tibetan populations, the CCP framed Tibetan cultural and religious traditions as “illegitimate” 
and attempted to erase their centrality to Tibetan people.  
A “backward” depiction of indigenous people’s way of life discounts their unique 
cultural, social, and environmental practices that have often been in place for hundreds of years. 
For example, for the Tibetan ethnic nationality in Yunnan Province adjacent to Wolong Nature 
Reserve, 80% of local mountains and forests were considered religiously sacred, and excessive 
human consumptive activities in these areas was explicitly forbidden by their cultural practices 
(Jing 2007). Indeed, Yunnan Tibetans considered the relationship between the land, ancestral 
spirits, and their bodies as interlinked, and self-regulated many of their own activities to 
compliment natural systems. While more research is needed to determine Wolong Tibetan 
cultural and religious practices and their relationship to the natural environment, it is significant 
that central government ethnic policies erase the legitimacy of local cultural, religious, and 
environmental practices and declare them to be illegitimate.  
 To achieve its goal of national unity, the CCP also purposely obscured public discourse 
about indigenous conflict while promoting ethnic propaganda to national and international 
audiences regarding China’s stability and unity (Brady 2012b). One of the major concepts 
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advanced by the Chinese central government was the idea of a “unified multi-ethnic country” 
(Information Office of the State Council 2009). Officially, the party describes the country’s 
history as “developed by all ethnic groups in the big family of the Chinese nation” (Ibid). The 
CCP’s ethnic policy stresses the importance of stability and unification among ethnic groups. 
Scholars such as Brady 2012b argue that these policies serve to maintain China’s long-term 
political stability and its international affairs. In practice, many of China’s policies in the 1900s 
promoted “unification” through the coerced assimilation of indigenous groups. For example, the 
CCP instructed indigenous children in Mandarin and discouraged local language learning.  
By portraying indigenous communities within a “unified multi-ethnic” national 
framework, Chinese national propaganda obscures the individual voices of indigenous 
communities, as well as the unique economic challenges that they face. For example, according 
to China’s most recent national regulation on ethnic policy, before CCP takeover, minority areas 
had poor infrastructure and “backward” social and economic development. The Chinese 
government, however, “completely got rid of stark poverty and backwardness” through 
economic and technological development (Information… 2009). While the CCP has brought 
basic infrastructure to rural indigenous communities like Wolong Nature Reserve such as 
electricity, these discourses erase the fact that the economic gap between urban populations and 
rural indigenous communities was often exacerbated by development strategies. As late as 2006, 
China’s indigenous population made up 40% of the country’s poorest individuals, despite the 
fact that they only made up 9% of the population (New Internationalist). Indeed, in Tibet, the 
urban-rural household income inequality reached a 5.5 ratio in 2001, the highest in the country 
(Fischer 2013). At Wolong Nature Reserve average per capital household income was a mere 
1624 yuan (250 USD), compared to a national rural average of 4760 yuan (734 USD; Liu et al. 
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2016B). Despite local Tibetan economic disadvantages, Wolong created policies that barred 
local access to food, firewood, and medicinal items for the reserve’s forest, effectively removing 
a major source of Tibetan income. The lack of consideration for Wolong Tibetan needs is 
reminiscent of the historical erasure of Tibetan and indigenous population economic needs, 
especially in the midst of rapid Chinese economic growth.  
85% of local populations who live within China’s state-level nature reserves are ethnic 
nationalities (Xu et al. 2006). In Wolong, Tibetan indigenous people make up 70% of the local 
population (Ibid). As such, the local economic conditions of indigenous people and their unique 
cultural, religious, and environmental stewardship practices are important considerations for 
preserving China’s ecological systems (Chinese Government 2009). Wolong’s Tibetan 
population face similar levels of urban-rural income disparity, even though the central 
government has improved infrastructure in both the reserve and the Tibetan plateau. Despite 
these disadvantages, environmental management at Wolong has historically erased indigenous 
economic needs. Environmental management strategies that recognize this history and engage 
with local indigenous populations are necessary for effective, socially responsible nature reserve 
management in China. 
 
Environmental Management and Local Economic Development – 2000s   
By the early 2000s, several scientific studies of panda habitat across all of China’s nature 
reserves convinced the central government that the preservationist management schemes of the 
1900s were not effectively preserving panda populations. Furthermore, several nation-wide 
natural disasters in the late 1990s raised the CCP’s awareness that erosion and deforestation was 
causing major flooding and droughts destructive to the safety and agricultural viability of China 
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(Liu et al. 2016B). In response to these concerns, the central government established two new 
conservation programs that safeguarded forest habitats. At Wolong in particular, three new 
conservation programs were put into place; the Grain to Green Program (GTGP), the National 
Forest Conservation Program (NFCP), and the Eco-hydropower Plant Program (EPP). Wolong 
also became subject to new regulations because it became one of fifteen PAs included in China’s 
2006 World Heritage Panda Sanctuary. The conservation programs of the 2000s signaled a major 
shift in nature reserve management in China, because they were some of the first pieces of 
national environmental legislation to provide financial incentives to local communities for 
adopting preservationist behavior. The regulations reframed the role of local communities as 
environmental stewards who provided manpower for habitat restoration and for environmental 
monitoring.  
The EPP was a local initiative established only within the boundaries of Wolong Nature 
Reserve itself. EPP provides electricity to local Wolong residents in order to reduce their 
dependence on fuelwood and facilitate reduced deforestation and habitat destruction. Since the 
program’s start in 2002, local fuelwood consumption has decreased by 40-50% (Liu et al. 
2016B). 
The National Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) is the most popular national initiative 
adopted at Wolong Nature Reserve; virtually all households participate in the program. Each 
household receives a parcel of natural forest to monitor in order to prevent illegal harvesting. If 
the household successfully protects their allotted forest area, they receive 850 yuan, or 5% of 
their annual household income (Liu et al. 2016B). Like the EPP, NFCP encouraged a local 
switch to electricity consumption, reducing the need for firewood collection.     
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The 2002 Grain to Green Program (GTGP) was one of the most significant land-use 
policies adopted by the national Chinese government in recent years. The legislation was a 
response to the rapid economic development of China’s economy, which often resulted in the 
deterioration of fragile natural ecosystems the exacerbation of rural poverty, especially among 
farming communities. China’s natural ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to deforestation 
and erosion due to the country’s mountainous geography. Over 6 million ha of Chinese farmland 
exist at slopes of over 25 degrees. These steep areas are vulnerable to soil erosion that accounts 
for 5 billion tons of eroded soil across nearly 40% of China’s national territory (UN 2003; Liu 
and Wu 2010). In 1998, massive flooding exacerbated by deforestation in mountain regions 
caused over 38 billion dollars in damages, and impacted the livelihoods of 230 million Chinese 
farmers (Liu and Wu 2010). The central government implemented the GTGP program in order to 
prevent natural disasters of a similar magnitude in the future. The Chinese government 
subsidizes farmers to convert agricultural land prone to erosion and pollution on sloped hills into 
forestland. Rural farmers receive an annual grain subsidy based on the number of hectares they 
converted into farmland. The central government also pays for the tree seedlings needed for 
reforestation (UN 2003). Nationwide, over 10 million farmers and one-third of farmer 
households in program areas are involved in farmland-forest conversions. It is also one of the 
largest national projects targeting poverty alleviation.  At Wolong Nature Reserve, the GTGP 
program paid local residents an annual 3450 yuan per hectare for eight years for cropland 
conversion. By 2006, local Wolong households had converted 56% of their land into forest, and 
the payments accounted for 8% of their household income (Liu et al. 2016B).  
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By 2007, the conservation programs appeared to be producing tangible results.15 
Electricity consumption doubled in the Wolong’s two townships, and forest cover increased by 
11.4%, (compared to a 14.2% loss between 1987 and 2001- Liu et al. 2016B) 
 While Wolong’s new conservation strategies did succeed in preserving and restoring 
forest-land, the economic benefits for local residents are somewhat questionable. In addition, the 
policies alone cannot account for the success of environmental initiatives. By 2005, even though 
95% of Wolong’s residents were considered farmers, over 38% of annual household income 
came from off-farm employment (Liu et al. 2016B). Much of this employment was temporary, 
such as construction work, and placed local people at risk of an unsteady income. Meanwhile, 
employment opportunities outside of Wolong remain difficult for local residents to access, 
because most working-age adults have little education and limited Mandarin Chinese language 
skills (Xu et al. 2006). Therefore, the switch to off-farm employment, while more friendly for 
environmental reforestation efforts, frequently places Wolong households into riskier, volatile 
financial circumstances. It also suggests that the success of reforestation must also be attributed 
to changes in local economic opportunities, as opposed to policy subsidies. 
 Part of the reason that local communities have shifted to off-farm employment is that the 
strict preservationist regulations governing Wolong Nature Reserve during the 1900s are still in 
effect. These regulations provide no economic incentives or alternatives for local consumption 
activities, and continue to exclude local people from activities essential for their livelihoods. For 
                                                          
15 It is worth noting that in some cases, environmental management strategies can have unintended consequences 
that degrade Wolong’s forest habitats. For example, after Wolong Nature Reserve began to restrict local livestock 
grazing, residents began to pen their livestock. In several instances, the animals escaped and trampled through 
fragile panda habitat, eating bamboo and causing much more damage than typical cattle grazing (Liu et al. 2016B). 
The rampaging cattle demonstrate the importance of considering the economic consequences of environmental 
management strategies for local people, and the ways in which local responses to environmental strategies can 
cause further damage to the ecosystem.  
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example, as late as the 1990s, medicinal plant gathering constituted 20% of local income. Today, 
local residents cannot gather plants even in disturbed forest areas, except at certain times of the 
year. The conflict between the subsidized 2000 conservation regulations and the 1900 
preservationist legislation at Wolong Nature Reserve demonstrates the contradictory nature of 
policy regimes – that is, one that subsidizes local environmental behavior, and one that seeks to 
displace and exclude local people. The intercurrence of these regimes reproduces the limited 
economic and environmental opportunities of the earlier period, even as new policies attempt to 
provide local communities with greater regulatory flexibility.   
 The income earned by local indigenous groups from the conservation regulations 
provides some economic stability – in 2008, the GTGP and NFCP accounted for 13% of annual 
household income (Liu et al. 2016B). That being said, 92% of the GTGP’s funds come from the 
central government, and the subsidies are on a limited eight-year cycle (Liu and Wu 2010). In 
2016, the GTGP is up for renewal. If the central government chooses not to renew the program, 
financial resources of the program run out, and Wolong households will no longer be able to rely 
on the GTGP income (Tallis et al. 2008). This is a significant concern, because despite the pro-
development regulations in place during the 2000s, the per capita net income of Wolong 
households in 2008 was only 1624 yuan, compared to an average of 4760 across rural China (Liu 
et al. 2016B).  
 In some instances, the conservation programs placed new burdens on Wolong’s local 
community. For example, with the switch from fuelwood to electricity, local residents have been 
consuming smaller quantities of firewood. While the electricity costs are subsidized by the local 
government, the subsidies have decreased significantly in the past two years, so much so that the 
price of electricity has more than doubled (Xu et al. 2005). In addition to financial insecurity, 
88 
 
unequal local distribution of ecotourism economic benefits is a significant issue for Wolong 
Nature Reserve. Employment of local people in ecotourism efforts was low even for temporary 
infrastructural jobs; 80% of these positions were given to outsiders (He et al. 2008).  
 
Conclusion 
 Wolong Nature Reserve demonstrates contrasting understandings and engagements with 
nature across multiple stakeholder groups. For the Chinese provincial and central government 
and international non-profit organizations, Wolong was a PA created for the protection of a 
national symbol of international conservation and Chinese diplomacy. For conservation 
scientists, Wolong was a fragile habitat that needed to be protected in order to ensure the 
continued survival of the giant panda. For local indigenous residents, Wolong’s forests were a 
source of income, food, and medicine that was becoming increasingly difficult to utilize due to 
tougher environmental enforcement. The PA’s management strategies also demonstrate the 
different power differentials between these stakeholders. Wolong Nature Reserve established 
“legitimate” uses of the environment, such as forest preservation, while “outlawing” other 
relationships with nature, such as local consumption, that had been in place for centuries.  
 Despite the contradictory nature of Wolong’s environmental preservationist laws (1960-
1990s) and its local financial incentive programs (2000s), both types of PA management 
represent legitimate environmental priorities that persist into the present. The giant panda 
remains central to Chinese international relations and a living hallmark of endangered species 
conservation worldwide. Furthermore, exclusionary environmental management strategies may 
be necessary to preserve its fragile habitat and prevent the panda’s extinction. That being said, 
the needs of the giant panda do not negate the realities of local Tibetan Wolong residents, who 
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remain economically volatile in part due to the reserve’s restrictions on local use of Wolong’s 
forest resources. While Wolong Nature Reserve may not be able to adopt participatory 
environmental management strategies for political reasons, government and park decision-
makers should consider environmental strategies that recognize both the specific needs of panda 






Chapter 4 - Mining, Wildlife Conservation, and Indigenous Rights – 
Environmental Management at Taiwan’s Taroko National Park 
 
Taiwan is split between a western plain region and an eastern mountainous area; 
mountains make up 70% of the island’s land mass (Wu et al. 1996). Taroko National Park is a 
92,000 hectare park located in these eastern mountains (Figure 4), and it extends to the island’s 
eastern shore. This chapter examines three distinctive eras in the management of human and 
natural systems within the Taroko area.16 The first era (1895-2008) is characterized by mining 
and indigenous displacement. Japanese (1895-1945) colonial and Chinese martial governments 
(1945-1986) managed and controlled Taroko’s human inhabitants, the indigenous Taroko people, 
by imposing forced assimilation schemes on them and by removing local people from their 
ancestral lands, which were deeply tied to indigenous Taroko religious, cultural, and subsistence 
practices. While Taroko National Park was established for multiple purposes, such as fostering 
national pride and preserving natural resources and wildlife populations, in practice Japanese 
(pre-1945) and Chinese lumber and mining companies exploited Taroko’s natural resources, 
even after the establishment of the park.  In the second era (1972-2005), Taiwan’s national KMT 
government established strict preservationist environmental legislation to protect the newly 
established Taroko National Park. Like Wolong Nature Reserve in China’s Sichuan Province, 
Taroko economically burdened local populations by making local subsistence practices illegal. 
Taroko took preservationist ideologies a step further by preventing human entry to certain areas 
of the park altogether. While the park severely limited local access to the park’s natural 
resources, mining companies and tourists numbering in the millions continued to enjoy the 
                                                          
16 I refer to the land area encompassing Taroko National Park as the “Taroko area” or “region,” because between 
1945 and 1986, the national park was not politically recognized by the Chinese colonial government. In addition, I 
will discuss events that occurred in the area before it was first designated as a park in 1937. 
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park’s natural wonders. The third era (2000-present) explores the legislative successes of the 
burgeoning Taiwanese indigenous rights movement. One of the most active indigenous groups 
within the movement were the Taroko, whose protests for local hunting rights and the return of 
their native lands. Their activism helped create a nation-wide indigenous movement.  
 Environmental management at Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National Park share 
certain similarities. Local indigenous residents at both protected areas (PAs) experienced 
displacement without movement because of bans on hunting, herb gathering, and other 
subsistence activities. The PAs also went through several overlapping environmental regimes 
with conflicting ideologies. The intercurrence of Wolong and Taroko’s management strategies is 
significant especially when present environmental policies are undermined by policies of 
previous eras. For example, at Taroko National Park, strict environmental laws coexisted with 
extractive mineral industries that destroyed vegetative and aquatic ecosystems until the 2000s.  
As a case study, Taroko National Park also brings new insights into PA management that 
is not as evident at Wolong Nature Reserve. With the democratization of Taiwan, the indigenous 
rights movement has blossomed under the protection of free speech. Indigenous rights continue 
to shape the environmental policies at Taroko today, from protests regarding ritual hunting rights 
on park lands to lawsuits for reclaiming ancestral lands. Taroko National Park is also a more 
extreme example of colonial state management and control of human and natural ecosystems. By 
displacing and shaping the social, economic, and cultural lives of Taroko people, the Japanese 
and Chinese colonial government gained control of the Taroko area, and rendered invisible 
indigenous life. In the process, they reshaped Taroko social and political organization itself into 




Background – Ecology, Management, and Local Residents  
 Initially established in 1937 by the Japanese colonial government, Taroko National Park 
was dissolved in 1945 after the takeover of the Chinese Kuomingtang (KMT) government. It was 
re-established in 1986. Like Wolong Nature Reserve, the park encapsulates a large range of 
elevations, from sea level to 3,742 meters. The park is also situated within The Tropic of Cancer, 
and receives a substantial amount of rainfall. As such, the park supports a variety of habitats, 
including broadleaf and coniferous forest and subalpine environments (Crook 2015; TNP 2016). 
Nearly half of all mammal species, 90% of bird species, and one third of all vascular plants 
found in Taiwan are represented at Taroko National Park (Wu et al. 1996). The park also harbors 
132 rare and endangered species, and some large animals such as the black bear, Formosan wild 
boar, and sambar deer.     
Taroko National Park is perhaps best known as a geological wonder and is dominated by 
inaccessible cliffs and deep gorges. One of the most well-known attractions at the park is Taroko 
Gorge, a 12-mile canyon carved nearly completely of solid marble (Figure 5; Wu et al. 1996). 
Overall, the park protects nineteen mountains. Despite the rocky surroundings, forest covers 
four-fifths of the park (Crook 2015). At high elevations, endemic plant communities even grow 
directly on the limestone (TNP 2015). Taroko’s natural wonders draw large crowds of tourists. 
As early as 1993, 950,000 visitors came to the park each year (Wu et al. 1996). By 2014, this 
number had grown to 6.28 million (Crook 2015).  Like Wolong Nature Reserve, Taroko National 
Park is the most frequently visited national park by foreign tourists in Taiwan.  
 Taroko has a long history of human settlement. According to oral histories of the Taroko 
indigenous peoples, they migrated to the Taroko region three hundred years ago from the 
western side of the island after the takeover of the colonial takeover of the Chinese Qing dynasty 
93 
 
(Chi and Chin 2012). The Taroko were semi-nomadic, and prized hunting for subsistence and 
cultural, and spiritual purposes. In 2005, 20,711 Taroko indigenous people live in Taiwan, with 
over 12,000 living permanently within or next to Taroko National Park (Shung Ye Museum 
2006; Simon 2011).  
 The majority of the indigenous people residing within the Taroko area in the 1930s were 
displaced by the Japanese colonial government shortly before the park was created. Two Taroko 
communities, the Skadang and Xorxos, remained until the park’s reestablishment by the Chinese 
central government in 1986, and retained land rights to their territory. While these communities 
still own the land, they cannot hunt, cultivate crops, or construct buildings on their property 
(Simon 2010). Today, two Taroko townships still reside within park lands. While the majority of 
the Taroko community no longer live inside the park, indigenous people still play an important 
role in transforming indigenous rights and land use rights both within and outside the park. The 
Taroko established the “return our land” movement in Taiwan, which received widespread 
national and international attention and helped jumpstart Taiwan’s indigenous rights movement 
in the 1980s. The Taroko have also demanded for their right to hunt on national park land. 
Despite the fact that indigenous people have the right to hunt on their ancestral lands as of 2005, 
this rule is not enforced on national park lands, and the Taroko continue to be fined and 
prosecuted for subsistence hunting.  Hunting is one of the most significant cultural, religious, and 
subsistence activities of the Taroko, and local residents actively protest their right to hunt to this 
day (Meng-ching et al. 2015).   
 The economic conditions of the Taroko mirror conditions across Taiwan. Indigenous 
people suffer from poverty and unemployment at rates much higher than the national average. In 
2002, household income for Taiwan’s indigenous people was less than 40% of the national 
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average (Munsterhjelm 2002). With a lack of viable economic alternatives, many Taroko 
communities both within and adjacent to the national park depend on migrant labor for their 
incomes. In fact, only 60% of Taroko indigenous residents remain within their hometowns year-
round; the other 40% engage in temporary labor in other parts of Taiwan (Simon 2011). 42% of 
indigenous employment is in unskilled, dangerous industrial labor (Chi 2001). 
The following section considers the historical context of indigenous displacement and 
exclusion in the Taroko area, beginning with Japanese takeover of Taiwan in 1895. The period 
continues until 2008, when the last remnant mining industries in the park from the Japanese 
colonial and Chinese martial rule periods closed down and became the property of the park.  
 
Era 1: Mining and the Displacement of the Taroko Indigenous Populations (1895-2008)  
Japanese Subjugation and Taroko Indigenous Displacement 
 In order to understand the context of Taroko National Park’s establishment, it is 
important to consider the park within the context of indigenous displacement and control by the 
Japanese and Chinese colonial governments. Before the 1600s, Taiwan was populated by 
indigenous people with Austronesian heritage. By the 17th century, the island was colonized by 
China’s Qing government. Unable to traverse the mountainous eastern part of the island, Chinese 
settlers settled on the western edge of Taiwan and set up military fortifications along their 
eastern border, leaving eastern indigenous Taiwanese people to govern themselves. Indigenous 
peoples, including the Taroko of Taroko National Park, remained predominantly unaffected by 
colonial rule until 1895, when China ceded Taiwan to the Japanese after their defeat in the First 
Sino-Japanese War.  
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 At first, Japanese colonial government officials adopted a similar isolationist policy 
towards eastern indigenous Taiwanese. They built electric fences that separated Han Chinese and 
indigenous Formosans. By 1903, Japanese officials began to realize that the eastern part of the 
island was covered in valuable trees, and the mountains possessed gold, iron, limestone, and 
marble. Japanese politicians like Yosaburo Takekoshi viewed Taiwan’s indigenous lands as the 
“golden key to the exhaustless wealth of the island.” The Japanese began to open up extractive 
industries such as logging in the eastern mountains (Simon 2006). Their progress was impeded 
by indigenous people who aggressively protected their land against intrusion. In response, the 
Japanese governor of Taiwan declared a “Five Year Plan to Pacify the Savages” in 1914 (Simon 
2010; Chi and Chin 2012). The resulting warfare led to the forced subjugation of eastern 
Taiwanese indigenous groups to Japanese rule.  
The Taroko indigenous people, who resided in the present-day boundaries of Taroko 
National Park, are famous for their fierce resistance to Japanese occupation. In 1914, 6000 
Japanese troops invaded Taroko lands. In order to do so, they used explosives to enlarge the 
steep mountain pathways into Taroko territory. The enlarged paths allowed the Japanese to 
utilize modern military equipment in their battle against the Taroko, who were armed only with 
bows and arrows and hunting rifles. The Taroko resisted for nearly three months before 
surrendering. While the Japanese originally allowed the Taroko to remain in the mountains, 
hostilities continued. During the 1930 Wushu Rebellion, Taroko warriors killed 134 Japanese. 
After the incident, the Japanese forcibly relocated the majority of the Taroko population to 
grassland regions, where they were more easily managed by the state. Under Japanese 
assimilation initiatives in the plains region, Taroko indigenous people were forced to adopt 
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Japanese names and pray to Shinto shrines. They were also recruited into the Japanese army 
(Simon 2007). 
The displacement of Taroko indigenous people from their original homelands served 
three main purposes. First, it allowed the Japanese administration to erase the Taroko’s 
precolonial social and political structures. For example, before colonial intervention, Taroko 
society was egalitarian. Instead of maintaining a hierarchical power structure, the Taroko had a 
loose political structure in which small indigenous groups had political authority over specific 
territorial ranges (Simon & Mona 2012). By forcibly relocating the Taroko, Japanese 
administrators separated indigenous people from their social, political, and economic center, 
their communal hunting land, and reorganized political and social relationships based on private 
land ownership and political hierarchy. In the process, the Taroko’s egalitarian, communal 
lifestyles were disrupted, including their relationship to their ancestral land. 
The second reason that the colonial government displaced the Taroko was to establish 
social control of indigenous populations. The new home of the Taroko, the eastern grasslands, 
were much more accessible to government officials compared to the Taroko’s original home – 
the mountains. The Japanese reorganized indigenous communities into sedentary villages with a 
hierarchical tribal council system (Simon 2011). The new system allowed Japanese 
administrators to make Taroko communities more accessible, manageable, and legible by 
creating indigenous “state mediators” such as councils and chiefs. The Japanese also encouraged 
the Taroko to become dependent upon sedentary agriculture and registered families into the 
national household registration system. Before colonial contact, the Taroko utilized communal 
land resources, were semi-nomadic, and heavily relied upon hunting for subsistence. By legally 
recognizing private ownership of individual indigenous plots of permanent land, the Japanese 
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colonial system categorized and made legible Taroko subsistence practices and land ownership 
rights. At the same time, these types of categorization shaped the lived reality of the Taroko 
community, who began to adopt a hierarchical political structure and a sedentary lifestyle 
dependent on both agriculture and hunting. The tribal council system remains the predominant 
social and political structure of Taroko communities today, and has led to the establishment of a 
new indigenous elite (Ibid). Taroko land ownership issues have also been central points of 
contention in Taiwan’s indigenous rights movement since the 1990s. 
Japanese administrators also took steps to prevent another violent Taroko uprising by 
pitting ethnic subgroups against each other. The Taroko indigenous community consists of three 
sub-groups: Truku, Teuda, and Tkedaya. The three groups have a violent history of contact. For 
example, the Teuda often invaded Truku’s hunting territory, and helped the Japanese military 
overtake the Tkedaya during the Wushe incident (Simon 2006). Japanese government officials 
purposefully sent groups of people from the same community to different villages, and combined 
different sub-groups together within these villages (Simon 2006; Chen 2012). In doing so, the 
colonial administration reduced the chances of another Taroko uprising by grouping individuals 
who were in conflict with one another, and were unlikely to band together to fight against the 
Japanese. As such, indigenous displacement acted as a means of social and political control over 
the Taroko, who had put up armed resistance against the Japanese on numerous occasions before 
relocation. Japanese displacement and assimilation schemes attempted to erase previous forms of 
Taroko social, economic, and political organization, and replaced it with schematic forms of 
governance that were legible to the Japanese colonial nation-state. These schemes mirror James 
Scott’s discussion of state management and control of human populations via homogenizing, 
panoptic legislative tactics.   
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James Scott suggested that nation-states developed techniques for controlling and 
managing both human and natural landscapes. The final reason for indigenous displacement by 
the Japanese administration embodies Scott’s theories. The colonial government used indigenous 
displacement as a means to gain ownership and control over the Taroko’s ancestral lands. As 
early as 1903, the national government required indigenous people to register the land that they 
“owned.” Very few Taroko individuals were able to register their land due to a lack of resources 
by which to do so. The Japanese government legally nationalized the majority of the Taroko’s 
unregistered lands as state land. In the process, the Taroko lost the right to their traditional lands. 
By the 1930s, the Taroko were displaced from the mountain regions, and Japanese companies 
were able to exploit the forest and mineral resources of the area. Resource exploitation increased 
exponentially after the beginning of World War II, because of new demands for materials and 
energy production that supported the war effort (IUCN 1969). The removal of indigenous 
populations was crucial for the success of natural resource exploitation at Taroko National Park, 
because the Taroko indigenous people guarded their territories ferociously, and killed Japanese 
lumber workers within their territories (Simon 2006).  
 
Park Formation – Ecosystem Preservation, Nature Exploitation, and National Pride 
Japan did not only manage natural landscapes for the purposes of resource gain; they also 
did so for the purposes of nature conservation. In 1937, Japan designated Taiwan’s first three 
national parks. The largest of these parks was Taroko National Park, which was 110,313 hectares 
(IUCN 1969). Japanese decision-makers argued that the key objectives of the parks should be the 
preservation of natural beauty from physical development, and the establishment of recreational 
park services. Administrators were particularly concerned with restoring the parks’ original 
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fauna and flora, especially in deforested areas where Japanese mining companies overharvested 
valuable trees such as camphor and hinoki (Simon 2006). Natural resource exploitation and the 
creation of farming plantations in other parts of Taiwan had destroyed forests in mountainous 
landscapes such as Mount Tatun (IUCN 1969). By establishing Taroko as a national park, the 
Japanese hoped to preserve and restore Taroko’s environment in order to preserve the integrity of 
Taiwan’s natural resources and the survival of its unique ecosystems.   
Despite the original environmental intentions associated with national park creation, 
Japanese decision-makers provided zoning loopholes in park preservation regulations that 
allowed Japanese companies to exploit natural resources with little oversight. The Japanese 
government had the jurisdiction to establish Special Areas where logging, mining, and farming, 
could be established. Companies were also allowed to establish dams and factories within 
national parks. Taroko National Park’s formation represents a paradox – the park was created to 
preserve natural ecosystems on one hand, while also acting as a means to control and exploit 
natural resources.  
Taroko National Park’s formation was also significant for religious and symbolic reasons. 
All three of the national parks were established in Taiwan’s mountainous eastern regions. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Japanese government selected the location of the parks partially 
based on cultural and religious values placed on majestic mountain landscapes by State 
Shintoism. In State Shintoism, Japan’s unique natural landscape, especially its mountains, 
symbolized the superiority of Japan’s Empire. Japan used State Shintoism religious beliefs to 
morally justify their military campaigns during World War II. Japanese decision-makers drew 
upon state Shinto concepts while designating parks in Taiwan. They hoped that the parks’ 
breathtaking natural scenery would affirm Japan’s greatness in the eyes of international tourists 
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(Kanda 2003). Taiwan’s national park designation by the Japanese demonstrates the ways in 
which protected areas are symbolically significant places that represent the nation (or empire) as 
a whole.  
The displacement of the Taroko indigenous people from their ancestral homelands 
allowed the Japanese colonial state to better control both human and natural landscapes. Part of 
this process led to the creation of Taroko National Park, which served the multiple, conflicting 
goals of the nation-state, from environmental preservation and natural resource exploitation to 
disenfranchising local stakeholders and constructing a national image of the colonial state.   
 Colonial government management and control of social and environmental landscapes 
was not limited to Japanese rule. In 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) government of China became 
the new de-facto martial rulers of Taiwan. KMT social and environmental policies under martial 
rule remained similar to those advanced by the Japanese. For example, the Chinese Nationalists 
continued forced assimilation policies toward indigenous people that resembled those used by 
Japanese. As late as the 1980s, each indigenous person was required to learn Mandarin and to 
abandon their indigenous name for an official Chinese name (Chi 2001). They also encouraged 
semi-nomadic indigenous people to adopt sedentary agriculture, and expanded the Japanese 
household registration system (Chi 2001; Simon 2007). In some ways, the KMT expanded upon 
Japanese attempts to control local populations. They relocated even more indigenous 
communities to the plains areas, and established an extensive police surveillance system.  
 KMT policies for controlling natural spaces also remained remarkably similar to 
Japanese colonial policies. The largest change that the new Chinese government made to 
Japanese colonial policy was to disband the Taiwan national park system. The KMT disbanded 
the national parks, partly because they were created by the Japanese, and reflected Japanese 
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ideals of nationhood and superiority (Kanda). Few PA scholars have discussed the implications 
of PAs that have been disbanded. Indeed, Taroko National Park may be one of the few PAs that 
was created twice; that is, the KMT re-established the park in 1986, forty-one years after it was 
disbanded in 1945. The dissolution of Taroko National Park had severe consequences for the 
environment; it allowed KMT officials to justify destructive mining practices in the Taroko area 
that were no longer protected by environmental regulations (see the following section). 
Additional research is needed to evaluate the extent to which PAs in other countries have also 
been disbanded, and for what reasons.  
The KMT considered the disbanded Japanese national parks to be “nationalized” territory 
owned by the state, and forbade local subsistence activities such as hunting, fishing, and 
agriculture. Chinese policies were more stringent than Japanese ones, who allowed indigenous 
people to continue hunting on their lands (Simon 2007). In the Taroko region, the Chinese 
military further widened the roads through the mountains in order to accelerate development of 
indigenous territories. The same roads were constructed by the Japanese military, and were used 
to transport large modern weapons into the inaccessible mountain regions to suppress Taroko 
indigenous resistance to colonial rule. In the late 1960s, the KMT also adopted indigenous land 
policies that disenfranchised Taroko individuals from their land. The KMT registered certain 
lands in the plains as indigenous “reserve lands.” However, aboriginal people had to cultivate the 
land in order to claim ownership; otherwise, the land became the property of local township 
governments. The result of the reserve land policy was that the Taroko also lost substantial 
portions of their land in their relocated home, the plains. KMT-run township governments leased 




Environmental Damages of Colonialism – Mining Before and After Park Designation 
 One Japanese and Chinese KMT action that had the most impact on the Taroko area’s 
environment was the exploitation of mining resources in the area, including marble and sulfur 
production. With the dismantling of the Japanese national park system and its accompanying 
environmental protections, the KMT established over 33 mining sites across the Taroko area by 
1950 (Li 2014). While no one has conducted a scientific assessment of the environmental 
degradation caused by mining at Taroko, anecdotal evidence suggests that it had significant 
impacts to local vegetation, water quality, and human safety. For example, marble factory 
operations in the Taroko region’s Qingshui Cliff used explosives to mine ores, which destroyed 
cliff-sides and clogged waterways with hundreds of tons of rock waste. At Qingshui, mining 
wastes completely blocked off and dried up several aquifers in the Sanzhan River Valley. Mr. 
Lung-Sheng Chang, a KMT official from the Ministry of Interior, noted that the once “limpid 
water” of the Sanzhan River “had been turned into dark mud” (Li 2014).  
One may assume that with the re-establishment of Taroko National Park by the KMT 
government in 1986, mining operations would cease, along with the associated environmental 
impacts. Unfortunately, mining has long-lasting impacts, and at past Taroko mining sites, natural 
ecosystems have still not recovered from the damage. The Taroko region contains special 
vegetation that can grow directly onto rock faces. Twenty-five years after mining ceased at 
Chongde Marble Mine, the area remains barren with almost no vegetation (Li 2014).     
 With the re-establishment of Taroko National Park in 1986, the Taroko area once again 
became subject to environmental legislation. Despite the strict environmental laws of the park 
(see page 103), nineteen mining companies retained mining rights within the park’s premises. 
The miners retained property and mining rights as late as 2007 (Li 2014). Other mining and 
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manufacturing companies set up operations just outside of park premises, including cement 
plants and limestone extraction companies.  While many of Taroko’s mining companies no 
longer actively mined on the site, they continuously extended their legal mining rights to the 
area. Furthermore, some companies continued to mine in the parks’ protected areas, and 
threatened both human and natural environments. For example, in 1990, 30 homes in Hsiulin 
Township were buried in an avalanche caused by limestone mining activities. A dozen Taroko 
indigenous people lost their lives in the tragedy (Arrigo 2002). A year earlier, iron mining 
operations from Lidong Mining caused erosion and rock-destabilization that filled Santsan 
Village’s local stream with 10 meters of rocky debris (Arrigo 1998).  Rocks from the mining 
operations continued to dislodge from the top of Taroko’s mountains for two years after the mine 
closed, because Taroko experiences frequent typhoons in the summer that send unstable rocks 
tumbling down into gorges where indigenous people live. In both instances, local Taroko 
residents protested the continuation of mining operations in the park. At Lidong Township, 
Taroko residents trespassed on limestone mining land to investigate land erosion in the area. 
They discovered that the miners had dug a mining pit 200 meters wide and 50 feet deep that 
threatened to collapse and send thousands of tons of rock into the seabed (Arrigo 2002). Taroko 
protesters confronted KMT government officials, Taroko national park managers, the mining 
bureau, and forestry mining department regarding the issue, but none of them responded to the 
situation, because the mining operations were legally approved by the KMT. Local Taroko 
residents told the media that their local representatives were “frequent drinking companions of 
mining company officials and were almost certainly paid off to approve the previous two years 




 In 1998, Taroko National Park managers began to explore the possibility of buying the 
mining lands of the remaining 19 companies within the reserve. Official compensation and 
removal of mining operations was not complete until 2008, when the TNP recovered 2,570 
hectares from sixteen of the mining sites (Li 2014).  
 
Era 2: Preservationist Environmental Regulations (1972-2005) 
 The second major era of environmental management at Taroko National Park is 
characterized by top-down strict environmental preservationist schemes established by the 
central KMT government. In 1972, the KMT passed the country’s first National Park Law. The 
purpose of the regulation was to “preserve the nation’s unique natural scenery, wild fauna and 
flora,” protect historic sites, provide public recreation, and create areas for scientific research 
(CPA 1972). The criteria for national park selection expressed the importance of outdoor 
recreation, education, and natural ecosystem preservation, as well as the role of the parks in 
representing the nation. National parks had to “represent the natural heritage of the nation” by 
possessing unique natural scenery or naturally evolving ecosystems. They also had to have 
educational significance as biological or historical sites worthy of “long-term preservation by the 
nation.” Notably, the law did not discuss the existence of local people within national park lands, 
and did not consult local stakeholders about its creation or management (e.g. Taroko hunters and 
disenfranchised indigenous land owners; CPA 1972). 
At Taroko, the National Park Law went into force in 1986, when the KMT government 
officially re-established the park. While the KMT’s Taroko National Park was geographically 
located in the same area as the original Japanese park, it was 18,000 hectares smaller. Like other 
Taiwanese parks administered by the National Park Law, Taroko was divided into different 
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management “zones,” according to the decisions of national decision-makers. 69.3% of Taroko 
National Park land is designated as ecological preservation areas (CPA 2003). The areas include 
nine of Taroko’s nineteen mountains, and are often hazardous to climb. The main purpose of the 
preservation areas is to “protect natural biology and environment.” Only administrators and 
authorized ecological researchers are allowed to enter them without applying for a temporary 
permit. Logging and building within the areas is also forbidden, though “changes [to] the original 
terrain” are permitted for “the purpose of resource preservation” (CPA 2003). The ecological 
areas share similarities with Switzerland’s Totalschutz park model of complete preservation, in 
which the goal of national parks was to maintain natural areas “undisturbed” by human activities. 
The strict rules governing Taiwan’s preservation areas seems to suggest that “natural biology” 
and the “environment” flourish best without any interaction with human populations. Taroko 
National Park managers enforced the boundaries of the ecological protection areas carefully. 
They not only required multiple permits for tourists who wished to enter the areas, but also 
required individuals to enter with a Taroko high-mountain guide as late as 2003. The guide could 
monitor and enforce environmental regulations while ensuring the safety of Taroko’s visitors.  
Taroko is also divided into special sightseeing areas, historical sites conservation areas, 
recreational areas, and ordinary control areas. Each zone represents as different level of 
environmental stringency. In special sightseeing areas, visitors are not allowed to leave hiking 
trails without permission, and logging and building is prohibited. At historical sites, park 
managers may repair trails and locations “in keeping with their original appearance.” Recreation 
and existing use areas are the least regulated. The National Park Law allows mining, farming, 
building, and animal husbandry in these areas if companies obtain permission from the national 
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park headquarters. Existing factories may also continue or expand their operations within park 
lands (cite legislation).    
Certain activities are illegal throughout the entire park, regardless of its zoning. 
Prohibited park activities include hunting, fishing, plant gathering, burning vegetation, littering, 
and polluting water or air. In 2014, the park expanded the bans to include camping, cooking, or 
swimming outside of designated areas. The new laws were intended to reduce the environmental 
impacts associated with Taroko’s six million annual tourists, who engaged in these activities 
illegally with little park enforcement. The 2014 regulation also prohibited the establishment of 
sacrificial areas, monuments, and tombs within park boundaries. It specifically targeted Taroko 
indigenous people, whose ancestral homes were within the park, and who had spiritual 
connections to their family tombs and monuments in the areas. The Taroko also have religious 
rites that require the sacrifice of game animals.   
Taroko’s environmental policies diverge significantly from management strategies 
adopted at Wolong Nature Reserve. Taroko park managers policed and enforced environmental 
regulations more successfully than at Wolong Nature Reserve. In contrast to Wolong’s “paper” 
enforcement strategies, Taroko received more financial support for policy enforcement, and had 
its own park police force. In addition, Taroko’s indigenous population lived outside of the park, 
and was easier to police than Wolong residents, where Tibetan people lived within the reserve’s 
premises. As a consequence, while local people at both parks engaged in illegal subsistence 
activities, Taroko indigenous people were at much greater risk of severe punishment from 
Taroko police, and were barred from entire mountainsides altogether. Taroko’s ecological 
preservation areas demonstrate the park’s commitment to preservation practices that excludes all 
human interaction. In contrast, local residents at Wolong were never successfully displaced or 
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prevented from entering the reserve’s forested areas. At the same time, Taroko’s environmental 
regulations were less stringent than those at Wolong, because they allowed for legal mining and 
factory operations within certain locations. Taroko National Park is also unique because one of 
its explicit purposes is to facilitate and monitor recreational activities.  
On the other hand, the parks shared certain similarities. They both banned local 
subsistence activities, even though in practice local residents of both regions frequently defied 
these laws. Both parks received monetary and enforcement support from the central government, 
who considered them as essential for building concepts of “nation-hood” (e.g. panda symbolism 
and mountainous scenery). Wolong and Taroko park managers and government officials both 
attempted to create natures that excluded the presence of human populations, though to different 
degrees. 
  
Is Nature “Protected” and for Whom? Considering Intercurrence and Indigenous Rights 
While Taroko’s environmental regulations attempt to preserve the natural environment, 
the success of the initiatives was undercut by the continuation of mining activities within park 
premises for twenty-two years after its establishment (see page 13; Chi 2002). In contrast, the 
enforcement of environmental regulations has disproportionately impacted local Taroko 
residents, including those who live outside the park but venture into its borders for religious and 
subsistence reasons. For example, first-offense hunters in Taroko Park may be imprisoned and 
fined 3,000-30,000 Taiwan dollars, the equivalent of two months of income for poor Taroko 
residents (Simon 2010; TNP 2016). In a hunting incident in 2007, a Taroko hunter caught on 
park lands was so afraid of paying the steep fine that he tried to escape the park managers, and 
fell off of a cliff to his death. The event sparked Taroko indigenous protests and resulted in a 
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formal apology by park police (Simon 2013). Taroko park managers also fined Taroko people 
for picking up semi-precious rocks on park premises that provided the Taroko with a small 
amount of income (Chi 2001). Picking up rocks was illegal because the park prohibits the 
transport of “ores” off of park premises (TNP 2016).  
While Taroko farmers were fined 1,200 Taiwan dollars for trying to remove rock from 
their fields without prior approval, boulders frequently tumbled down from mining operations to 
destroy watersheds in surrounding valleys (Chi 2001). Government officials and national park 
managers argued that they could not stop mining operations, because the companies existed 
before the Taroko’s creation. The Taroko responded to these justifications as insults. One Taroko 
member replied to state officials with the following statement: “We have been living here and 
doing all kinds of (now prohibited) activities for hundreds of years, well before the mining 
companies and the national parks came here” (Chi 2001; Jacoby 2014). Even if government 
officials found legally removing mining companies from Taroko as a challenge, they did not 
respond to frequent Taroko protests regarding the environmental and safety hazards posed by the 
mine.  
 
Alternative Environmental Protection Schemes – Rituals of Taroko Hunting 
 Before the Japanese and Chinese colonial governments resettled the Taroko in the plains 
area, the Taroko had established cultural, religious, and subsistence hunting practices that 
complemented their natural environment. The Taroko present alternative understandings of the 
environment and its management that allow for more inclusive, participatory interaction and 
stewardship of natural ecosystems. It also counters preservationist environmental discourse that 
values the exclusion of human bodies from natural spaces. 
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 The Taroko’s religious system is based upon the sacred law and justice system of Gaya. 
Gaya polices social and ancestral relationships and Taroko behavior, including indigenous 
relationships with their surrounding environment. Hunting, collective ownership, and collective 
social actions are especially significant for upholding Gaya’s moral practices. In the case of 
property rights, Gaya valued collective hunting territories and family-held cultivated land as 
sacred, because they were the “product of the labor of the ancestors” (Simon 2010; Simon 2013). 
If the Taroko disrespected and alienated themselves from their ancestral lands, the Gaya 
punishes them with spiritual retribution (Ibid). Present-day Taroko note that before Japanese 
colonialism, they protected their collective territory from other hunters via head-hunting 
practices. They also prevented Japanese companies from exploiting natural resources within their 
established territories. These practices prevented over-hunting and natural resource exploitation, 
because it limited the number of people who retrieved forest resources from each territory. After 
the Skadang and Xorxos communities were forcibly relocated from Taroko National Park, 
several young Taroko men died from alcohol poisoning and motorcycle accidents (Simon 2010). 
The communities attributed the deaths of their children to their abandonment of their native land 
due to coerced displacement.   
Gaya spiritual practices regarding hunting not only represent the cornerstone of Taroko 
religious and cultural beliefs, but was also essential for establishing environmental stewardship 
practices among Taroko hunters. Under the Gaya belief system, when a Taroko man dies, he is 
judged by his ancestors based on his ability to hunt. Those who pass the hunting test are 
permitted to enter the afterlife, where ancestors are worshipped by their living relatives. Hunters 
in the afterlife are also responsible for enforcing the moral and environmental code of Gaya. 
Taroko men who failed to hunt during their lifetimes are eaten alive by crabs. As such, hunting is 
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an essential part of Taroko culture, and one of the few ways to prove a person’s true masculinity 
(Simon 2013). Hunters prove their strength, agility, and prestige by carrying heavy animal kills 
across treacherous mountain cliffs back to their village (Simon 2010). Hunting is also essential 
for inspiring group solidarity. Hunters cook and eat in front of their homes, and share their meat 
strategically with other community members as a way of fostering communal relations. Taroko 
view caught game as one of the most valuable gifts they provide to the community, one that 
binds individuals in unbreakable relationships. Hunting skills are also an essential prerequisite 
for Taroko marriage agreements (Simon 2013).    
The Gaya enforces certain rules regarding Taroko hunting that preserve the integrity of 
environmental systems. For example, hunters were only allowed to hunt during certain times of 
the year that did not interfere with family events, such as pregnancy and mourning. Hunting 
during the spring was taboo, because hunters could accidentally kill pregnant game animals or 
“innocent” young. In addition to hunting only within their designated collective territories, 
Taroko hunters considered many of the park’s mountains to be sacred, and banned hunting in 
these “spiritual” conservation areas. Hunters also performed certain rituals before entering and 
leaving the forest that were intended to foster respect to both the animals and their ancestors. 
Hunters watched the behavior of certain spiritual birds in the forest to gauge their luck on the 
hunt. If the bird passed an ill omen to the hunters, they left the forest immediately. Violation of 
any Gaya hunting rules by hunters results in injury, death, or the failure to capture prey. On the 
other hand, the Taroko interpret successful hunts as “an outward manifestation of moral 
righteousness” (Simon 2013). Hunters self-regulated their own behavior according to moral and 
environment preservationist logics for religious reasons. Scholars such as Scott Simon note that 
Taroko men practicing Gaya did not deplete wildlife populations for hundreds of years, and that 
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it was only after habitat destruction from mining, forestry, hydroelectric plants, and tea 
plantations that natural ecosystems became threatened with extinction (Simon 2010).  
Today, many Taroko residents of Taroko National Park practice Gaya and follow its 
moral laws regarding hunting. Taroko hunting is one of the few remaining activities conducted 
entirely in local Taroko languages, and many of the group’s folklore and cultural practices are 
maintained via hunting practices. As such, hunting is essential for the Taroko’s linguistic and 
cultural survival.  
 Despite the fact that Taroko indigenous peoples continue to practice Gaya and hunting 
rituals, environmental preservation regulations established by Taroko National Park often 
conflicted with Taroko belief systems. Government officials banned hunting in the Taroko area 
as early as 1972, and the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1989 banned animal trapping across the 
entire island (Simon 2013). The park’s ban on hunting ironically discouraged environmental 
stewardship practices by Taroko hunters. Before the regulation, the Taroko maintained their own 
unique hunting territories so that animal populations in each region were not exhausted. After the 
ban, the territories became moot, as hunters developed strategies to hunt secretly in similar 
locations that were less accessible to Taroko park managers. The overlap of Taroko hunting 
territories burdened local animal populations to a greater degree than before the hunting ban 
(Simon 2013). Taroko hunters admitted to park managers that they would accept certain 
limitations on their hunting, and that under certain circumstances, they strained animal 
populations at Taroko by over-hunting and selling bush-meat (Ibid). That being said, the Taroko 
resisted Taroko’s ban on all hunting activities, because they considered their hunting sustainable 
and as an essential part of their culture.  
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 The Taroko’s Gaya reveals the social, cultural, and religious dimensions of 
environmental stewardship. It also provides an alternative narrative to park environmental 
management schemes. Instead of relying on top-down enforcement schemes, the Taroko self-
regulate their behavior based on a moral justice system. While Taroko National Park managers 
and government officials did not consider Gaya principles or indigenous needs while 
establishing Taroko’s environmental regulations, the Gaya may present a future opportunity for 
inclusive participatory environmental stewardship between Taroko National Park and Taroko 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Era 3: The Taroko Environmental and Indigenous Rights Movements (2000-Present) 
 From 1945 to 1986, the Chinese colonial government established a political system in 
Taiwan based on military martial law. Martial law gave the KMT complete political control over 
the island while barring the public from public protest. By the early 1980s, Taiwanese and 
indigenous people began to indirectly contest the political regime by critiquing the island’s 
environmental degradation caused by Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and industrial expansion 
(see Chapter 2 - Chi 2001). Taiwan’s indigenous rights movement developed at the same time. It 
pushed for formal recognition of indigenous people by the Taiwanese constitution (achieved in 
1997), and for legislative protections of indigenous subsistence rights and autonomy.  By 1986, 
the KMT remained in control of the government, but lifted martial rule and introduced 
democratic political ideals and free speech to Taiwan. In the 1990s, Taiwan had developed an 
environmental and indigenous rights protest culture, so much so that the island held 10 nation-
wide protests every month (Ibid).  
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The Taroko indigenous people were an integral part of Taiwan’s transition to a political 
climate that recognized and protected indigenous rights in national law. That being said, the 
implementation of indigenous rights laws at Taroko National Park is questionable, and the 
Taroko continue to demand the establishment and implementation of their legal rights today.   
 
Return our Land – Taiwan’s Indigenous Rights Movement and the Taroko Indigenous People 
 In 1997, Igung Shiban, a female indigenous leader of the Taroko tribe, stood before the 
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and asked for their help in the Taroko 
“Return Our Land!” movement. In 1973, the Taiwanese company Asia Cement rented land from 
Taroko families for a 25-year lease period with the promise of local employment (Simon 2007). 
The land in question was located outside of the entrance of Taroko National Park, and had 
belonged to Taroko families for generations (Lu 2013). After the leases expired, Asia Cement 
refused to return the Taroko tribe’s land, and claimed that it had papers proving that the company 
was the new owner. Since cement factory operations had commenced on Taroko lands, the tribe 
had received little rent money or compensation for their displaced crops, let alone employment 
opportunities (Shiban 1997). Shiban told the UN, “We [the Taroko tribe] want our land, not 
money. The land is the heritage from our ancestors that provides our survival; it cannot be 
exchanged for money” (Ibid). Indeed, Igung’s UN speech described the Asia Cement land claims 
as an extension of military and economic incursion from the Chinese Han invaders hundreds of 
years ago, when indigenous peoples across Taiwan lost their lands. “Now the enemy is the 
cement companies that have stripped the skin from Hwalien’s pristine mountains and showered 
cement dust on its tropical forests,” she exclaimed (Shiban 1997).  
114 
 
 Shiban helped filed a lawsuit on behalf of the Taroko’s land rights against Asia Cement 
in order to settle the dispute. Shiban received support from National Legislator Bayan Dalur, an 
indigenous representative from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main political group 
opposing the Chinese KMT rule. Despite the support, the Taroko people were denied access to 
examine their land ownership documents, which were held by township officials. After local 
officials apparently accidentally left the papers behind after a conference, Shiban realized that 
the papers were forgeries. Many of the documents lacked official seals, and the signatures of the 
one-hundred Taroko property owners who supposedly had relinquished their property rights 
were all in the same handwriting (Shiban 1997; Scott 2002).  
The lawsuit received national and international attention. Journalists supported the 
movement, and Taiwan’s “SuperTV” made a documentary film about the event (Scott 2002). 
The Asia Cement company owners, with the occasional involvement of the KMT ruling party, 
began to retaliate. Shiban’s family was physically attacked twice by unknown assailants, and 
were warned that they could be expelled from Taiwan for “political activities” (Shiban 1997). 
Shiban also ran for township council representative in 1997 for the DPP party that supported her 
during the lawsuit. In response, the KMT nominated her brother’s wife and split her tribe’s votes. 
Asia Cement bribed poor and unemployed Taroko tribe members as much as $300 to vote for the 
KMT representative instead, and Shiban lost the election by 50 votes (Shiban 1997; Scott 2002).  
In August 2000, the Taroko people won the court case. While they were not given the 
property rights to Asia Cement land, they were allowed to cultivate crops on it (Scott 2002). The 
victory was one of the first landmark court cases in Taiwan that upheld indigenous rights. It was 
also credited by scholars as one of the first movements to bring indigenous land rights into the 
public eye and onto the DPP’s political agenda (Scott 2007). However, the ruling did not return 
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full ownership of the land to the Taroko people; instead, they were merely allowed to cultivate 
the remaining open space on their lands that were not being used by the Asia Cement factory.  
Unfortunately, the new ruling was not implemented in practice. In 2001, Taroko farmers 
began to replant their crops on their land. Asia Cement, whose factory still maintained operations 
on the land, sent foreign workers to remove Taroko plants from the ground (Ibid). In 2004, the 
Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, a non-profit organization that supports environmental 
and indigenous rights grassroots movements, began assisting Taroko land owners to pursue an 
eight-year legal case to gain full ownership rights for their land. The County and District courts 
rejected the claims, because while Asia Cement did not legally own the land, they still occupied 
it (Lu 2013). The courts argued that in order for the Taroko to claim ownership of the land, they 
had to cultivate it, but this was impossible because there was a factory sitting on top of their land. 
On October 2012, the Council of Indigenous People, the highest legal body governing 
indigenous affairs under Taiwanese law, overturned the judgement in support of the Taroko land 
owners. The Council cited Taiwan’s revised Constitution, international human rights law, and 
foreign court opinions to substantiate their judgement. The victory demonstrated the recognition 
of indigenous land and cultivation rights by national-level Taiwanese authorities (Lu 2013). Asia 
Cement still retains mining authorization in the Taroko area, even if they no longer have a right 
to the land itself. However, the 2012 ruling provides a precedent for indigenous people across 
Taiwan to contest opposing land claims.  
 The Taroko “Return Our Land!” movement was one of the first nationally recognized 
indigenous rights movements that fought to attain Taroko cultivation and ownership rights to 
their ancestral lands. While the movement sought to restore land owned by a private company to 
the Taroko indigenous people as opposed to government-owned PA land, the success of the 
116 
 
movement provides an interesting example of the possibilities for returning ownership of Taroko 
National Park land back to the Taroko indigenous people. This is especially pertinent for Taroko 
members of the Skadang and Xorxos communities who still own land in the park, but are unable 
to cultivate or develop it due to environmental regulations sanctioned by the park (Simon 2010).  
The lawsuit also signaled a shift in Taiwan central government attitudes towards 
indigenous groups. As Shihan pointed out in her speech to the United Nations, the cement 
company caused massive environmental damage to Taroko National Park’s tropical forests, and 
yet it never came under the scrutiny of the park’s environmental regulations. On the other hand, 
indigenous people were frequently prosecuted for hunting and rock collection in the park that 
comparatively caused much less environmental damage. By affirming Taroko cultivation rights 
to the land, the courts recognized the legitimacy of Taroko subsistence practices near the park’s 
premises for one of the first times.   
Taiwan’s Indigenous Rights and Environmental Laws –Intercurrence 
In 2005, Taiwan’s government adopted one of the nation’s first indigenous rights 
legislation. The Basic Law on Indigenous People allowed indigenous people to hunt for non-
economic purposes, such as cultural heritage and religion (Simon 2007). It also required the 
government to obtain consent from local indigenous people before establishing protected areas or 
other resource management institutions of any kind. Environmental managers were required to 
create common environmental management schemes that involved local indigenous stakeholders 
(Simon 2013). However, the co-management requirement did not apply to existing parks. The 
regulations were established by the Democratic People’s Party (DPP – in power between 2000 
and 2008), the first Taiwanese political party to hold power since the KMT’s takeover of Taiwan 
in 1945. The DPP, which began as an environmental protest group in the 1980s, promised the 
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expansion of indigenous rights as one of the hallmarks of its campaign election. The resulting 
Basic Law did not specify the “inherent rights” of indigenous people, but it did provide room for 
certain indigenous subsistence activities and political participation. 
Unfortunately, while the Basic Law allowed indigenous groups such as the Taroko to 
practice hunting for ritual purposes including Gaya, hunting remains illegal in practice in Taroko 
National Park.  Officials continued to arrest and prosecute indigenous people for exercising their 
right to hunt on park premises. Taroko community members publicly protested their treatment in 
front of the park headquarters in 2007. The protest was in direct response to a tragedy that took 
place on park premises. On a dark winter night, two Taroko men were hunting in the park when 
they were stopped by the park’s police force. The police fined the “illegal” hunters the equivalent 
of two months’ worth of their income. One of the Taroko men was too afraid to pay such a steep 
fine, and attempted to escape. In the dark, he slipped, and tumbled off of one of Taroko’s 
numerous cliffs to his death. Taroko community members furiously debated whether to storm the 
Taroko police station in retribution against those responsible for the hunter’s death, an act that 
they considered to be a just enforcement of their religious Gaya judicial system (Simon 2013). 
Instead, the Taroko held a peaceful demonstration in front of the police headquarters.  
At the protest, the Taroko employed cultural, historical, and environmental discourses to 
support their hunting rights claims. They also drew upon indigenous rights discourses that 
blamed preservationist environmental decision-making for ignoring indigenous needs. One 
Taroko demonstrator reminded national park managers that the Taroko had a history of rebellion 
and resistance towards colonial powers such as the Japanese. He declared, “you will never stop 
us… hunting is part of our culture, our life, the spirit of the Taroko. We are prepared to use our 
own lives to protect our land [against the police]” (Ibid). Taroko speakers at the protest told their 
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own stories regarding park police harassment. Taroko people said that they were “arbitrarily” 
searched and warned by the police to not enter park premises, despite the fact that many of the 
Taroko owned land titles within Taroko’s borders (Simon 2013). Other Taroko were fined and 
harassed for collecting wild plants, cooking, and carrying hunting weapons in the park. The 
Taroko blamed the DPP and nonprofit environmental organizations for supporting indigenous 
hunting bans on national park land. The DPP claimed to support indigenous people during their 
election campaign, and Taroko community members felt that their needs were abandoned by the 
party in favor of “environmental” priorities. 
As a solution to the conflict, indigenous community leaders suggested that Taroko 
National Park police should stop enforcing hunting regulations in Taroko until the national 
government corrected the National Park Law in accordance with the Basic Law that affirmed 
indigenous hunting rights. Taroko indigenous representatives argued that they were the true 
environmental stewards who had personal experience with preservation.  “Only with hunters do 
we have land… [and] wild animals,” protesters said. The Taroko submitted a demand to the park 
officials that called for an autonomous Taroko government and a co-management board of park 
administrators and Taroko community members who would jointly manage environmental 
schemes at Taroko National Park. Park manager and Taroko conflicts continue until the present; 
in December 2015, Taroko community members protested the imprisonment of indigenous 
hunters, who killed two endangered animals for religious reasons. Taroko Tribal Council 
Chairman Masaw argued that the national park needed to respect traditional hunting rights, and 
called the hunting ban and its enforcement “toxic residue form the Martial Law era” (Meng-
ching et al. 2015). 
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Indigenous protests at Taroko National Park demonstrate the challenges associated with 
legislative intercurrence and the different valuation of environmental goals. Under the Basic 
Law, the Taroko have the right to hunt for religious reasons; at the same time, the National Park 
Law bans hunting activities within the Taroko National Park. These conflicting regulations also 
reflect the different environmental priorities of the second and third eras. Taroko park regulations 
enforce environmental regulations that preserve an environment free from local human activity. 
On the other hand, the Taroko argue that sustainable local hunting and environmental practices 
allow wild populations to survive, and even flourish. They protested that their concerns were 




 In contrast to Wolong Nature Reserve, which did not force local indigenous residents to 
relocate, Taroko National Park’s PA environmental management strategies mirror global fortress 
conservation techniques in the 19th and early 20th centuries (e.g. Native Americans in U.S. 
national parks and black people in British colonial Africa) that forcibly removed local residents 
and failed to consider local economic and cultural needs (Cronon 1995; McDonald 2002). In 
Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American 
Conservation, Karl Jacoby (2001) argues that discourses about PAs have historically rendered 
the traditional practices of local PA residents invisible. Jacoby also highlighted that PA 
management strategies often acted to purposefully eradicate local subsistence activities such as 
hunting. Given the rise of Taiwan’s indigenous rights movement and its importance to central 
government politics, Taroko National Park should consider the ways that it has historically 
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erased the discourses and needs of indigenous groups. The park should also recognize its 
complicity in outlawing local subsistence activities that are key to the cultural heritage of the 
Taroko. 
Taroko National Park also highlights the possibilities of alternative management 
strategies that incorporate indigenous cultural and religious beliefs into PA regulations. 
Indigenous Taroko Gaya hunting practices inherently include environmental stewardship 
practices and enforcement systems based on a spiritual judiciary system. By softening and 
adjusting existing park management strategies to incorporate Gaya principles, Taroko National 
Park can recognize indigenous needs while also preserving indigenous, scientific, and park 
manager conservation ideals. Co-management strategies may also help garner local indigenous 
support for the park; currently, Taroko people view the park as a colonial vestige that excludes 
local needs and forbids local activities such as hunting, small-scale agriculture, and rock 
collection (CPA 1972). While the intercurrence of strict preservationist and indigenous rights 
regulations remains a contentious issue at the park today, and park manager still outlaw Taroko 
hunting, indigenous people’s successes in attaining cultivation and ownership rights to their 
traditional land in court and in passing the Basic Law signal a shift in environmental 
management possibilities for Taroko.   
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Chapter 5 – Strategies for Environmental Conservation and Human 




Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National Park adopt a variety of environmental 
management strategies that are representative of protected area (PA) diversity across the globe. 
At each PA, a broad array of stakeholders construct their own understandings of “nature” based 
on particular historical, political, economic, cultural, religious, and environmental contexts. For 
example, Chinese government officials in the 1980s defined Wolong’s nature as the best place to 
protect the endangered giant panda (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). But for Taroko park 
managers and government officials in the 1930s, nature was not only undisturbed land to be 
protected, but also a source of national pride, tourist income, and mining resources (Kanda 2003; 
Simon 2006). Local indigenous residents at Wolong and Taroko also engage with nature in 
different ways. While Wolong residents understand nature as a source of needed income and 
food, Taroko indigenous people also view their relationship with the environment as a religious 
and cultural connection governed by spiritual Gaya laws (Simon 2010; Simon 2013). The 
differences between similar stakeholder groups in China and Taiwan illustrates the importance of 
local context in constructing “natures” unique to each country.  
Yet government officials, nonprofit organizations, local communities, park managers, and 
extractive industries at the same PA also value nature in disparate ways. As such, PA 
environmental management strategies draw upon multiple different “natures” simultaneously; as 
a result, they reflect a range of different interests that change through time. Present PA 
management also reflects the intercurrence of several different legislative “eras.” For example, 
isolationist environmental policies forbidding local use of Wolong Nature Reserve’s forest 
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resources reflect Chinese preservationist ideologies of the 1960s. These policies persist at the 
reserve, despite new environmental strategies in the 2000s that recognize and subsidize the 
economic needs of Wolong’s residents. Because PA management schemes from earlier periods 
are not revoked, they layer on top of each other to create seemingly contradictory, co-existing 
policies (i.e. intercurrence) that complicate environmental management at the PAs today.   
Amidst the complexity and diversity of PA management strategies worldwide, how can 
decision-makers develop useful frameworks for PA management? What are the best techniques 
by which to address social and human rights concerns of indigenous displacement, invisibility, 
and equity while also promoting conservation goals? How should PAs balance the needs of 
endangered species, ecosystems, local communities, state bodies, extractive industries, and other 
stakeholders? 
This chapter provides general recommendations for socially conscious PA environmental 
management, and applies these principles to the Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National 
Park case studies. My suggestions are based on the successes and failures of past environmental 
management strategies, as described in the current international PA literature. I will consider 
three competing literatures regarding best PA management practice. The win-win approach to 
PA management attempts to fulfill both international conservation and human development 
goals. The majority of the adopted win-win strategies in the 1980-90s failed to produce adequate 
conservation and development results (Adams et al. 2004; Barret et al. 2004; Christensen 2004; 
Tallis et al. 2008; McShane et al. 2011). Despite this fact, win-win strategies remain a popular 
PA management approach (McShane et al. 2011), because they promise to satisfy the desires and 
needs of all stakeholders. Some scholars began to respond to the “failure” of the win-win 
approach by advocating for a return to a strict preservationist approach to PA management that 
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emphasized scientific management. The preservationist discourse argues that including social 
concerns in conservation strategies “dilutes” the achievement of high priority environmental 
goals such as preventing biodiversity loss (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Soule 2013). The strict 
preservationist approach shares many similarities with PA management strategies in the early 
20th century that advocated for the preservation of fragile natural ecosystems through scientific 
management techniques and local resident exclusion. Preservationist discourse retains a central 
place (McShane et al. 2011) in discussions regarding best PA environmental management 
practices, especially in PAs that protect endangered species that require large tracts of 
undisturbed habitat for survival. I will consider the successes of both PA management 
approaches, as well as their shortcomings. The thesis ultimately supports a tradeoffs model of PA 
management. The tradeoffs model attempts to find a middle path between win-win approaches 
and strict conservation by supporting active discussion and tradeoffs between specific 
conservation and development agendas. It recognizes both ecological conservation and social 
justice as valuable goals, but requires stakeholders to make concessions regarding some of their 
PA environmental strategies in order to best achieve their primary management priorities (Ibid). 
The thesis concludes by recommending four general PA environmental management 
strategies that may guide local and national decision-makers. These strategies adopt an 
interdisciplinary, participatory decision-making framework that attempts to counter existing 
critiques in the literature regarding the failure of PAs to simultaneously achieve environmental 
and social justice goals. I describe how each strategy may apply to Wolong Nature Reserve and 
Taroko National Park in order to demonstrate the strengths of each approach under varying 
circumstances. The strategies include: 1) Devise environmental strategies that are suited to the 
particular political, economic, cultural, historical, environmental, and religious contexts of the 
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PA 2) Respond to socio-economic activities and landscape changes outside the physical 
boundaries of the PA 3) Include local communities and indigenous people in all phases of 
environmental management  4) Establish concrete, participatory regulatory enforcement. 
 
PA Environmental Management Literature 
Win-Win Discourses - Successes 
 In order to understand the PA environmental management recommendations in this 
thesis, one must first understand the successes and failures of current PA environmental 
management strategies. Win-win strategies emerged in the 1980s alongside new international PA 
and human rights literatures that recognized and embraced environmental justice and human 
rights goals. This literature responded to PA management policies in the early 20th century that 
excluded local access to PA resources, and in the process harmed local economic livelihoods and 
cultural survival (Cronon 1995; McDonald 2002). From South Africa and Taiwan to the United 
States, PAs across the globe historically mistreated and displaced local residents, especially those 
under colonial rule (see Chapter 1). Win-win PA strategies were one of the first attempts to 
address past social injustices and to incorporate local economic development goals into PA 
conservation schemes. 
As early as 1982, the World Parks Congress released a statement that local people needed 
to be integrated into PA planning (Turner 2014). After the conference, win-win strategies 
became one of the fastest growing environmental management strategies worldwide. Between 
1988 and 2008, the number of World Bank projects that supported both biodiversity and poverty 
reduction goals quadrupled (Tallis et al. 2008). Win-win conservation approaches included debt-
for-nature swaps, community-based natural resource development, integrated conservation and 
development projects, and pro-poor conservation (Tallis et al. 2008; McShane et al. 2010). All of 
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these strategies shared a common assumption: PA management strategies could simultaneously 
improve local economic well-being while also promoting ecological preservation.  
The successes of win-win discourses are instructive for identifying approaches to 
environmental management that can serve social and environmental goals. Namibia’s 1996 
Nature Conservation Act is a classic example of community-oriented environmental 
management that produced economic as well as ecological benefits through a direct financial 
incentives system. Namibia is home to a variety of charismatic and critically endangered 
animals, including rhinos, elephants, lions, leopards, and cheetahs. Unfortunately, the country 
has had significant trouble with poaching and illegal trophy hunting (Conniff 2011). Namibia’s 
law, created in conjunction with the World Wildlife Fund, gave the ownership rights of wildlife 
populations to local communities, instead of the national government. In doing so, revenue from 
charismatic wildlife ecotourism and selective trophy hunting went directly to local communities, 
and gave people a material interest in preventing poaching and supporting environmental law 
enforcement. The law also took into account local economic survival strategies. It allowed local 
people to herd on community-managed lands, but reserved 30% of the PA as an exclusive 
wildlife protection zone (Ibid). 
By 2008, 17% of Namibia’s total land area was dedicated to community-managed 
conservancy land under the protection of the Conservation Act (Tallis et al. 2008). Anti-
poaching enforcement on community-managed land was so successful that in some areas, 
elephant and zebra populations increased by as much as 600%, and the government began 
relocating endangered animals from Namibia’s “overcrowded” national parks to “unfenced” 
community land (Conniff 2011). Local enforcement of environmental priorities was successful 
not only because of the financial incentives, but also because it was socially unacceptable for 
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local poachers to “steal” game from their neighbors, who now legally owned local wildlife 
populations (Ibid).  
The program also provided concrete economic benefits for the local community; by 2004, 
total local income increased by 2.5 million, and conservation programs were providing over 
3,000 part-time and 500 full-time jobs to local residents, many of whom were women (Conniff 
2011). The establishment of the National Conservation Act itself was a significant step toward 
redressing historical mistreatment of Namibia’s black people. Namibia experienced a period of 
racial apartheid, in which wealthy white private landowners exploited wildlife populations while 
excluding black people from the same benefits. By passing ownership of wildlife populations to 
the “subversive black community” (Ibid), the Namibian government attempted to redress the 
environmental injustice of past imperial colonial regimes. Namibia’s government recognized the 
inequitable treatment of the country’s black majority, and provided them with the opportunity to 
benefit economically from a conservation system that was no longer in the hands of an apartheid 
regime. In the process, Namibia’s community conservation initiatives allowed wildlife 
populations to recover and prosper while also providing economic benefits and livelihoods to 
historically disadvantaged communities. Namibia is representative of two of the primary goals of 
win-win PA strategies – to directly address social justice concerns related to PA management, 
and to reject isolationist PA models that negatively impact the livelihoods and cultures of local 
residents (Cronon 1995). 
 
Strict Preservation and the Win-Win Critique  
 Win-win strategies remain a popular PA management strategy among decision-makers 
today, because they promise to address all social, environmental, and economic issues facing the 
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PA and the local community. However, since the 1990s, a new PA discourse began to critique 
the win-win approach as an overambitious and underachieving conservation strategy with more 
failures than successes (Adams et al. 2004; Barret et al. 2004; Christensen 2004; Tallis et al. 
2008; McShane et al. 2011). While win-win did produce notable success stories in places like 
Namibia, an analysis of thirty-two World Bank projects17 between 1986 and 2006 revealed that 
only 16% made significant progress in achieving both conservation and poverty reduction goals 
(Tallis et al. 2008). In fact, at the 2003 World Park Congress, human rights activists and 
indigenous groups publicly critiqued the failure of win-win strategies to adequately improve 
local social conditions (Adams et al. 2004; Christensen 2004). On the other hand, 
conservationists such as Terborgh and Soulé argued that win-win strategies diverted resources to 
local economic development, and failed to adequately protect fragile ecosystems (Terborgh 
1999; Soulé 2013). 
 Why do the majority of win-win PA management approaches fail to produce adequate 
results for both conservation and development? The shortcomings of the win-win approach are 
outlined in the strict preservation PA literature. Strict preservation proponents make two major 
arguments that critique the win-win method, and propose an isolationist, scientific approach to 
PA management instead. First, conservation biologists argue that PAs are the “last safe havens” 
for the preservation of extensive, undisturbed habitat (Wilshusen et al. 2002). Without this 
protection, many key species of wildlife and fauna are at risk of extinction (Wilshusen et al. 
2002; Soulé 2013). In addition, biologists argue that the kinds of species that would persist under 
win-win conservation strategies are “nonthreatening, convenient plants and animals [in] 
                                                          
17 Namibia was a project supported by the Namibian central government and the World Wildlife Fund, and was 
unassociated with the World Bank. 
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domesticated landscapes,” as opposed to keystone species that help maintain ecosystem 
diversity, quality, and resiliency (Soulé 2013). The biologists identify human economic growth 
and population increase as the major causes of habitat destruction worldwide. As such, they 
argue that the strict protection of fragile ecosystems is necessary in order to prevent mass 
extinction, which is impossible with win-win strategies that promote continued human use of 
natural habitats. 
 The second major critique of win-win strategies is shared by many PA scholars beyond 
the strict preservationist community. They argue that win-win strategies assume biodiversity and 
sustainable economic development are inherently compatible, despite the lack of concrete 
evidence supporting this ideal (Barrett et al. 2004; Christensen 2004; Blom et al. 2010; Soulé 
2013). For example, win-win approaches often assume that local people will stop exploiting 
natural resources in PAs if they receive higher incomes or economic substitutes. This assumption 
ignores the cultural, political and economic context of the PA that may encourage local 
communities to maintain their reliance on PA ecosystem services (Wilshusen et al. 2002). 
Similarly, many win-win discourses valorize the role of the “ecologically noble savage” in 
preserving conservation goals. This outlook assumes that local indigenous people always protect 
the environment, without critically assessing real-world situations where “local” communities 
exploit natural resources (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Christensen 2004; Soulé 2013). A wide range of 
PA scholars argue that win-win discourses need a more nuanced understanding of “local 
communities” and their role in environmental stewardship.  
While many scholars raise these concerns, what distinguishes the arguments of strict 
preservationist proponents is that they argue that it is impossible to attain sustainable 
development without sacrificing environmental ideals, as proved by the failure of win-win 
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strategies worldwide to produce tangible benefits for conservation and development goals. 
Conservation biologists argue that win-win strategies expect conservationists to address all 
social and environmental issues in the PA, from poverty reduction and social justice concerns to 
environmental conservation and restoration (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Soulé 2013). By trying to 
“do it all,” win-win strategies inadvertently sacrifice the goals of conservation for those of 
development, or vice versa (Ibid). Strict preservationist schemes argue that conservationists 
should focus on one achievable goal, ecological preservation, and exclude other social 
imperatives that could not be successfully solved by environmental management strategies in the 
first place.     
 Strict preservation emphasize the importance of preventing large-scale wildlife 
extinction, preserving large tracts of land for ecological purposes, and the dangers of dividing PA 
conservation strategies into too many conflicting management goals. Indeed, win-win strategies 
need to move beyond discourses that assume that poverty reduction automatically produces 
conservation benefits (Blom et al. 2010; Soulé 2013), and to recognize the complexities of PA 
management from a socioeconomic and biophysical perspective (Barret et al. 2004; McShane et 
al. 2011). That being said, strict preservation approaches to PA conservation have their own 
limitations. For example, successful PA conservation programs must consider the ecological 
imperative to protect fragile ecosystems across the globe. However, strict preservation also needs 
to consider how to enforce these ecological goals (Wilshusen et al. 2002). In many cases, 
exclusionary PA systems may not be effective or politically possible. For example, in certain 
cases, community conservation efforts are the only alternative to large-scale extractive logging 
that is much more destructive to the environment than local consumption. While preserving 
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fragile ecosystems from human activity is certain important, one must consider which policy 
decisions are feasible under particular political and social circumstances. 
Strict preservation also assumes that the failure of win-win strategies is due to the 
inherent incompatibility of conservation and economic development. However, in many cases, 
win-win strategies failed on the ground due to the social, political, and economic circumstances 
of the particular PA (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Blom et al. 2010; McShane et al. 2011). For 
example, the World Bank adopted the West African Wildlife Project in 1995. The project was 
similar to Namibia’s conservation program, and attempted to involve local communities in the 
sustainable exploitation and ecotourism of wildlife populations (Tallis et al. 2008). Despite its 
similarities to the Namibia case study, the West African Wildlife Project failed to prevent 
poaching or to improve local livelihoods. An analysis of the program concluded that it was 
primarily unsuccessful because of infrastructure and political issues, including the start of civil 
war, the lack of judicial systems to punish poachers, limited monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities, and ineffective local training programs (Ibid). Even when local people attempted to 
enforce wildlife preservation, they did not have the means to do so.  
By assuming that win-win strategies fail due to the incompatibility of social and 
environmental goals, strict preservation discourses presume that a dichotomy exists between 
“pro-human” and “pro-nature” PA management strategies (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Roe and Elliot 
2006). In this zero-sum game, conservationists cannot negotiate a balance between social and 
environment goals; instead, they must prioritize the intrinsic rights of nature over human rights 
through exclusionary practices (Wilshusen et al. 2002). The dichotomy undermines dialogue and 
negotiation in the PA environmental decision-making process. It also obscures the social and 
political complexities inherent in PA management that may be causing the failure of both win-
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win and strict preservationist approaches. Strict preservation approaches that attempt to engage 
scientific, environmental management strategies are already embedded into political, social, 
religious, cultural, and environmental contexts. As such, the success of preservationist goals 
depends on their political and social viability. At the same time, PA management strategies 
necessarily shape social and political realities. While conservationists cannot be expected to 
solve all social and environmental ills within the PA, PA management strategies that do not 
recognize their involvement in causing local economic hardship or displacement risk replicating 
colonial PA systems from the early 20th century. Despite the flaws of both approaches, win-win 
and strict preservationist discourses remain significant in international debates about PA 
management. 
 
Tradeoff Discourse – Negotiating Conservation and Development Goals   
Instead of adopting a win-win approach that assumes an inherent link between 
conservation and development approaches or a strict preservationist approach that excludes 
human rights needs in exchange for nature conservation, the tradeoffs approach to PA 
management of the 2000s adopts elements of both approaches. It advocates for a PA 
management system in which multiple stakeholders identify and explicitly acknowledge the 
tradeoffs between their various management goals, and attempts to reconcile the ones that 
conflict with one another. The approach presumes that PA management requires stakeholders to 
prioritize between different interests and values, and at different spatial and temporal scales 
(McShane et al. 2011). For example, local communities may value a forest ecosystem as a source 
of livelihood, and seek to protect species that provide them with medicines, food, and fuel. On 
the other hand, international non-profit organizations may seek to protect endangered species 
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with less direct value to the local population (Roe and Elliot 2006; Blom et al. 2010). The 
tradeoffs discourse suggests that stakeholders must discuss these different valuations of nature, 
and choose to protect elements of each. In contrast, in win-win strategies, choices regarding 
which natures are most important to preserve were often made implicitly, because environmental 
management schemes could not respond to all social and environmental goals at the PAs 
(McShane et al. 2011). The tradeoffs discourse encourages individuals to explicitly identify 
tradeoffs in order to develop better designed and resilient PA initiatives.   
A recent example of an effective tradeoffs environmental management strategy is the 
establishment of the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia that culminated in February 2016 
(Hunter 2016). The PA will conserve 85% of the old growth trees in the world’s largest intact 
temperate rainforest, a land mass twenty times larger than Rhode Island (Hunter 2016; Schloredt 
2016). As late as the 1990s, less than 10% of the rainforest was protected from large-scale 
logging practices in the forest. The rainforest is home to endangered cedar, spruce, and Douglas 
fir trees, and to salmon, wolves, grizzly bears, and cougars. Twenty-seven indigenous First 
Nations reside within the rainforest, and consider the forest to be a sacred place, as well as a 
source of livelihood (Schloredt 2016).  
The Great Bear Rainforest Plan is the result of a 16-year negotiation between lumber 
companies, the 27 First Nations, non-profit environmental organization, and British Columbia’s 
provincial government. Negotiations first began after intense protesting and media attention 
against logging in the forest in the 1990s (Schloredt 2016). Originally, environmental groups 
developed a draft rainforest agreement in 2007, but it did not take into account the local culture 
of First Nations. After indigenous people became one of the main decision-makers in the 
process, the revised agreement incorporated indigenous rights to a share in timber profits, and a 
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15 million dollar investment into First Nation economic development by the provincial 
government (Hunter 2016). The plan still allows logging companies to extract 2.5 million cubic 
meters of wood annually for the next ten years. However, logging practices will be subject to 
scientifically defined stable harvest levels, and are now one of the most strictly regulated 
commercial logging standards in North America (Ibid).  
The tradeoffs model adopted by the Great Bear Rainforest Plan diverges from win-win 
strategies in two important ways. First, the Great Bear Forest Plan recognized that in order to 
achieve its main priority, the protection of old growth forest, it would have to make concessions 
agreeable to logging companies who were previously allowed to log over 90% of the forest 
(Ibid). Environmental groups realized that given historical logging practices in the forest, 
extractive industries would not agree to a ban of all logging activities in the Great Bear Forest. 
Environmental groups made the choice to allow 15% of the forest to be subject to sustainable 
logging; in exchange, they protected 85% of Great Bear’s fragile old growth forests. While the 
plan was not a full “win”’ for the environment due to the continuation of Great Bear logging, it is 
notable for halting the majority of destructive extractive practices, and replacing them with 
community-based conservation and scientific sustainable forestry measures. Second, the Great 
Bear Rainforest Plan decision-making process included multiple stakeholders from all scales, 
especially indigenous populations. While win-win discourses advocated for indigenous 
involvement in PA decision-making, in practice PA management remained top-down, and local 
participation was token at best (Blom et al. 2010). In contrast, indigenous people were one of the 
primary stakeholders involved in the Great Bear Rainforest Plan, and significantly altered the 
original PA plan written by environmental groups (Schloredt 2016). Tradeoff models actively 
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include multiple stakeholders in decision-making practices, and asks each group to reconcile 
their competing social, economic, and environmental claims.  
  
PA Environmental Management Strategies  
 The successes and failures of the win-win, strict preservation, and tradeoff discourses 
provide a basis for creating practical PA environmental management recommendations. The 
following recommendations attempt to create a participatory decision-making processes that is 
open to many PA stakeholders. It also acknowledges social and environmental concerns 
explicitly. I will use Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National Park as case studies in order 
to demonstrate the ways in which the recommendations can be applied to PAs with different 
local contexts. 
 
1) Devise environmental strategies that are suited to the particular political, economic, cultural, 
historical, environmental, and religious contexts of the PA 
 One of the weaknesses of the win-win and strict preservationist approaches is their 
simplification of the social, political, historical, and economic climate in which the PA exists. 
The win-win literature often assumes that promoting local economic growth will facilitate 
increased biological preservation, without considering that local conditions such as difficult 
political climates, human mobility, ambiguous land tenure, corruption, and illegal natural 
resource extraction may negatively impact the success of the PA (Roe and Elliot 2006). On the 
other hand, strict preservationist discourses attempt to address conservation issues only, and 
ignore the fact that PAs are necessarily a part of pre-existing social and political dynamics 
(Barett et al. 2004; Christensen 2004). As such, both PA management models often fail to 
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produce adequate results in practice because they do not consider the feasibility of PAs within 
their local contexts (Blom et al. 2010; McShane et al. 2011). PA environmental management 
must take into account a host of factors that shape the implementation and feasibility of 
environmental projects. 
 For example, the unique historical, political, and cultural circumstances of Taroko 
National Park and Wolong Nature Reserve determines the types of management strategies that 
are possible in each location, and that would be most effective. Taiwan’s indigenous people have 
had a long history of colonial domination and erasure. With the rise of democracy and the 
indigenous rights movement in Taiwan (Simon 2007), the Taroko indigenous people have the 
political freedom to pursue equitable environmental management strategies at Taroko National 
Park. Park managers and central government officials also have a moral obligation to incorporate 
local decision-making, because the park and its government managers were partially responsible 
for indigenous displacement, cultural erasure, and colonial domination. To this day, park 
managers bar the Taroko indigenous from exercising their cultural hunting rights within park 
premises (Simon 2013), even though the Taiwan central government legalized indigenous 
cultural hunting throughout the nation. Under these circumstances, Taroko National Park’s 
environmental management strategies must be developed in tandem with local indigenous 
communities, or else risk exacerbating local stakeholders who consider top-down exclusionary 
environmental management to be an extension of colonialism (Ming-ching et al. 2015). Taroko 
indigenous people have already asked park managers to establish a PA co-management 
committee that includes both park managers and local residents (Simon 2013). By giving local 
people shared decision-making power, Taroko national park managers signal to local people that 
the park values and responds to local needs, and is willing to consider alternative environmental 
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management strategies that do not exclude them. The approach has the potential to decrease 
illegal Taroko hunting in park lands through co-managed environmental schemes that recognize 
both Taroko religious and cultural beliefs as well as scientific sustainable hunting techniques. 
 Another way that Taroko park managers can address the historical erasure of Taroko 
indigenous people and their cultural/religious legacy is to develop educational materials 
regarding Taroko history and culture into the park’s ecotourism and employee training sessions. 
Taroko already has three educational centers (Wu 1996), and only one discusses the existence of 
local indigenous people. Taroko park managers could allow Taroko indigenous people to have 
the chance to represent themselves in these exhibits, and to educate the six million annual 
visitors of the park (Crook 2015). The educational programs could begin to soften Taroko 
perceptions of the colonial Taroko park management, and provide indigenous people with 
visibility, employment opportunities, and the right to represent themselves in national park 
discourses. 
 In contrast, Wolong Nature Reserve is not in a political position to establish co-
management committees. The Chinese central government forbids public organizing that 
questions their political authority. Furthermore, indigenous resistance to national policies has 
historically resulted in forced suppression (Barnett 1998). Under these circumstances, the central 
government could consider Wolong environmental management strategies that provide local 
Tibetan indigenous people with decision-making power as a political threat. The central 
government also has considerable economic and political investment in giant panda preservation. 
As such, it is unlikely that they would consider community environmental management 
strategies that allow local residents to collect firewood and other goods from Wolong’s forests. 
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Instead, environmental management strategies at Wolong may necessarily exclude local people 
from decision-making processes.  
That being said, Wolong Nature Reserve can still develop environmental strategies that 
are politically feasible and that consider local needs. For example, the majority of Wolong’s 
local population is involved in temporary wage labor (Liu et al. 2016B). These jobs increase the 
economic vulnerability of local people and the likelihood that they will disturb fragile Wolong 
forest habitat for subsistence purposes. As such, Wolong Nature Reserve should develop policies 
that provide local communities with sustainable economic options that reduce local dependence 
on agriculture and logging. The central and regional government, in conjunction with park 
managers, have the responsibility to provide economic alternatives for Wolong residents, 
because they are responsible for barring local residents from using the forest’s resources as a 
source of income, thereby creating local economic insecurity.  
With support from government officials, Wolong Nature Reserve could establish full-
time job quotas for local employment and provide training programs for local people who cannot 
access job markets because they do not speak Mandarin Chinese. The reserve could also 
redistribute a percentage of the park’s ecotourism funds and subsidize local necessities such as 
electricity. Families without electricity gather firewood for cooking and heating, and disturb 
Wolong’s forest habitats (Liu et al. 2003). However, because the price of electricity at Wolong 
has tripled in recent years, many families simply cannot afford electricity (Liu and Wu 1999; Liu 
et al. 2001; Liu et al. 2003).  
It is important to note that providing economic opportunities for local Wolong residents 
alone may not eliminate local consumption of Wolong’s forest resources, and decision-makers 
should not assume that economic prosperity necessarily results in better environmental 
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management by local stakeholders. Economic policies should be adopted in conjunction with 
other environmental management strategies such as existing anti-logging incentive policies in 
order to enhance environmental management at Wolong Nature Reserve. 
Wolong Nature Reserve has already adopted several economic programs such as the 
Grain to Green program (see chapter 3) that are intended to both preserve the environment and 
increase local income. These programs are subsidized by the central government; the nation-
wide implementation of the GGP alone cost 7.6 billion dollars (Liu et al. 2016B). The high cost 
of these regulations makes it unlikely that they will be renewed in the long-term.  In fact, the 
GGP program expires this year. Once financial incentive programs like the GGP retire, local 
communities will lose another stable source of income that incentivized stewardship behavior. 
China’s central government should consider sustainable funding sources so that they can 
continue to pay for incentive programs in the long-term. At Wolong Nature Reserve, which 
receive over 200,000 tourists a year (He et al. 2008), programs like GGP could possibly be 
funded through redistributed ecotourism revenues alone. At PAs with fewer tourists, the central 
government may need to consider alternative strategies, such as taxing existing extractive 
industries for their environmental damages, and using this money to subsidize environmental 
programs. 
Even with the aforementioned economic safeguards, Wolong’s residents may 
occasionally face difficult economic circumstances for which they have no economic safeguard. 
For example, Wolong’s population consists of over 80% farmers (Ghimire 1994), and a famine 
could threaten local survival. Under these circumstances, local residents are likely to harvest 
food and medicinal resources from Wolong’s forests illegally. Park managers should consider 
implementing environmental strategies to deal with famine and crises situations and allow 
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residents to utilize local resources in a sustainable manner.18 For example, Wolong scientists 
could help the reserve locate particular regions of the PA where medicinal plants could be 
harvested more heavily and with limited impact on the local ecosystem. For the year of famine 
only, local residents could be allowed to gather additional herbs in these designated regions, as 
opposed to illegally gathering plants elsewhere and disturbing Wolong’s fragile ecosystem. The 
famine strategy recognizes that environmental contexts and realities change. Wolong park 
managers need project designs and implementation strategies that reflect the changing needs of 
Wolong’s ecosystem and of local residents (Barret et al. 2004; Blom et al. 2010; McShane et al. 
2011).    
The political, cultural, economic, and environmental conditions at Wolong Nature 
Reserve and Taroko National Park require each PA to adopt different environmental 
management strategies. Indeed, co-management strategies that are essential at Taroko for 
redressing historical Taroko mistreatment and embracing indigenous rights could be politically 
dangerous to the well-being of Wolong residents.19 In addition, park managers must consider that 
political and economic circumstances limit the effectiveness of environmental management 
strategies. Park managers may need to choose between rampant illegal local consumption of 
forest resources and a low level of local consumption during periods of famine.20 While neither 
                                                          
18 While the central government still supports Wolong environmental management strategies that make all forms of 
local gathering of forest resources illegal, park managers in China have a great deal of authority to implement laxer 
regulations. In fact, Wolong residents continued to depend on forest resources long after legislation banned these 
actions in the 1980s (Ministry of Forestry & WWF 1989). 
19 Another example of an environmental management scheme that worked well in one context and not another is 
Namibia’s community management schemes based on trophy hunting and ecotourism. Even though Wolong also 
possesses charismatic animals that could promote ecotourism, Wolong’s giant panda tourism mostly depends on the 
PA’s captive panda population. Wild pandas who depend on Wolong’s forest habitats for survival are elusive and 
hardly even seen by local residents, let alone tourists (Ghimire 1994). Unlike Namibia (Conniff 2011), Wolong 
residents are not in a political situation to retain ownership of wild pandas. As such, local residents would not have 
an incentive to protect wild panda populations, and their protection would not enhance tourism operations.  
20 The benefit of legalizing local consumption under certain circumstances is that park managers can regulate local 
behavior. For example, they can apply scientific forestry concepts such as maximum sustainable yield to local 
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management strategy is ideal in a fragile ecosystem, regulated local consumption during crises 
situations may be necessary to prevent more destructive local practices. 
 
2) Respond to socio-economic activities and landscape changes outside the physical boundaries 
of the PA 
 PA win-win and strict preservationist strategies traditionally adopt environmental 
management schemes focused within the physical boundaries of the PA. However, PAs are 
embedded into wider physical, social, political, and economic landscapes, and conditions outside 
the PA frequently impact the success of environmental management within the PAs. For 
example, Wolong residents are increasingly turning to volatile wage labor jobs outside of the 
reserve for the majority of their income (Liu et al. 2016B). As such, the conditions of wage labor 
in cities surrounding Wolong greatly impact local economic security, and by extension, the need 
of local residents to consume forest resources that degrade the quality of Wolong’s forest 
habitats. Local recession and layoff of temporary workers in neighboring cities could have 
detrimental impacts on Wolong’s residents and on the environment. Wolong park managers 
should consider working with provincial and central government officials to adopt economic 
opportunities for Wolong residents that increase their resiliency in outside job markets. Training 
programs for local residents in Mandarin Chinese and in basic job skills may help local residents 
attain permanent jobs that are less volatile to changing economic circumstances in China.21  
                                                          
consumption patterns, and require local communities to harvest certain trees or species during particular seasons. In 
contrast, illegal forest resource harvesting is likely to be much more destructive to the environment.  
21 Typically, PA management only adopts job creation schemes and training programs directly associated with the 
PA, such as creating park manager and construction jobs (Thompson and Peepre 2000; Australian Government 
2015). This thesis proposes that PA managers should consider expanding local job opportunities beyond the 
boundaries of the PA, with the help of provincial and central government officials. This economic strategy more 
accurately reflects current employment trends for Wolong residents, and provides a wider range of opportunities for 
local people.   
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PAs should also consider the physical landscapes that surround it, and the land 
management strategies adopted by these adjacent environments. For example, external threats 
such as plantation expansion, population migration, and extractive industries often have much 
greater environmental impacts on PAs than local consumption (Christensen 2004; Blom et al. 
2010; McShane 2011). This was especially the case at Taroko National Park, where mining 
operations both within and outside the park ceased water flow in one of the park’s waterways (Li 
2014). At Wolong Nature Reserve, logging companies continued to destroy forest ecosystems 
around the reserve until 1999, when the Chinese government banned logging in the forests 
surrounding Wolong (People’s Gov 2002). Interestingly, Wolong’s forests and panda 
populations did not begin to recover until after logging operations outside of the park ceased 
(Liu et al. 2003; Liu et al. 2016B). The physical boundaries of a PA do not impact the movement 
of human and animal populations between PA and outside territories. Environmental damages 
that occur outside PA boundaries may also have a profound effect on the PA, especially on 
wildlife such as the giant panda that require large tracts of land for their survival. For example, 
small wildlife populations (i.e. metapopulations) that are surrounded by inhospitable habitats are 
isolated from other members of their species and can become locally extinct, or in the case of the 
giant panda, globally extinct (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2008).  
In 2006, the Chinese central government halted all mining and logging operations22 in the 
close proximity to Wolong Nature Reserve by establishing a World Heritage Panda Sanctuary 
(People’s Gov 2002). The sanctuary is over three times larger than Wolong, and protects the 
                                                          
22 Another important consideration is the ways in which PAs have multi-scalar impacts on other environments. For 
example, China’s Natural Forest Conservation Act increased forest cover by 1.6% of its land area. As a result, China 
tripled its imports of endangered Myanmar rosewood in 2013 alone (Minter 2016). Even though logging bans in 
Wolong are essential for protecting panda habitat, one must consider the tradeoffs between protecting ecosystems 
services in Wolong, as opposed to fragile forest ecosystems in Myanmar and other countries. 
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physical landscapes surrounding Wolong from extractive industries. It also connects Wolong’s 
forest habitats to fifteen other national parks, scenic areas, and nature reserves (Ibid). While the 
sanctuary is a great first step towards acknowledging the importance of protecting habitats 
outside of the PA, the policy should be expanded to include environmental management 
strategies for the protection of not only the giant panda but also the entire forest ecosystem. For 
example, while giant pandas require large tracts of undisturbed habitat for survival, Wolong’s 
other keystone species may have different habitat requirements. Additional scientific studies are 
needed to identify the needs of Wolong’s ecosystems, as opposed to the giant panda alone. 
Furthermore, Wolong park managers may wish to consider environmental management 
strategies that promote the growth of wild medicinal plants and trees that could supplement the 
income of local residents.   
 
3) Include local communities and indigenous people in all phases of environmental management   
 Historically, win-win discourses argued that community engagement was a key to the 
success of PA management strategies. However, in practice, win-win strategies often adopted 
top-down decision-making structures with token community participation (Blom et al. 2010). As 
a result, win-win strategies have often resulted in implicit tradeoffs between environmental 
priorities, and unequitable distribution of PA benefits to different stakeholders. For example, 
PAs such as Taroko National Park preserve natural ecosystems for the benefit of an international 
public good, but at the expense of local indigenous Taroko people’s livelihoods (Roe and Elliot 
2006; Blom et al. 2010; McShane et al. 2011).  
Ideally, PA environmental management should include allow a range of stakeholders to 
identify and reconcile their different understandings and valuations of nature, as well as address 
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their other economic and cultural needs. As discussed in the third and fourth chapter of this 
thesis, government officials, scientists, park managers, and local communities adopt multiple, 
nested, and overlapping definitions of the environment (Barett et al. 2004). The tradeoffs model 
allows all stakeholders to negotiate their various interests, and reconcile those that do not align 
(Christensen 2004). That being said, park management needs to consider that PA stakeholders 
are not equally impacted by PA environmental management schemes. For example, Taroko 
National Park management doesn’t endanger the livelihoods and cultural survival of 
international non-profit organizations. In addition, local residents and indigenous people often 
have few financial and political resources, and have historically been excluded from PA 
decision-making processes. As such, while this thesis supports a multi-stakeholder decision-
making approach to PA environmental management, it explicitly highlights the necessity to 
include local residents and indigenous people in all aspects of PA decision-making processes. 
 At a minimum, park managers should inform local residents of adopted environmental 
management strategies because of the policy impacts associated with them. For example, at 
Wolong Nature Reserve, surveys of local residents in 2003 showed that over 85% did not know 
what constituted the PA’s core zones, despite the fact that all local activities are banned in these 
areas (Xu et al. 2006). Instead, residents gathered firewood and food items from all parts of 
Wolong’s forests without regard for zoning. However, in most cases, communication with local 
residents is simply not enough to address social equity or environmental priorities efficiently. 
Consider the adoption of state-sponsored tourism at Wolong Nature Reserve (He 2008). State 
officials adopted a top-down approach to ecotourism development, and did not consult local 
residents. Even though residents were aware that they could financially benefit from tourists by 
running bed-and-breakfasts and selling local handicrafts, the majority of them did not have the 
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capital investment necessary to start small businesses (Ibid). Residents who successfully started 
small businesses did not make significant amounts of profit, because tourists preferred to stay at 
large state-owned housing facilities. Without local resident involvement in the planning and 
implementation of ecotourism schemes, Wolong residents only received 4.7% of ecotourism 
revenues in 2008 (Liu et al. 2016A). 
 In contrast, environmental management strategies that actively include local residents in 
all aspects of the decision-making process tend to address environmental and social priorities 
more effectively (e.g. Great Bear Forest and Namibia). Such strategies allow local residents to 
discuss and implement strategies that address their needs and concerns (Roe and Elliot 2006; 
Blom et al. 2010). PAs with inclusive decision-making consider more than government or 
international organization priorities of protecting rare and endangered species and habitats, and 
also value locally significant species that have cultural significance or provide food and shelter 
(Roe and Elliot 2006).  
Local resident inclusion in decision-making processes is necessary at Taroko National 
Park, where present top-down management strategies persist and illegal local harvesting of food 
and forest resources is prevalent. For example, hunting remains illegal within park boundaries, 
despite the fact that Taroko indigenous people are allowed to hunt for cultural reasons in any 
region of Taiwan (Simon 2010; Simon 2013). Taroko National Park could establish a co-
management committee in which park managers, Taroko indigenous people, government 
officials, scientists, and other stakeholders have equal decision-making power regarding 
environmental management at the park. Together, the committee could determine sustainable 
Taroko hunting privileges and seasons within the national park that was sustainable according to 
scientific studies as well as culturally sensitive to Taroko Gaya practices. Under some 
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circumstances, scientists may discover that current wildlife populations may be unable to support 
Taroko hunting. If so, Taroko indigenous people in the co-management committee may opt to 
tradeoff their right to hunt certain endangered animals, in exchange for other rights, such as 
asking for non-religious subsistence hunting of animal populations that are more plentiful. 
Alternatively, Taroko indigenous people could request that the park allocate more jobs for local 
people within the park, in exchange for reduced hunting privileges. The goal of inclusionary 
local and indigenous decision-making is to recognize and address local understandings of nature 
and subsistence needs that are frequently excluded from PA management schemes. Even when 
environmental strategies tradeoff local subsistence rights for other environmental priorities, local 
communities have the opportunity to decide for themselves which management strategies they 
prefer (McShane et al. 2011), without having environmental strategies imposed upon them. 
While inclusionary decision-making is a valuable PA management strategy, it is 
important to recognize that local communities and indigenous groups are not “static, 
homogenous or generalizable” entities (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Christensen 2004; Blom et al. 
2010). Historically, win-win strategies failed to produce adequate economic benefits to 
‘communities’ because they assumed they were uniform entities that could be regulated 
homogenously. As a consequence, win-win strategies tended to benefit elite members of 
indigenous groups, while the majority of the population continued to be excluded from economic 
benefits and continued to degrade forest resources (Blom et al. 2010). As such, PA 
environmental management strategies must carefully consider how to engage with many 
different parts of local “communities,” including members of different genders, ages, classes, 
and ethnic groups. 
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Heterogeneity of local communities is especially important to consider at Taroko 
National Park, where historical rivalries between three Taroko sub-ethnic groups remain central 
to indigenous politics today.  The Truku sub-group composes 85% of the Taroko indigenous 
population, while the Tkdaya and Tuda make up the other 15% (Chi and Chin 2012). The Tuda 
assisted Japanese forces in violently subduing Truku resistance in the early 1900s (Simon 2006; 
Simon 2007). Truku people remain hostile towards the Tuda. With Truku elites possessing most 
of the political roles in Taroko communities, Tkedaya and Tuda opinions are often excluded in 
policy decisions. For example, with the support of elite Truku politicians, The Taroko indigenous 
people became officially recognized as an indigenous group by the central Taiwanese 
government in 2004 (Simon 2011). However, the Taroko became recognized under the name of 
“Truku,” effectively erasing the other two sub-ethnic groups from indigenous discourses (Chi 
and Chin 2012). 
Inner community politics also affects the success of government programs that attempt to 
engage with “local communities.” The central Taiwanese government, along with academic 
experts, helped the Taroko indigenous people undertake a project to map their traditional 
territory in the 2000s (Ibid). Official maps of tribal territory are an important political tool for 
indigenous groups when asserting their subsistence rights in certain locations, such as Taroko 
National Park. Mapping is a highly subjective process, especially because the Truku, Tkedaya, 
and Tuda often occupied the same land at different periods of time. Unfortunately, only Truku 
elites were involved in the mapping process, and often labeled land where present Tuda live as 
Truku “traditional territory” (Chi and Chin 2012). The Taroko indigenous tribe mapping process 
provides a cautionary example of the difficulties in engaging with heterogeneous societies, even 
when government and NGO decision-makers involve local “community” members. If Taroko 
147 
 
National Park decides to create a co-management board with indigenous involvement, the board 
must ensure that Taroko representatives include a variety of local people from each of the three 
sub-groups, as well as members from different classes, ages, and genders.  
 
4) Establish concrete, participatory regulatory enforcement. 
PA scholars suggest that the establishment of PA environmental legislation is valuable, 
but that PA enforcement mechanisms often determine the efficacy of these programs (Barett et 
al. 2004). Enforcement strategies are a particular concern in China, because the country has a 
large number of “paper parks” whose environmental regulations are not implemented in practice 
(Quan 2011; see Chapter 2). At Wolong Nature Reserve, one of the most effective environmental 
strategies, the National Forest Conservation Program, financially incentivized local residents to 
protect tracts of forestland from illegal harvesting (Liu et al. 2016B). In contrast, regulations 
barring local collection of food, firewood, and medicinal items from Wolong’s forests remain 
poorly enforced. Similarly, at Taroko National Park, Taroko indigenous people continue to 
practice their traditional cultural and religious hunting practices on park premises, despite the 
fact that the park has effective police forces who hunters harshly (Simon 2010; Simon 2013). At 
both Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National Park, top-down enforcement mechanisms 
seem ineffective in preventing local people from hunting and gathering forest resources for 
subsistence purposes. Instead of adding additional security to the reserves, PAs should consider 
enforcement strategies that are cognizant of the root causes of local subsistence activity.  
Taroko National Park should consider adopting participatory enforcement mechanisms in 
which both PA managers and indigenous hunters help create and enforce culturally-sensitive 
environmental regulations such as hunting seasons and zones. For example, before Japanese 
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colonization, Taroko hunters fiercely defended their hunting territories from outsiders (Simon 
2006); in the process, they ensured that they did not overharvest animal populations, because 
only a small number of Taroko people hunted in each territory (Simon 2013). Taroko National 
Park can learn from the example of Namibia’s Nature Conservation Act, where local people 
enforced anti-poaching regulations and reported illegal poaching activity directly to their local 
leaders, as opposed to government officials or park managers who were strangers to local 
enforcers (Conniff 2011). Like Namibia, Taroko National Park faces illegal poaching concerns 
from within the community itself. A participatory enforcement system led by local residents may 
be especially effective in the case of Taroko National Park, because many indigenous Taroko 
view the park as a “colonial” force imposed upon them (Simon 2013), and reject current 
enforcement mechanisms instated by park police.   
That being said, the complexities of Taroko political and ethnic issues may pose 
challenges for establishing equitable, participatory enforcement schemes at the national park. For 
example, the majority of the indigenous people who will be chosen to enforce the park’s 
environmental regulations will most likely come from the Truku ethnic sub-group, who make up 
85% of the Taroko population. Truku enforcers may attempt to police the boundaries of their 
traditional hunting territories at the expense of the remaining two sub-ethnic groups, who have 
less political power and visibility. Indeed, Truku elites have already claimed substantial amounts 
of Tuda and Tkdaya “traditional lands” as belonging to the Truku (Chi and Chin 2012). Given 
the internal divisions among the Taroko community, environmental management schemes such 
as Namibia’s return of wildlife ownership to indigenous populations are impossible in Taroko 
National Park without exacerbating existing community inequalities. As such, mechanisms must 
be in place to ensure a diversity of actors in environmental enforcement and decision-making.  
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At Wolong Nature Reserve, local resident participation in decision-making processes and 
enforcement mechanisms may be impossible, due to the unfavorable political climate. The 
provincial and national government should consider strengthening existing top-down 
management schemes such as the National Forestry Conservation Act that subsidize local 
enforcement of anti-logging mechanisms within Wolong (Liu et al. 2016B). However, park 
managers and government officials should also consider alternative strategies that reduce the 
need for enforcement. For example, by providing economic opportunities and training for local 
residents both within the park and in the surrounding community, park managers and 




The diversity of PA management strategies at Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko 
National Park demonstrates the importance of considering the local historical, cultural, religious, 
economic, political, and environmental contexts of PAs. While recognizing the many “natures” 
present at PAs across the globe is essential for reinterpreting PA literature within an 
interdisciplinary context, it is also essential for creating practical PA management strategies that 
produce tangible environmental and social justice results. For example, at Wolong Nature 
Reserve, PA decision-making is necessarily top-down due to political constraints on Tibetan 
indigenous people. However, similar exclusionary policies are inappropriate in democratic 
Taiwan, and likely to exacerbate existing conflicts between Taroko park managers and Taroko 
indigenous people. The goal of a tradeoffs PA management model is to allow stakeholders to 
identify and reconcile their numerous valuations of “nature” by sacrificing some of their 
management priorities for the sake of achieving more important environmental and social justice 
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goals. In contrast, win-win approaches in the 1980s attempted to satisfy the management goals of 
all stakeholders, but were unable to accomplish them (Blom et al. 2010). Instead, tradeoff models 
adopt interdisciplinary approaches to PA management that explicitly addresses not only the 
environmental contexts but also the social, cultural, political, historical, and economic 
circumstances of the PA. This thesis argues that adopting this interdisciplinary approach to PA 
management is crucial if PAs wish to successfully engage with PA environmental and social 
justice concerns.  
Even though environmental management at Wolong Nature Reserve and Taroko National 
Park has begun to incorporate the needs of local people into PA strategies, it is important to 
recognize that the strict preservationist schemes of past management eras that banned local 
subsistence persist into the present. The intercurrence of exclusionary and inclusionary 
environmental management schemes may pose enforcement challenges to PA tradeoff strategies. 
In order to engage with the complexity of “natures” at each PA, decision-makers and 
stakeholders must be willing to consider alternative PA management strategies that incorporate 
social as well as environmental goals, and that change existing PA practices to incorporate more 
flexibility for PA actors. By acknowledging PA diversity and by actively incorporating local 
indigenous people into PA decision-making processes, stakeholders have the opportunity to 
construct PAs that address the issues most precious to involved stakeholders, from creating 
economic alternatives for local residents and preserving fragile ecosystems to fostering national 







Figure 1  Wolong Nature Reserves is located in central Sichuan province. It borders the slopes of the 
Tibetan highlands to the west. The map also shows forest cover and the location of human 




Figure 2 Tibet is China’s second largest autonomous region. It was incorporated into the PRC in 





















Figure 3   Location of core, buffer, and experimental zones at Wolong Nature Reserve. Note that 
since 1998, Wolong residencies have been designated as experimental zones (Hull et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 4  Major cities and national parks in Taiwan. Taroko National Park is one of Taiwan’s 
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